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PREFACE
When the Convention ruled France, the revolutionary 
government instituted représentants en mission. The task 
of these representatives on mission was to organize the new 
provincial governments and to supervise the French revolu­
tionary armies and their generals in the field. Given wide 
latitude, they were largely on their own. If revolutionary 
France was to have an army capable of meeting the forces of 
Europe, she had to entrust the army's leadership to former 
officers of the king who could not be fully trusted. Thus, 
the representatives on mission had the duty to oversee the 
loyalty of these officers. As to the success or failure 
of these first political commissars, historians have ever 
since differed. To some, they were meddling civilians who 
knew nothing of military affairs; to others, they were 
champions of liberty, democracy, and the rights of the com­
mon soldier. It seems unlikely that the controversy can be 
adequately settled, since France's revolutionary armies 
were victorious as well as defeated both with and without 
them. A similar statement can be made concerning the Red 
Army's on-again off-again experiments along the same path.
I l l
When the bolsheviks created the Red Army during 
the Russian Revolution, they instituted a system similar 
to that of revolutionary France over 100 years previously. 
They either had to use old Tsarist officers in the Red Army, 
men of doubtful political reliability, or face a crushing 
defeat at the hands of the professionally-led counterrevo­
lutionary forces. Trotsky's solution resembled that used 
by the French Convention. He assigned a political commis­
sar, called a Politruk at lower levels, to every commander 
in order to monitor his activities and to ensure his loy­
alty to the communist regime. No operational order held 
validity unless countersigned by the commissar who stood 
virtually on the same level as the commander. The officers 
were to train the army and lead it into combat while the 
commissars watched their conduct, prevented treason, and 
educated the rank and file politically. After 193^ these 
commissars only supervised troop morale and political in­
doctrination, but after Stalin's purge of the army in 1937, 
they again regained their former status. During the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union in June 19^1, the commissar 
(hereafter called the Politruk for the sake of simplicity) 
again took up his "co-commander" duties, but in October 
1942, as part of Stalin's appeal to Russian nationalism, 
he once more reverted to the role of political advisor and 
propagandist. The Politruk is the foil in this study which 
concerns a pale German version of the Politruk, the National
iv
Sozialist Fuhrungs Offizier (NSFO--National Socialist 
Leadership Officer). The NSFO had the duty of ensuring 
the final nazification of the German army. German condi­
tions were both different from and yet similar to those 
which called forth the NSFO's precursors. The German army 
had a strong officer corps in being which followed age-old 
military and social traditions; however, Hitler questioned 
the loyalty of those in the higher ranks of this officer 
corps. Still, tradition dominated the officers, and the 
nazi party was not strong enough to assert its own absolute 
domination through the activities of the NSFO. When first 
established in late 1943, the NSFO served as a staff ad­
visor to his commander for the indoctrination of the German 
troops in nazi ideology. However, in the last few months 
of the war he more and more began to resemble a Politruk as 
Germany appeared headed for total defeat, and certain mem­
bers of the nazi party tried to give him full Politruk-like 
powers. Yet in the last few weeks the party failed in an 
attempt to take over the NSFO system in its entirety. Thus 
the NSFO never became a Politruk. Although the evaluation 
of his success or failure is clouded by the defeat of the 
Third Reich in 1945, enough evidence is at hand to pro­
nounce the NSFO a failure.
This study will investigate the reasons for the 
establishment of the NSFO system and the way it worked; it 
will also evaluate the accomplishments and failures of this
system within the Wagnerian mists of the last months of 
the war and assign reasons, and blame where appropriate, 
for its failure.
This work arose out of an interest in nazism dating 
back to my youth and from my twenty years of military serv­
ice as a regular officer in the U.S. Army. Two things 
sparked this interest. The first was two periods of army 
service in Germany where I met and talked with people who 
had lived through the nazi period and where I visited many 
of the "shrines of nazism." The second was a graduate 
seminar conducted by my major professor in German history 
at the University of Oklahoma, Dr. Gordon Drummond, who 
assigned me the task of presenting a review of a documen- 
tive article by G. L. Weinberg on the NSFO. (See sources 
consulted.) Looking for a suitable theme at that time for 
a master's thesis, the NSFO seemed to offer a challenge 
and a possible solution to my dual interest in nazism and 
the military, especially sincj it was an untried subject. 
Professor Drummond suggested the value of using the same 
subject for both the master's thesis and my doctoral dis­
sertation and recommended that I conduct research on the 
party side of the NSFO question in Germany. I was not 
exactly thrilled with incorporating information on the 
party because I had conceived the thesis and dissertation 
as military works. To this end, for my thesis I used The 
Captured German Records Filmed at Alexandria, Virginia
vi
which I purchased from the National Archives on microfilm. 
His rationale finally enthused me, and for my dissertation 
I conducted research in the records of the N.S.D.A.P. in 
Germany. This led to significant results. The records in 
the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz provided startling answers to 
some of the questions I had tried to answer in my master's 
thesis. Thus, this work is a political-military study of 
one facet of the nazi era--the party's attempt to nazify 
the German army. Those who expect a history of nazism or 
a biographical sketch of leading nazi or military person­
alities will not find it here. There are countless excel­
lent studies of this nature for those who are interested, 
and some of the best are listed in the sources consulted. 
Wherever I thought that information concerning a man's 
character or past was important for understanding a par­
ticular event, it is, of course, present. Also, the ele­
ments of the so-called nazi ideology are interwoven through­
out the study.
The two main primary sources for this study are the 
National Archives microcopies of the Captured German Records 
F ilmed at Alexandria, Virginia, referred to in footnotes as 
NAM (National Archives Microcopy), and documents contained 
in the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, Germany, referred to in 
footnotes as BAK (Bundesarchiv Koblenz).
I especially wish to acknowledge Professor Drummond, 
Dr. Elisabeth Kinder for the valuable assistance she gave
vii
me at the Bundesarchiv and since, Professor Harold J. 
Gordon, Jr. of the University of Massachusetts who showed 
a deep and definite interest in this study, and, of course, 
my wife Jean who helped with her time, assistance, encour­
agement, infinite patience, and love.
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HITLER'S POLITICAL OFFICERS: THE NATIONAL
SOCIALIST LEADERSHIP OFFICERS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Compromise
In 1938 General Ludwig Beck said that although the 
basis for the German army at that time was national social­
ism, the nazi party should not be allowed to infiltrate the 
army since this could only lead to the disruption and even­
tually the destruction of the army.^ Beck, who would lose 
his life in the abortive July 20, 1944, coup d'etat against 
Hitler, showed a duality in the thinking of leading German 
generals which would haunt them to the day of the final 
destruction of the German army--and beyond. Granting a 
need for nazism while attempting to resist the nazi party's
Karl Demeter, The German Officer Corps in Society 
and State 1650-1945, transi Angus Malcolm (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, I965), p. 203. Cited 
from Beck's papers in the Bundesarchiv--Militkrarchiv, 
Koblenz. Beck was appointed Chief of the Truppenamt, cover 
name for the illegal General Staff, on October 1, 1933. He 
became Chief of the General Staff when Hitler brought that 
institution into the open in 1935 and resigned in August 
1938 in protest over Hitler's policies. He then became a 
leader of the resistance movement.
2penetration into the army, the German generals fell into
a trap largely of their own making. Beck's concept proved
impossible of fulfillment as nazism progressively stalked
its prey with the purpose of at least controlling political
matters in the army. The German army attempted to preserve
the Prussian traditions of honor and obedience and the 
2
Seecktian ideals of political non-involvement within a 
nation which increasingly surrendered its freedom and con­
science to the N.S.D.A.P. (National Socialist German 
Worker's Party--the nazi party). Starting with Hitler's 
assumption of power at the beginning of 1933, the soldiers 
and the party both compromised, but on the military side 
the generals could never seem to solve their duality in 
thinking. Within eleven years the total victory of nazism 
over the German army would lie in sight for the party with 
the institution of the Nat ional Sozialist Fuhrungs Offizier 
(National Socialist Leadership Officer). The NSFO repre­
sented the strong arm of the party within the ranks of the
3
army itself, and through the NSFO the party tried to gain 
a larger share of control over the German army. However, 
the new institution itself manifested a compromise--a pale 
image of the Soviet political commissar, the Politruk,
2
General Hans von Seeckt was head of the Reichswehr 
(the name of the German army during the Weimar regime) from 
1920 to 1926. Seeckt was often referred to as the father 
of the Reichswehr.
3
The NSFO was established in all of the armed 
forces, but this paper primarily concerns the army.
3blended with the traditional Prussian system. The NSFO, 
having no veto power over commanders, had as his responsi­
bility the fanatical nazification of the German soldier. 
This study will trace the struggle between Prussian mili­
tary ideals and the nazification of the German army and 
will evaluate the significance of the NSFO within this 
battleground.
Tradition in the German Army 
When Hitler assumed power as Chancellor in January 
1933 the Prussianized German army had strong traditional 
customs, but even these practices allowed for the political 
indoctrination of soldiers. In the Prussian reform period 
of the early nineteenth century, the army's training task, 
as indicated in rather primitive textbooks, included awak­
ening young men to a Christian and patriotic spirit. In 
October I896 Emperor Wilhelm II decided to present a medal 
to every soldier, sailor, and civil servant to commemorate 
the centenary of the birth of his grandfather, Wilhelm I. 
His chancellor, Hohenlohe, objected, saying that socialists 
among the soldiers would not appreciate the decoration.
The Kaiser, as Supreme War Lord, took this as a serious 
insult to the army and claimed that the army had the capac­
ity of converting the overwhelming majority of "'potential 
socialists because of its grand ideals, its educational 
influence, and the ethical and religious vitality which it
4provides.'"^ In 1905 the commanding general of the XVIII 
Army Corps, General Hermann von Eichhorn, instructed his 
officers and noncommissioned officers that they must open 
the eyes and the thoughts of soldiers to the surrounding 
world. This, he ordered, would include instruction in 
German history and the great men of the Fatherland as well 
as political questions of state.^ During World War I 
"Officers for Fatherland Instruction" carried out an indoc­
trination program to counter enemy propaganda efforts,^ and 
during the German "revolution" after the armistice in Novem­
ber 1918, the High Command instituted "Education Officers"
(Bildungsoffiziere) to offset the revolution's disruptive 
tendencies in the army. Thus even before Hitler's dicta­
torship the army had used methods for implanting ideas in 
the minds of the troops in order to increase their effec­
tiveness. Before World War I the army's leaders carried 
this idea to such extremes that they feared technology and
4
BAK, Boetticher Papers, Folder 23, Kaiser to 
Hohenlohe, December 6, I896.
^Otto Graf zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, Die unent- 
schiedene Generation: Deutschlands konservative Fuhrung-
schichten am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges (München;
Rl Oldenbourg, I968), p. 335• Cited from Demeter, Das 
deutsche Offizierkorps, p. 291ff and Hohn, Die Armee als 
Erziehungschule, p. 4l3ff«
^NAM, T78, Roll 135, Frame 6064910.
^Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston: Houghton Mif­
flin Company, 1939)1 p. 269. This English version trans­
lated "Bi1dungsoffizier" as "Instruction Officer."
5rearmament would irreparably damage the spirit of officers
and men; they expected everything from the spiritual forces
of the soldiers and above all from the highly developed
sense of honor of the officers.^
The historical concept of a German officer's honor
was medieval, aristocratic, and linked with monarchism.
However, the heavy sacrifices in World War I, followed by
the experience of the I918 revolution, exerted strong
forces toward raising the principle of absolute obedience
to a level higher than the concept of honor. The struggle
for life and death turned absolute obedience into a supreme
and unqualified value, and officers from the old Imperial
Army, led by General Hans von Seeckt, based their whole
thought and feelings as soldiers on a directive from Seeckt
9
which based honor on obedience. Little by little after 
1918 officers fixed their devotion more and more on author­
ity- -first that of Seeckt and then that of Field Marshal 
Paul von Beneckendorff und Hindenburg when the latter be­
came President of the Reich. When Hindenburg died and the 
generals acquiesced in Hitler’s assumption of the supreme 
office of Germany, it became highly probable that obedi­
ence to Hitler would soon override all else--including the
g
Stolberg-Wernigerode, Generation, p. 321. Cited 
from L. Rudt von Collenberg, "Fiirst Bulow und die Entwick- 
lung der deutschen Wehrmacht," in Front wider Bulow,
p. 159ff.
9
Demeter, German Officer Corps, pp. 147-48.
6personal and collective honor of the officer corps. When
the array took its oath of loyalty to the person of the
Führer, it becarae even more probable. Nonetheless, the
officer corps expected to retain its traditions.
The officers, led by their generals, wanted to
maintain the array's position as the pillar of the state.
Their traditions and prejudices had changed little since
the days of the unification of Germany, and aristocrats
still dominated the c o r p s . T h e  officers' traditional
contempt for the lower classes and civilians in general
caused much of the ensuing difficulties between them and
the nazis. In addition, they wished to be left alone to
run things in the traditional ways they knew and loved.
Through the teachings of Seeckt the army prided itself in
remaining nonpolitical, and this factor helped it to fall
12easy prey to a thoroughly political animal like Hitler.
Some of the officers never accepted the nazi Weltanschauung
as a way of life while others never grasped that something
really different had perhaps occurred with the advent of 
13nazism, and there existed in the collective thinking of 
the officer corps an incredible duality.
^^Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika: Generals and
Nazis in the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1952), p. 371.
l^Ibid., pp. 16-19.
12B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk 
(New York: William Morrow & Co., 1945), p . IÔ.
13Demeter, German Officer Corps, pp. 36O-6I. From
7In spite of the apolitical stance of the officers, 
they still considered the army as the central basis for 
the state and the educator of German youth. Leaning on 
past glory and customs, the officer corps was not prepared 
to meet the challenge of nazism; however, others saw the 
basic problem. As early as 1931, Dr. Julius Leber, a par­
liamentary specialist of the Social Democratic Party and 
later a leading member of the resistance against Hitler, 
said that he feared that Seeckt had made an enormous mis­
take in believing that discipline and obedience were enough 
to make an army function properly. He did not think that 
any unit at that time placed itself without reservation 
in its commander's hands. Nazism had found strong support 
in the army, he said, because the nazis offered them some­
thing the Republic had not o f f e r e d . S u c h  a statement, 
two years before Hitler's assumption of power, indicated 
that the nazis had already made remarkable inroads into 
the Reichswehr.
a photographic copy of a document supplied by Dr. H. A. 
Jacobsen, original in the so-called "Kaltenbrunner 
Papers" on the attempted assassination of 20 July 1944 
(Washington: Microfilm [Demeter failed to define his
source further]). General Hans Oster made this state­
ment to the Gestapo (Secret State Police) during an 
interrogation.
l4Taylor, Sword and Swastika, p. 371.
^^Demeter, German Officer Corps, p. 195. Cited 
from Dorothea Groner-Geyer, General Groner, Soldat und 
Staatsmann (Frankfurt a.M. : n.p., 1955 ) , 27&f.
8Nazi Inroads into the Reichswehr 
Nazism had already captured many of the rank and 
file as •well as receiving support from some Reichswehr 
leaders. Army commanders in Bavaria had launched Hitler 
on his road to political demagoguery in 1919 when, looking 
for "political officers" to bolster soldiers' morale d’lring 
the Red panic there, they made Corporal Hitler an "Educa­
tion Officer." Hitler claimed that he brought "many hun­
dreds, probably thousands" of soldiers "back to the Father­
land" through his l e c t u r e s . A s  the years progressed, he 
also made inroads into the officer corps. For example, in 
1923, shortly before Hitler's attempted putsch in Munich, 
many young officers attending the Infantry School in the 
Bavarian capitol adhered to the nazi movement. A Lieuten­
ant Leist, a young Prussian officer from Magdeburg, wrote 
his battalion commander. Lieutenant Colonel Freiherr Kurt 
von Hammerstein-Equord (a future successor to Seeckt and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army for the first year of the 
nazi regime), of the conflict of conscience he suffered be­
tween his nazi sympathies and his sworn duty; he described 
the passionate and vehement debates which had occurred over 
the revolt against Seecktian policies by pro-nazi officers 
in Bavaria. By openly supporting Hitler in his threats 
against the Berlin regime, the Bavarian Reichswehr had
^^Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 289-90.
9fallen under an edict pronounced by Seeckt at a time when 
the Bavarian government also stood in near revolt against 
Berlin. When Leist and a couple of companions made known 
their unqualified support for the Chief of the Reichswehr, 
the vast majority of officers present broke out into "child­
like enthusiasm" for the Bavarian regime and the nazis and 
called Leist and his friends "red dogs" who sympathized with 
the "Jewish regime" in Berlin. Leist explained to Hammer- 
stein his own national sympathy for nazism as the expected 
salvation of the Reich but held it as his honorable duty, 
because of his oath, to support the Berlin regime even 
though he detested the entire Weimar system. Pitifully he 
asked his commander to either suggest a way out of his di­
lemma or to recall him to his battalion. Hammerstein's 
telegraphic answer: "Obey Prussian principles" (i.e., Obey
Seeckt).^" Allegedly garrisons existed even before 1933 
where every officer espoused nazism. One of these was the 
Potsdam garrison, the very heir to the traditions of the 
Prussian Guards; and the Berlin War Academy, commanded by 
a nazi sympathizer, contained a large group of passionate 
supporters of nazism. Even many officers of the older
18generation felt an attraction for the nazi movement.
Thilo Volgelsang, "Die Reichswehr in Bayern und 
der Munchner Putsch," Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 
(January 1957), PP • 95-97* Document from Bundesarchiv, 
Koblenz, Nachlass Schleicher, Bd. I7/I, fol. p. 9ff.
18Demeter, German Officer Corps, p. I96. Cited 
from Oster's interrogation.
10
Regardless of the contemptuous attitude of most leading 
generals toward the nazis, Hitler offered something which 
even they could not ignore--the possibility of expansion 
of the army and the resurrection of Germany as a dominant 
power in Europe. Also there were certainly some who were 
not immune from the attraction of conquest or even the 
nazi racial theories. Seeckt himself had written a memo­
randum in 1915 urging Germany's expansion at Russia's 
expense--even if it meant expelling twenty million Jews 
and Slavs and losing a million of the best German soldiers. 
Whether Seeckt retained this attitude during the time of 
the Weimar regime or not is unimportant; it approached 
Hitler's theories of lebensraum, anti-semitism, and a 
German master race and showed that even a Prussian general 
might go along with Hitler's ideas. The main point of
departure between Reichswehr leaders and Hitler at this
19time appeared to be in methods and timing. Secure in 
the thought that they held the upper hand, and believing 
they were safe from any nazi infringement on military tra­
ditions, the leaders of the army encouraged Hindenburg to 
appoint Hitler Chancellor of Germany.
Army Leaders and Hitler 
On January 30, 19331 Adolf Hitler became Chancel­
lor, but before he could subordinate the army to his will.
19Louis Fischer, Russia's Road from Peace to War: 
Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917-1941 (New York: Harper &
11
he had to secure its loyalty since the soldiers had the 
power to oust him if they so wished. His first real oppor­
tunity arose from the Rohm affair. Ernst Rohm (Chief of 
Staff of the Sturm Abteilunjz;--SA) wanted to continue the 
"nazi revolution" and reduce the army to the status of a 
people's militia while his politically indoctrinated storm 
troopers became the elite bearer of German arms. This pre­
sented Hitler with a dilemma. He needed the army's sup­
port while he consolidated his regime, but he also owed 
his status in Germany, at least in part, to those members 
of the SA who had loyally served him during the difficult 
days before the Machtergreifung (seizure of power).
Whether Hitler basically opposed Rohm's plans is difficult 
to say, but if he did agree with the SA Chief the time had 
not yet come. Hitler apparently felt it more expedient at 
the moment to maintain the traditional army as a pillar of 
the state since he needed professionals to rearm and expand 
the army--to ready it for war. Besides, it was question­
able whether the rank and file of the SA wanted to serve as
the arms bearer of the nation anyway, and it was perhaps 
more questionable whether they were capable of acting in 
that capacity. If an SA Standarte (unit) in the lower 
Rhineland is any guage of the SA at that time, the answer
would be a resounding no 1 In the entire Standarte only one
Row, Publishers, I969), p. I8I. Cited from Francis L. 
Carsten, Reichswehr und Politik: 1918-1923 (Koln:
Kiepenheur & Witsch, 1964), pT 257•
12
SA Leader had had a military career in the Reichswehr. The 
world war veterans were either too old or had secure civil­
ian jobs which they would not have traded for a military 
career. Further, many SA men were unmoved by the assassi­
nation of Rohm.^^ In any event Hitler, perhaps fearing 
that the army might overthrow his regime or conceivably 
because of his own devious reasons, offered to subdue the 
SA in return for the presidency upon Hindenburg's death 
which was expected soon. Senior members of the armed
forces were concerned over the SA revolutionary threat,
21so they agreed unanimously to the proposal. On June 30, 
1934, Hitler acted. In a bloody purge of the SA, Rohm was 
murdered. The leading generals and Hindenburg approved of 
the Chancellor's action, and on August 1, 1934, when Hin­
denburg died. Hitler claimed his reward. On August 2 he 
combined the offices of President and Chancellor, and on 
that day members of the armed forces swore a personal oath 
of unconditional obedience to the new German Führer. After 
the purge Hitler reportedly said that he would end the ex­
ternal aspects of the revolution while it would continue
22covertly until he was able to proceed more openly.
20Letter, Captain of Reserves Karl Ducoffre, a.D., 
September 21, 1972. Ducoffre was the leader of the SA in 
Dormagen, Niederrhein.
21John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, 
The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945, Viking Compass ed. 
(New York: The Viking Press, 1967)1 PP* 312-20.
22Alan Bullock, Hitler; A Study in Tyranny,
13
Publically, however, he announced that only the army would
23
bear arms and that it would stay out of politics. Nearly 
all Germans now acclaimed the Führer as the savior of Ger­
many, and a plebiscite overwhelmingly approved his assump­
tion of Hindenburg's office; however, he still needed the
24support of the generals. He believed that Hindenburg,
who had been patronizing and unfriendly, had appointed
General Werner von Blomberg as Defense Minister in order
25to guard the state against the nazis, and he must have 
known of the contempt most generals showed for politics, 
especially nazi politics, and for him personally since 
Heinrich Himmler's Gestapo maintained a discreet surveil­
lance over the generals. The army had real power and 
would have even more after it rearmed, so before imposing 
his will. Hitler had to tread carefully and win over the 
generals by giving them what they wanted: a large and
powerful army; freedom from the Versailles Treaty; faster 
promotions; prestige and respect; and a rightful place in 
Europe for G e r m a n y . M e a n w h i l e  Hitler acted respectably
rev. ed.. Harper Torchbooks (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1970)1 p . 7?4. Cited from Hermann Rauschning, Hitler 
Speaks (London: n.p., 1939), P- 176.
23lbid., p. 307
24Liddell Hart, Generals Talk, p. 28I.
25Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 289.
^^Taylor, Sword and Swastika, pp. 113-14.
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and played the waiting game with complete success until he 
felt strong enough to make his first assault on the army.
For the next few years Hitler wooed the armed 
forces with daring political moves, shrewd military per­
sonnel policies, and an air of respectability. In 1935 
he denounced the Versailles Treaty and unveiled the 
Luftwaffe, and the following year Germany occupied the 
Rhineland. On his forty-seventh birthday in 1936, Hitler 
bought the souls of several leading generals; he gave 
Blomberg the baton of a field marshal, made Freiherr Werner 
von Fritsch (the Commander-in-Chief of the Army since Ham- 
merstein's resignation in January 1934) a colonel general,
and during the next two days he distributed honors remi-
27niscent of imperial splendor. By this time the age of 
field grade officers had fallen to 1914 levels; several 
thousand retired officers had been recalled; the number of 
generals had quadrupled; and the number of co’onels had 
tripled. Meanwhile, rearmament sped ahead while open and 
latent opposition to Hitler withered. Many of tho^e who 
had maintained a cool reserve or a "wait and see" attitude
28 • *publically avowed loyalty. The Führer left promotion of 
officers, judgments of courts-martial, planning, and oper­
ations completely in army hands until January 19381 and he
27Taylor, Sword and Swastika, pp. 115-17*
0 fi
‘""ibid., pp. 113-14.
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received briefings on exercises without comment or criti­
cism while showing complete confidence in the generals.
He gave the impression that he looked on the earlier days
29of terror and gangsterism h repugnance. The generals 
truly 1 lieved they held the upper hand and felt they had 
little to lose in making concessions to the nazis. Besides, 
they had much to gain. However, the game could be played 
two ways.
Rearmament and expansion decreased the ability of
the army to withstand the nazi onslaught by weakening the
stable base of the former unanimously professional Reichs- 
30wehr. The rapid introduction of universal military serv­
ice and the expansion of the army allowed Hitler to base 
the army on a broader class of society than previously and 
more readily allowed him the opportunity to align it with 
national socialist ideas. This began in the lower ranks 
but worked its way upward into the higher ranks especially 
during the war. The generals, out of touch with the revo­
lutionary spirit and fanatical faith of youth, stood for 
tradition which isolated them from public affairs, and 
their discipline and loyalty to their oath checked any real
29Robert J. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi
Party: 1933-1939 (New York: James H. Heineman, Inc.,
19^6;, pp. 15-1Ô, n. 15. Information provided by General 
Friedrich Hossbach, Hitler's army adjutant between 1934-
1938.
^^Liddell Hart, Generals Talk, pp. 87-89. Based on
remarks made by General Rohricht after the war.
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31move to counter the nazi Führer. After World War II
General Gunther Blumentritt admitted that the generals
might have been fools when it came to politics, but he
felt that tradition had made them that way and they should
32not try to be anything else. Attitudes of this nature
assisted the advance of nazism.
The key figures of Hitler's army from 1934 to 1938
were Blomberg as Defense Minister, Fritsch as Commander-in-
Chief of the Army, and Beck, the Chief of the Army General
Staff. Blomberg, after a visit to Russia in the late
1920s, had admired the prestige the Red Army held-in the
eyes of the Soviet proletariat. What impressed him most
was that the Soviet generals got what they wanted. As
early as 1930 he perceived in Hitler a man who could do
for the German army what Stalin had done for the Soviet
army, and Hitler and his doctrines made a deep imprint on
him. Though Blomberg thought he was taking the army--like
Seeckt before him--out of the political arena in which
3 3Schleicher had placed it, he would nonetheless allow 
enough nazi indoctrination to strengthen the army's spirit
31Demeter, German Officer Corps, pp. 5-6.
3 2Gordon A. Craig, "Army and National Socialism 
I933-I945: The Responsibility of the Generals," World
Politics 2 (April 1950): 437. Blumentritt's comments 
were made after the war.
^^Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, pp. 296-300. General 
Kurt von Schleicher was a former Chancellor whom the nazis 
murdered during the SA purge.
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and discipline. Fritsch considered himself as the chosen
guardian of the Seeckt tradition. Contemptuous of nazism,
he nevertheless admired its achievements; his contemporaries
widely considered him as the one who would toss out the
nazis if their experiment failed. The Commander-in-Chief
of the Army attributed nazi excesses to their youthful
vigor, and the end of the SA threat meant for him an end
to nazi lawlessness. He believed the army could stand
above and remain immune from the nazi experiment; meanwhile
it could lay the groundwork for a new German order based on
35Prussian traditionalism. Not beyond allowing some nazi-
fication to placate the Party, Beck, a future leader of the
German resistance to Hitler, had shown as early as a trial
of young nazi officers from his regiment in 1930 that,
although no nazi himself, he might allow the nazis to con-
or
duct their political experiment. The obedient General 
Wilhelm Keitel fell completely under Hitler's spell and 
received the rank of field marshal. General Walther von 
Reichenau, Blomberg's chief of the Armed Forces Ministerial 
Office and a democratic-minded aristocrat, strongly sup­
ported Hitler and like Rohm openly favored a nazi-
37indoctrinated people's army. However, even he was upset
3^NAM, T77, Roll 797, Frame 5528470.
35Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, pp. 302-4. 
^^Ibid., pp. 296-300.
37lbid., p. 301.
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over Rohm's ideas of using the SA as the foundation stone
O Q
for such an army. He would later receive his reward in 
the form of a field marshal's baton. Blomberg and Reichenau 
cooperated with Hitler, and Keitel did as he was told; Ham- 
merstein (before his resignation), Fritsch, and Beck main­
tained a cool reserve. The stance of these officers re­
flected the divided opinion throughout the officer corps 
which hindered any decisive policy vis-a-vis the nazis, 
yet under their leadership, nazification of the army had 
started even before the purge of the SA.
Preliminary Moves
Nazification began in February 1933i within thirty
days after Hitler became Chancellor. With Hindenburg's
approval, Blomberg made plans for the adoption of the nazi
party eagle and swastika as insignia on Wehrmacht uniforms.
The donning of the new insignia on May Day 1934 publically
39identified the army with national socialism. The mili­
tary ceremony at the Potsdam Garrison Church on the occa­
sion of the opening of the new Reichstag on March 21, 1933, 
though meant to publicize the strong place of the army in 
the nazi state, had already signified to the rank and file 
that the army leaders accepted nazism to the fullest extent. 
At this ceremony Hitler showered profound deference and
38Taylor, Sword and Swastika, p. 76.
39Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 312.
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40respect on Hindenburg, the army, and the absent Kaiser.
But when the army donned the swastika, a veritable ava­
lanche of instructions, intended to placate the nazis and 
strengthen the army's spirit and discipline, poured forth 
from the High Command. Regardless of intent, these direc­
tives showed the more far-reaching effect of allowing the 
party to get its foot in the door. On May 25th Blomberg 
issued a decree to all the armed forces on the "Wehrmacht 
and National-Socialism" which, he directed, would form the 
basis for instruction in all service schools. It directed 
a sweeping away of class barriers, more democratic con­
tacts between officers and men, and identified the fate of
41the German people with nazism. That same day Fritsch 
issued a new version of "The Duties of the German Soldier,"
signed by Hindenburg, which made it clear that the army
42identified itself with nazism. Regardless of these public 
avowals of loyalty to the nazi cause, however, there was a 
clear distinction in the minds of some officers between the 
person of Hitler and national socialism.
As early as August 1934 this distinction was being 
made. Colonel Franz Haider (later Chief of the Army General
^^O'Neill, German Army, p. 63-
^^Ibid., pp. 64-65- 
4 2Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 3l4. For the text 
see Karl Demeter, German Officer Corps in Society and State 
I65O-I945, trans. Angus Malcolm (New York : Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers, I965), app. 33» P- 363-
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Staff) wrote a letter to Beck in which he called Hitler's 
acts pure and idealistic; however, he believed that Hitler 
was being betrayed by the incompetent and useless party 
organizations. He thought that the Rohm revolt was not 
the only sickness the army would have to face. Haider's 
prophetic voice was lost amidst the public declarations 
by members of the High Command, and he would later dis­
cover that he had sadly misjudged Hitler. This devotion 
to the person of Hitler while denigrating or showing con­
tempt for the party would exist as a constantly recurring 
theme in the minds of thousands of soldiers and officers 
until the very end in 19^5 »
While the High Command was willing to use nazism 
to enhance military discipline and spirit, to Hitler, 
nazification signified a full indoctrination of the armed 
forces for ideological reasons as a means to gain total 
obedience to his will; furthermore, the Führer and the 
party did not oppose each other as Haider believed. When 
Rudolf Hess, the Chief of the Party Chancellery until 1940, 
opened the nazi party Congress in September 1934, he said 
that "the law of totality" (i.e., total submission to the 
party) would guide all future nazi policy. Hitler himself 
informed the congress that he had unlimited power and that 
only tactical, personal, and therefore temporary motives
43Demetêr, German Officer Corps, p. 203* Cited
from Beck's Papers.
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would inhibit his future actions. Both nazis thus made
it clear that neither Hitler nor the party would accept 
anything short of total domination of Germany and her in­
stitutions, and the Führer revealed that he would play a 
waiting game or even disguise his intent while the party 
drove onwards toward the nazi goal of domination.
Confident that they would retain military control 
and their traditional command and staff structure, the 
generals continued to cooperate. In 1935-36 the army 
established reading rooms for the troops, and the state 
allotted funds for stocking them with the Volkischer 
Beobachter (the official party newspaper) and other 
"approved" periodicals. The reading rooms also contained
large numbers of books and pamphlets published by Joseph
45
Goebbel's Propaganda Ministry. On January 30, 1936,
Blomberg ordered expanded political instruction in service
schools and army units, and the party assisted with the
program and gave the military teachers special instruction.
This would later prove to be a significant precedent when
the NSFO came along. By 1937 party officials conducted
46
courses for army units and constantly extended their
44
Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship: 
The Origins Structure and Effects of National Socialism, 
trans. Jean Steinberg (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1970), p. 246. Cited from Der Kongress zu Nürnberg vom 
5 .-6 . September 1934 (München : nTp., 1934), pp. 18, 22-24
^^O'Neill, German Army, pp. 73-74. Information on 
reading rooms from Wehrkreis VII, file 2306.
^^Ibid., p. 71.
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influence. Each year Hitler, Himmler, and other party 
leaders spoke to officers attending political courses, and 
the party occasionally succeeded in quietly getting rid of 
uncooperative generals. By the end of 1937 many SA and 
SS (Schutzstaffeln--Defense Detachments) personnel in the 
army reported to party superiors on their company com­
manders and officers until Blomberg succeeded in persuad-
48ing Hitler to order that such practices cease. Success­
ful protests against party violations of traditional mili­
tary concepts seemed to lull the generals into a false 
sense of security, and they retired more and more from 
involvement in political questions. This cost them 
severely; in 1938 the Führer struck, and the generals 
learned quickly that their control of the army was no 
longer absolute.
47'Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General 
Staff: 1657-I945, trans. Brian Battershaw (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1953)i P* 30^•
^®NAM, T77, Roll 707, Frames 5527586-87.
CHAPTER II 
NAZIFICATION AND THE WAR OF IDEOLOGY
The BIomber.gj-Fritsch Affair and the 
Reorganization of the Wehrmacht
Until early 1938 Hitler had lulled the generals 
into thinking they held the upper hand, but in January he 
began to stamp his personal imprint on the armed forces. 
Suddenly he procured Blomberg's resignation because of a 
"disgraceful marriage." The generals accepted this since 
the Defense Minister had all too willingly played the nazi 
tune and had tarnished the honor of the officer corps by 
marrying a woman of questionable background. Then nearly 
simultaneously the other shoe fell when Hitler relieved 
Fritsch for alleged homosexuality. While the supporters 
of the army's Commander-in-Chief waited indignantly for 
the announcement of Fritsch's innocence by a Court of Honor, 
Hitler incorporated Austria into the Reich. In the joyous 
hullabaloo which followed, Fritsch's innocence hardly mat­
tered in a nation which considered its leader a latter day 
Charlemagne, Luther, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Bis­
marck, and perhaps Christ, all rolled into one. Upon 
Blomberg's departure. Hitler personally took over command
23
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of the armed forces, reorganized them to his own satisfac­
tion, appointed General Walter von Brauchitsch as army 
Commander-in-Chief, relieved sixteen high ranking generals 
from their commands, transferred forty-four others plus a 
host of other senior officers, and distributed promotions 
left and right. Sixteen higher generals and twelve more
at lower levels received promotions.^ Brauchitsch himself
2
became a Colonel General. It was a policy of using the 
carrot and the stick. Now the army was lowered to the 
same level as the navy and the air force under the direc­
tion of a joint headquarters, Ob erkommando der Wehrmacht 
(OKW--High Command of the Armed Forces), commanded per­
sonally by Adolf Hitler. The belated but quiet restora­
tion of Fritsch's honor appeared to satisfy the supporters 
of the ex-Commander-in-Chief, and Hitler's prestige stood 
at an all time high.
Further bloodless victories added to the Führer's 
prestige. The deliverance of the Sudetenland to Germany 
that same year coupled with Hitler's victory over Britain 
and France at Munich in spite of dire warnings from timor­
ous generals, secured another victory for Hitler over the 
military. Under the circumstances, the generals found
^Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika; Generals and 
Nazis in the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1952), pp. 168-73.
2
John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power,
The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, Viking Compass ed. 
(New York: The Viking Press, 1967), p. 372.
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themselves trapped by Hitler's proven success, his pres­
tige among the people and within the army itself, and by 
the sacred oath they had personally given the dictator.
The year 1938 had shown the officer corps that the army 
no longer dominated the state.
Hitler had prepared the ground well during the 
first five years of the nazi regime, and he could now in­
creasingly stamp his personal mark on the army while Himm­
ler and Martin Bormann (Deputy to Rudolf Hess until the 
letter's flight to England in 1940, whereupon he became 
Chief of the Party Chancellery) waited in the wings. Himm­
ler, the real victor in the SA purge, had risen rapidly in 
influence and at the time of the Blomberg-Fritsch affair 
already appeared as a future challenger to the army's 
position. Bormann's day would arrive with the institution 
of the NSFO, but now Himmler's SS loomed as the immediate 
threat to the army.
Haider had indeed shown perception in August 1934 
when he foresaw danger to the army from sources other than 
Rohm and the SA. As early as June of that year, the SS 
Chief had started the movement toward creating his own 
military force. The views of Rohm, Himmler, and Bormann 
differed little insofar as each aimed to increase his per­
sonal influence in the armed forces. Where Rohm failed, 
Himmler would largely succeed through the Waffer-SS (Armed- 
SS) and his own growing importance. Bormann, the last man
26
standing in his way, would play his card with the NSFO. 
Meanwhile Himmler, using the theme that the army had held 
itself aloof from direct participation in the 19)4 SA 
purge, convinced Hitler that several regiments of SS troops 
should be created to carry out domestic police actions.
The Führer obtained Blomberg's concurrence easily since 
the army had no wish to perform such duties, and thus the 
direct ancestors of the Waffen-SS, the SS-Verfugungstruppen 
(SS General Service Troops), came into being as a possible 
Trojan horse for SS invasion of the military sphere. By 
1938 the Waffen-SS had become a separate military force-- 
theoretically equal in status to the army. Himmler's part 
in the Fritsch affair spurred General Beck to try to stop 
the SS Chief's activities, but he got nowhere when Brau­
chitsch, the army's new Commander-in-Chief, refused to 
back him.
The choice for Commander-in-Chief in 1938 fell be­
tween Brauchitsch and Reichenau, but the senior generals 
opposed the latter as being too closely attuned to nazism. 
Even Keitel, according to General Alfred Jodi, felt that 
Reichenau's appointment would constitute "the third, and 
most intolerable, shock to the army" after the Blomberg-
Fritsch scandals; both Jodi and Keitel believed Brauchitsch
4
could help the army pass through the shock to its honor.
3
Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 392.
^Taylor, Sword and Swastika, pp. I68-7O. Cited
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The officer corps trusted Brauchitsch, and Hitler probably 
appointed him to inspire confidence after the army's re­
cent degradation--he would also be easy to handle.^ In 
return for his new job, Brapchitsch agreed to the reorgani­
zation of the Wehrmacht which downgraded the army, to the 
retirement of tradition-minded generals, and to the promo­
tion of high-ranking officers who were either pro-nazi or 
friendly to Hitler. The officer corps, still in shock, 
failed to recognize the situation for what it was--a power 
play by Hitler.
The years between 1938 and the invasion of Russia 
brought German domination of Europe, glory and prestige 
for Hitler, and an increasingly subservient officer corps. 
The conquest of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and France took 
place as Hitler prodded the generals along--often against 
their own ideas of what was feasible. Some of the generals 
saw that Hitler was leading Germany into a war she might 
lose, and they began making secret plans for a revolt, but 
their plans always fizzled as time and time again Hitler's 
judgment proved correct. Ulrich von Hassell, a noted 
German diplomat destined to lose his life after the "20th 
of July revolt" (July 20, 1944, when an attempted assassi­
nation of Hitler failed which set off a string of executions
from the unpublished Diary of General Alfred Jodi, 1937- 
1942.
^B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk 
(New York: William Morrow & Co., 1948), pp. 31-32.
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and nazi revenge), knew many of the generals personally.
In January 1939 he commented that Brauchitsch carried 
little weight with Hitler. Brauchitsch told Hassell on 
January 26, in reference to the SA, SS, and the army, that 
only time would tell which would gain the upper hand.^
His statement ably described his thought processes--he 
would take things as they came but would not intervene to 
change fate. In October Hassell said that Haider, Beck's 
replacement as Chief of Staff, held little power, and that 
he had the jitters.^ During the battle in France in May 
1940, the aristocratic diplomat wrote perceptibly that the 
army leadership was not getting -proper recognition for its 
contribution to the military victories and declared that
g
this would mean the end of the old tradition.
The generals would not willingly overthrow all of 
their principles in favor of nazism, but if they could 
combine both, the army could have the best of two worlds 
--a disciplined force inspired by a political ideology.
For the moment this suited Hitler and would provide a 
basis for the forthcoming NSFO concept; however, the mar­
riage of Prussian tradition and nazi ideology still had a 
long way to go. In the spring of 1939 Hermann Goring (the
^Ulrich von Hassell, The Von Hassell Diaries: 
1938-1944 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc.,
1947), pp. 34-35.
^Ibid., p . 68.
®Ibid., p. 139.
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Head of the Luftwaffe and Hitler's designated successor),
as senior officer of the Wehrmacht, even felt it necessary
to upbraid the army in a speech to high-ranking military
9
leaders for its non-nazi traditions, and even on Hitler's 
OKW staff after the 1938 reorganization of the armed forces, 
the only department head who wholeheartedly supported 
nazism was General Hermann Reinecke of the General Army 
Office (Allgemeines Heeresamt), Other department chiefs 
had misgivings of some sort, felt anger at the nazis, or 
had outright anti-nazi s e n t i m e n t . R e i n e c k e ' s  reward came 
later with his appointment as Chief of the OKW National 
Sozialist Fuhrungs Stab (National Socialist Leadership 
Staff--part of the NSFO system). Hitler was determined, 
however, to force his will on the generals.
The Führer increasingly made his views known after 
the Blomberg-Fritsch affair. On January 30, 1939, he de­
livered a speech to senior generals in which he strongly 
criticized the frequent pessimism in the Army High Command 
concerning his military plans. He also attacked the intel- 
lectualism which had existed in the army since the days of 
Field Marshal Graf Alfred von Schlieffen, the famous Chief 
of the General Staff at the turn of the century. He
9
Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, 
trans. Anthony G . Powell (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,
1958), p. 77.
^^Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General 
Staff: 1657-1945, trans. Brian Battershaw (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1953), P* 323.
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demanded an immediate and complete change and said that 
only men who had faith in him should receive commissions 
as officers. He further stated that he had charged Brau­
chitsch with giving the officer corps a new purpose. 
Hitler's remarks could not have fallen on deaf ears. An 
attack on Schlieffen, a man revered by German officers, 
could only signify the Führer's desire to downgrade Prus­
sian military traditions and establish nazism as the basis 
for German military life. The speech also brought into 
the open his distrust of the generals and his distaste for 
their caste arrogance. Hitler's prestige, and thus his 
increasing ability to dominate the army, increased daily 
as he triumphed at Munich, entered Prague as a conqueror, 
defeated Poland while French and British soldiers faced a 
small German defensive force in the west, prostrated France 
in six weeks, and ran the British off the continent of 
Europe. The criticisms and dire warnings of some of the 
generals made them look ridiculous even in their own eyes. 
Above all, however. Hitler's diplomatic and military suc­
cess caused planned revolts to collapse time after time. 
Hitler's long gift of being right overwhelmed opposition
in the army and gave him an advantage over his military 
12advisors. Nazification now moved to a new phase; so far.
Walter Goerlitz, ed., The Memoirs of Field- 
Marshal Keitel, trans. David Irving (New York: Stein and
Day, 19&6), ^  246.
^^Liddell Hart, Generals Talk, p. 4.
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warfare had followed traditional lines, but now a war of 
ideologies began.
The Invasion of the Soviet Union 
Hitler's mind frequently turned toward the Soviet 
Union because he believed that in the future, Europe would 
be dominated by either Germany or the Soviet Union. Al­
though admiring and respecting Stalin for his accomplish­
ments, he nevertheless believed that either he or Stalin 
must crush the other. Russia had had her revolution, and 
an elite, the communist party, ruled the Soviet Union and 
controlled the Soviet army; Hitler saw the advantages of 
such a system and desired a similar one for Germany. A 
war between the two nations meant for him a battle of 
ideology with the annihilation of the loser. The war--a 
fight to the finish without quarter--would decide who would 
rule the weakened capitalistic Europe, and a millenium 
would r e s u l t . O n  March 17, 19^1, Hitler summoned his 
generals to the Chancellery and laid down the rules for 
"Operation Barbarossa," the invasion of Russia. He an­
nounced that the days of chivalry had ended; the coming 
war with the U.S.S.R. would be one of ideology. Insulting 
those present by saying that such ideas were incomprehen­
sible to generals, he demanded that they rid themselves of
11H . R . Trevor-Roper, Introduction to Hitler's 
Table Talk, by Adolf Hitler, trans. Norman Cameron and 
R. H. Stevens (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953),
pp. xxiii-xxiv.
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their obsolete theories of warfare and carry out his orders 
to the letter. He then ordered the liquidation of captured 
Soviet army commissars (the Politruk) and suspended mili­
tary law concerning responsibility for war crimes by German 
l(lsoldiers. No one present openly objected, but privately 
after the conference, several generals reproached Keitel 
for not preventing Hitler's issuance of these orders. Yet, 
they themselves had said nothing. Keitel claimed that if 
he had resigned over such an issue. Hitler would have re­
placed him with Himmler which would have produced even 
more disastrous consequences for the army.^^ As it was, 
Himmler became deeply involved.
On May 13, 194l, Keitel signed an order, in the 
name of Hitler, entrusting the SS Chief with the adminis­
tration of the rear area.^^ In this sealed off area, after 
the German army had stabbed deeply into the U.S.S.R., the 
SS carried out the nazi racial policies and the terror
l4Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 513* See p. 512n 
as to the controversial date of the conference; also see 
Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 134-36.
^^Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 249i 252.
^^William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and
Schuster, I96O ), pp. 831-32. Keitel issued several direc­
tives on May 131 1941, one of which was the order suspend­
ing courts-martial in the case of summary executions and 
other offenses committed against enemy civilians in the 
U.S.S.R. Text of directive contained in U.S., Nazi Con­
spiracy and Aggression, 8 vols., 2 supps. (Washington, B.C. 
Government Printing Office, 1946), vol. 3, PP* 409-13* 
(Nuremberg Document 447-PS.)
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ordered by Himmler. Knowledge of these acts, plus the 
scattered acceptance of the commissar order, made the 
German officer corps a collective fellow traveler if not 
an accessory to some of the worst excesses of national 
socialism; they committed the army to nazism, for better 
or worse, as no other previous nazification measure had 
done. In this affair, Prussian chivalry, honor, and mor­
ality suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the nazis. 
Hitler brushed aside Keitel's objections with the comment
that the field marshal should not be concerned; he was not
17responsible--only Hitler was:
Hitler as Commander-in-Chief of the Army
By December 5» 1941, the German offensive had
stalled. Although the German army stood on a line from
Lake Ladoga to the Sea of Azov, Leningrad, Moscow, and
Rostov still remained in Soviet hands. Soviet resistance
had stiffened; then temperatures dropped to minus forty
degrees Fahrenheit, and the German troops suffered severely
from frostbite because of a shortage of winter clothing.
Hitler had already publically claimed the destruction of
the Soviet army. Even so, he reluctantly called off the
German offensive, and the Teutonic armies settled down for 
18the winter. Hitler used this first setback as an
^^Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 28.
1AColonel Vincent J. Esposito, ed., The West Point 
Atlas of American Wars (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 
Publishers, 1959), vol. 2, maps 28-29, World War II,
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opportunity for dismissing Brauchitsch as a scapegoat and 
to assume direct, supreme command of OKH (Ob erkommando des 
Heeres--the Army High Command). As Commander-in-Chief of 
the Army, he relieved anyone who objected to his policies 
or who opposed him. Nazism now had the opportunity to 
infiltrate as never before, and the spectre of the SS 
loomed larger than ever.
That winter the struggle for military manpower be­
gan. Waffen-SS requirements climbed, and the "Black Order" 
siphoned off the cream of German youth while the army's 
protests to Hitler proved fruitless. As early as the 
Polish campaign the Waff en-SS Division Leibstandarte Adolf 
Hitler and at least one or two reinforced SS regiments had
fought under army command, and the German forces initially
19invading Russia included at least two SS divisions, while
others were newly organizing in the homeland or serving
elsewhere. An OKH order of March 21, 1941, listed Hitler's
goal for the Waffen-SS at $-10 per cent of the peacetime
20strength of the army. This limit, however, was far ex­
ceeded by the end of the war. Keitel claimed that many 
army replacements were untrained men who were rounded up
^^Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 34, 1?8, 210.
?nKarl 0. Paetel, "Die SS: Ein Beitrag Zur
Soziologie des Nationalsozialismus , " Viertel.jahrshefte fur 
Zeitgeschichte (January 1954), pp. 10-11. Cited from OKH, 
Gen. St. D.H., Nr. 137/3«4lg (I) dated 21.3*41 in Interna­
tional Military Tribunal, vol. 35, p . 355f*
35
21anywhere they could be found. Hitler himself believed 
that volunteers at that time had to be enthusiastic na­
tional socialists and that they preferred to follow the
spirit of national socialism in the SS or the Air Force
22instead of in the tradition-minded army. Clearly the
Führer hated the Christian ethics and Prussian tradition
of the professional soldiers. At the moment, however, he
still needed them, and he frequently bemoaned the fact
that he had insufficient SS leaders, whose spirit he liked,
23to replace the army leaders. This attitude gives an 
inkling of his concept of command.
Hitler demanded nazi spirit as the main prerequi­
site for German leadership. When Hitler took over direct 
leadership of OKH, he told Haider that anyone could direct 
military operations, that the real task would be to train 
the army in nazism, but the Führer said he did not know of
any general who could do this; that was why he had decided
24to take over command of the army himself. To make the 
transition from an army based on Prussian tradition to one 
organized on nazi lines, the direct hand of Hitler was
^^Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 169-70.
22Franz Haider, Hitler as War Lord, trans. Paul 
Findlay (London: Putnam"^ 1950) , p"I T"!
2^Ibid., p. 9.
24Haider, Hitler as War Lord, p. 49. Hitler made 
this statement in a private conversation with Haider on 
December 19, 1941.
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needed. Although some generals opposed his direct in­
tervention and others plotted against him, most followed 
his orders without question. Those who did not slavishly 
follow his commands were dismissed. Within the next few 
months as the military setbacks in the U.S.S.R. continued, 
the Führer purged several higher commanders, to include 
field marshals and colonel generals plus lesser fry, and 
vented his uncontrollable anger on those closest to him 
in the military hierarchy--Keitel, Jodi, and Haider.
After a stormy scene in September 1942, he replaced 
Haider as Chief of the General Staff with Colonel General 
Kurt Zeitzler. The toll included Field Marshals von 
Witzleben and von Bock, Colonel Generals Guderian and
Hoepner, and more than thirty-five divisional and corps
25
commanders returned home in disgrace. Following his 
customary practice. Hitler would bring some of them back 
on active service once he felt they had learned their les­
son, or, as more often happened, when he needed them. On 
dismissing Haider, the Führer told him privately that 
nazism would count more than military skill in the future 
and that he could not expect this from the traditional of­
f i c e r . O n c e  again Hitler had given a preview of the 
future.
2 5Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, pp. 525-26. 
^^Halder, Hitler as War Lord, p. 58-
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Stalingrad
On May 8, 1942, the Germans opened a new offen­
sive in Russia. One of its main objectives was Stalingrad. 
Although the offensive began with great success, it ended 
nine months later in disaster. To begin with, the German 
army of 1942 was not the same army which had invaded the 
Soviet Union the year before. Losses had been heavy, and 
the army had suffered horribly through the winter of 1941- 
1942. In addition, the German army labored under the 
Führer's erratic and irresponsible leadership. His "mili­
tary genius" and German supply problems soon came to 
Stalin's rescue, and by October the German momentum had 
withered. By November 7-8 the German troops had reached 
Stalingrad and the battle for the city was raging furiously, 
Two weeks later with the tide turning against the Germans, 
the commander of the 6th Army, General Friedrich Paulus, 
requested permission to break out of his encirclement at 
Stalingrad. Hitler refused. By February 2, 1943, the Rus­
sians had destroyed the 6th Army of approximately 300,000 
men, leaving a gap in the German army which could never be
27refilled. Catastrophes for German arms continued in 
North Africa and Sicily, and Goring's vaunted Luftwaffe, 
conspicuously absent in the European skies, could not
27Esposito, West Point Atlas, maps 30-35» Goerlitz 
in the German General Staff lists the strength of the 6th 
Army at 320,000 men, p^ 426.
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prevent the Anglo-American air forces from dropping their 
bombs on the Reich in ever increasing numbers. Himmler's 
star (second now only to Bormann's) waxed in influence, 
and doubt and despondency settled upon Germany while a
28wave of arrests of Jews and dissidents took place. The
army conspirators accelerated their planning and believed
they could count on the troops to follow them; yet they
could not be sure since no one really knew to what extent
nazism had infiltrated the ranks. So whether the troops
could be counted on to support a military coup remained
29an open question. Between September and December 19^3
the conspirators attempted at least six times to kill the
Führer, but each time fate intervened to save him and the
war dragged on. Hitler had not expected a long war and
consequently had never prepared for it. As a result, the
German war machine slowed down because of critical short-
30ages of raw materials, especially fuel; Hitler, however, 
blamed the generals.
The military disasters held dire significance for 
the army. After the fall of Mussolini, Hitler, raging
28Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 539- Cited from 
Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, Berlin Underground, 1939-1945 
(London: n.p., 1948), pp"I 78-8I; and Hassell, Diaries,
pp. 295-96.
29Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 584. Cited from 
Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Offiziere gegen Hitler (Zurich: 
n.p., 1946), pp. 88-91.
30"Playboy Interview: Albert Speer," Playboy,
June 1971, p . 92.
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against the international conspiracy of aristocrats, ex­
pelled most members of princely families from the army and, 
naming Himmler Minister of Interior, began a crack down on 
defeatism. Hitler labeled generals who presented him cor­
rect estimations of enemy forces as defeatists, and as a
result, pro-nazi officers moved to positions of high rank
31in increasing numbers. This appeared to signal an
attack on Prussion traditionalism. In fact, after the
Allied invasion of Italy, Himmler confirmed in a meeting
of SS-Group Leaders in Posen that a general attack on the
officer corps had started. Stalin, he said, had shown
shrewdness in executing Red Army generals, and the source
of Russian strength, he believed, arose from the influence
32of the communist Politruk. In this war of ideology, the 
nazi ideologist par excellence, Alfred Rosenberg, had al­
ready inserted himself, and one of the definite steps 
toward the NSFO system now began.
Alfred Rosenberg 
In 1934 Adolf Hitler had named Rosenberg as "Deputy 
of the Führer for the Supervision of the Entire Spiritual 
and Weltanschauung Schooling and Training of the N.S.D.A.P." 
This grandiose title apparently convinced its bearer that 
his ideological duties should extend beyond the ranks of
^^Goerlitz, German General Staff, pp. 442-43* 
^^Ibid., p . 446.
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party and state and should also include the armed forces.
On April l4, 1934, Blomberg fell in -with this idea by ask­
ing Rosenberg to oversee the ideological training of the 
Wehrmacht. In practice, this invitation only resulted in 
Rosenberg's attendance at a few "national-political" 
speeches and in his office examining books and literature; 
nevertheless, he was looking to the future. When war broke 
out, he prepared a plan to exert a stronger influence in the 
armed forces, but the military services closed ranks against 
him. Part of this plan included getting Hitler to give him 
the new title of "Deputy of the Führer for the Safeguarding 
of the National Socialist Weltanschauung." Another part 
was to have OKW appoint someone to act as a kind of censor 
in questions of ideology. After he failed to convince the 
generals, especially those in OKH, he managed to see Hitler 
in the fall of 1939 and received the Führer's approval, in 
principle, for him to administer the ideological mandate 
for party and state. Where his 1934 title had restricted 
him to activity within the party, Rosenberg now freely in­
terpreted his task as including the Wehrmacht under the
classification of the "state"; accordingly he set out to
3 3win support in extending his activities.
Volker R. Berghahn, "NSDAP und 'Geistige Fuhrung' 
der Wehrmacht 1939-1943," Viertel.jahrshefte fur Zeitge- 
schichte 17 (1969): 19-22. Cited from BAK, Kanzlei Rosen­
berg, NS 8 vorl. 108. "Begrundung des beiliegenden Wort- 
lauts eines Entwurfs [zu einem Fuhrer-Befehl]," January 2, 
1940, with Rosenberg's handwritten corrections. Also
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In early 1940 Rosenberg solicited Hermann Goring's 
support as he began a campaign which lasted for several 
years and which showed his ultimate desire of directing all 
aspects of nazi indoctrination of the armed forces. In a 
letter to the Luftwaffe Chief, dated January l6 , 1940, 
Rosenberg revealed that he and Keitel had worked out an 
arrangement for a program of indoctrinating the armed 
forces in the nazi Weltanschauung. Some differences ex­
isted in Keitel's and Rosenberg's concepts. Keitel wished 
to call the program "Ideological Leadership" while Rosen­
berg preferred the designation, "Ideological Training." 
Both, however, wished Goring to assume overall responsi-
34bility, in Hitler's name, for the indoctrination program.
It is not clear what Goring's response was; however, Rosen­
berg continued to appeal for his support. In another let­
ter, dated July 8 , he informed Goring that although he and 
Rudolf Hess had agreed that ideological schooling of armed 
forces personnel should take place on party territory, the 
Wehrmacht was adamant that courses of instruction had to be 
held on military property. He asked for Goring's help and 
recommended the Hess-Rosenberg solution so that the party 
people would not find themselves guests of the Wehrmacht.
Rheinhard Bollmus, "Das Amt Rosenberg und seine Gegner: 
Studien zum Machtkampf im nationalsozialistischen 
Herrschafts-system" (Ph.D. dissertation, Heidelberg, I967), 
p. 220ff.
^^BAK, Kanzlei Rosenberg, NS8/I67, pp. 83-84.
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The Air Force Chief did not answer until August 3i and then 
he smoothly blasted Rosenberg's ideas. Goring wrote that 
he was very happy that the latter had been able to estab­
lish his proper influence in the armed forces. He also 
agreed on the necessity for ideological training but said 
that it was a basically false idea that the Wehrmacht, "as 
sole arms bearer of the nation," was only responsible for 
training in arms while the party was responsible for the 
"spirit of the troops." The latter responsibility, said 
the Air Force Commander-in-Chief, belonged solely to the 
service Commanders-in-Chief; dividing such responsibility 
was impossible since the spirit of the troops was decisive
in battle. In closing, he warned Rosenberg that "training
35in discipline" was not within the nazi thinker's purview.
This was all Rosenberg needed to hear. Immune to 
rebuffs and able to cling unswervingly to a basic idea, 
Rosenberg set out to placate Goring who had at least con­
ceded a strong need for ideological training and had ap­
proved his contacts with OKW. On September 9 and again on 
September 10, 1940, he wrote Goring agreeing with every­
thing the Air Force Chief had said; he added that he had 
merely failed to express himself properly in his earlier 
letters. In the second letter, he casually mentioned that 
he had talked to Hitler and that the Führer had liked his 
ideas. Apparently Rosenberg interpreted this to mean
^^Ibid., p. 66. ^^Ibid., pp. 63-66.
43
that he had Hitler’s full support, but it is more likely
that Hitler gave his consent in principle and, as was his
practice, left it to his underlings to negotiate the means 
to achieve the desired end. In this case Rosenberg simply 
began to bargain and negotiate with other nazi leaders in 
order to stake out his area of influence and control. There 
is no evidence that Goring responded to this initiative; 
nevertheless, Rosenberg continued undaunted by following 
up his opening into OKW.
On November 9, 1940, he and Keitel signed an agree­
ment on ideological training in the armed forces. Briefly,
Rosenberg agreed to furnish literature and schooling ma­
terial to OKW on a continuing basis, to establish training 
courses for officers and Wehrmacht officials who would in 
turn conduct instruction within armed forces installations, 
and to furnish speakers to Wehrmacht courses of instruction.
OKW, for its part, would take care of all details, sched-
37ules, and orders. The army initially turned down the 
entire agreement; OKH had already started its own program 
and wanted no interference from OKW. Therefore, OKW began 
to apply pressure on the Army High Command and pointed out 
that Hitler himself had commissioned Rosenberg with the 
duty of overseeing ideological training and that this would 
in no way interfere with the army's new program. On
pp. 14-15-
^^BAK, Kanzlei Rosenberg, NS 8/236. Abschrift,
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January 19, 1941, OKH stated flatly that the army could 
only accept that part of the Keitel-Rosenberg agreement 
which provided that the Amt Rosenberg would provide liter­
ature and schooling material to the armed forces. This 
left little of the agreement in effect as far as the army 
was concerned, and the invasion of the U.S.S.R. plainly 
showed OKH that the soldiers needed no ideological spur-
38ring. Victory over the primitive Russians appeared easy.
The army's new program was termed spiritual 
39Betreuung. Spiritual Betreuung in the army was conducted
exclusively by the unit commander and received no special 
emphasis since the German soldiers had been everywhere 
victorious. Such troops needed no special gimmicks to 
make them fight harder or better. The program stressed 
normal military matters, such as discipline, success in 
combat, example of superiors, and concern for the well­
being of subordinates--a traditional leadership program
40with a fancy name.
^^Berghahn, "NSDAP und 'Geistige Fuhrung,'" 
pp. 29-31.
39Betreuung cannot be directly translated; it con­
cerned all measures involved with the physical and emo­
tional well-being of the troops in order to improve their 
fighting spirit. Since it will be used extensively in 
this study, henceforth it will be used in its German form 
but not italicized.
^^Berghahn, "NSDAP und 'Geistige Fuhrung,'" p. 26. 
Cited from Militargeschichtliche Forschungsamt, Freiburg, 
WOl-6/345 (OKW 1511). Auszug aus der Verfugung des Genstab 
d. H./Abt.z.b.V. (0 QU IV), January 26, 1940; verbal in­
formation to Berghahn from Prof. Dr. Hess, October l4, I965
CHAPTER III
STEPS TOWARD THE NSFO SYSTEM
The Betreuung Officer 
For the next year and a half the status of ideolog­
ical training and Betreuung remained basically the same; 
nevertheless, events were forcing a change. The winter of 
194I-I942 had been harsh, and the German soldiers had suf­
fered terribly after their offensive had bogged down. The 
old assumption that the German soldier only needed proper 
leadership to be victorious was being questioned; in addi­
tion the leadership itself fell under scrutiny.^ In the 
4th Army, it was reported that the troops were completely
apathetic and incapable of carrying their weapons or of
o
doing their jobs. By June 1942 Army Group South had begun 
its drive toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus; Army Group
Volker R. Berghahn, "NSDAP und 'Geistige Fuhrung' 
der Wehrmacht 1939-1943," Viertel.jahrshef te fur Zeitge- 
schichte I7 (1969): 32. Cited from Gustav Harteneck,
"Die 2. Armee zieht sich aus dem Schlamm," Foreign Mili­
tary Study (Historical Division, Hq. U.S. Army, Europe),
p . 22.
^Ibid., p. 33 « Cited from Militargeschichtliche 
Forschungsamt, Freiburg, WOl-6/326 (OKW 732), extract of 
a report by Major Gehmichen on his visit to the 4th Army 
at the front from February 9-24, 1942, undated.
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Center was in a see-saw battle in front of Moscow; and 
Army Group North was besieging Leningrad and mopping up 
partisans behind the lines. As a result of the deteriora­
tion of morale and in order to spur the spirit of the of­
fensive, a double impetus for strengthening the army's 
Betreuung activity occurred nearly simultaneously from two 
different directions--from Army Group Center and from Field 
Marshal Keitel.
One such proposal for ideological training came 
from a major of reserves, Wilhelm Freiherr von Lersner who 
was serving in Army Group Center. Lersner had joined the 
Intelligence Section (Ic) in April 1942 at a time when the 
memory of the harsh conditions of the previous winter was 
still fresh in everyones' minds. Ever since World War I 
when he had been a prisoner of war, Lersner had thought a 
great deal on the leadership question and officer-soldier 
relations. Because of his experiences, he had worked after 
1918 as the President of the Federation of former Prisoners 
of War (Reichsbundes ehemaliger Kriegsgefangener), and in 
connection with this function he had caught the attention 
of the high command just before war broke out. He was 
serving at that time as Rittmeister (Captain of Cavalry) in 
Wehrkreis XIC in Danzig and spent much of his time in the 
inspection of training and education for which he traveled 
extensively and delivered speeches at military schools.
3
Ibid., p. 35* From verbal information to Berghahn 
from Herr von Lersner, August 21, I965.
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In June 1942 Lersner presented a paper to his Chief of
Staff, General Otto Wohler, on the importance of new meas-
4
ures in the sphere of spiritual Betreuung. This impressed 
the Chief of Staff who sent Lersner to the 3rd Panzer Army 
to investigate methods for implementing these measures. It 
wasn't long before Lersner realized that a position would 
have to be created--a Division Betreuung Officer (DBO)--to 
supervise the entire Betreuung and propaganda program and 
to work with the unit commanders. Also, a Betreuung offi­
cer at field army level would have to oversee the entire 
program. The DBO would also have to serve as a teacher 
and distributor of Betreuung material and would have to 
stress to unit commanders that the noncommissioned offi­
cers had the principal duty of presenting a national so­
cialist image and example for their men to follow. The 
commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, where the experiment be­
gan, soon gave a hearty approval to the new program,^ and
g
that summer many divisions established the new positions. 
Although certain difficulties were associated with Army
4
Ibid. From a letter to Berghahn from Herr von 
Lersner, March 21, 1966.
^Ibid., pp. 35-37. Cited from NAM, T77, Roll 1039, 
Frames 6513257-69*
^Ibid., p. 37. Cited from NAM, T77, Roll 1039, 
Frames 6513217-20. Although Lersner's DBO would make a 
good theme in itself, it was only part of the picture and 
need not be investigated thoroughly here. For more de­
tails, see Berghahn's excellent article.
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Group Center's new program, what counted was that the DBO 
program was a child of the army itself.
A second initiative came from Keitel. On June 1, 
1942, he wrote the senior army commanders stating that 
Hitler had assumed supreme command of the army in order 
to bring the officer corps and the basic conception of 
state leadership into harmony; the field marshal saw his 
primary duty as furthering this goal by bringing the offi­
cer corps closer to Hitler and in deepening understanding 
for the Führer's acts. He then said he would soon trans­
mit Hitler's personal ideas concerning nazi ideology to
the senior commanders in the form of orders and instruc- 
7
tions. On June 11 OKH, clearly working closely with OKW 
for a change, directed field commands to appoint Offiziere 
fur Wehrgeistige Fuhrung (Officers for the Leadership of 
Spiritual Defense; the short title was, as in Army Group 
Center, "Betreuung Offizier" or B.O.) in the staffs of all 
commands down to regimental and battalion levels. They 
would perform their duties as B.O.s in addition to regu­
larly assigned duties, and OKH charged them with oversee-
g
ing both Betreuung and nazi ideological training. This 
latest nazification measure had first appeared on the daily
7
Waldemar Besson, "Zur Geschichte des National- 
sozialistishen Fuhrungs Offizier (NSFO," Vierteliahrs- 
hefte fur Zeitgeschichte, doc. no. 1 (January 19ol),__ g ^
o
NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frames I526319-2O,
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calendar of the Chief of Staff of the Army in March 1942
9
before the German Summer Offensive of that year, so it 
did not develop in a spirit of defeat as it could have 
after Stalingrad, but during a period of expected triumph. 
Nevertheless, it was conceived during the period of great 
trial of troop morale during the horrible winter of 1941- 
1942. In conception, therefore, it was undoubtedly a 
morale measure. Further, this date preceded Lersner's 
use of "Betreuung Officer," so it cannot be claimed that 
OKH borrowed the idea from Army Group Center. The re­
verse is more likely. Undoubtedly, the establishment of 
the B.O. was also an ideological measure since Hitler con­
sidered the war with the Soviet Union as one of ideological 
struggle. Accordingly, the Führer would want to stamp a 
firmer ideological countenance on his own army. Such a 
move would not have been necessary until the Wehrmacht met 
the politically oriented Soviet army since the campaigns 
in Poland and in the west took place on more traditional 
lines. Besides, Hitler, always an opportunist, had assumed 
direct command of the army in December 1941; thus the B.O. 
may have served as a measure for imprinting the Führer's 
personal mark on his army since he now was in a better po­
sition for getting what he wanted. Previously, the army 
had its own Commander-in-Chief which may have deterred 
Hitler from direct involvement in an army which had
^NAM, T?8 , Roll 134, Frame 6O63615.
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attained easy victories without showing total homage to 
nazism- Now the army had let him down in combat by fail­
ing to defeat the Soviet Union before the onset of winter. 
This too must have precipitated the establishment of the 
B.O, Furthermore, the actions of Hitler and the party 
had demonstrated since 1933» and especially since 1938, 
that the trend toward a thoroughly nazified army always 
took place in progressive moves. Seen in this way, the 
B.O. was just another step toward party infiltration of 
the army and the smashing of continued resistance to the 
Führer's desires which demanded complete subservience 
from his underlings. Hitler's continued success in the 
past, in spite of objections by many generals, progres­
sively opened more paths to nazification, and he always 
stood ready to take advantage of any opportunity. The 
still remaining prospect of total defeat of the Soviet 
forces gave him such an opportunity, and his army needed 
a shot in the arm. It had ground to a halt without taking 
Moscow and Leningrad, and the rigors of the Russian winter 
had taken its toll of the morale of the German fighting 
men. OKH instituted the new B.O. in an» army inferior to 
that of the previous year and during the struggle for 
manpower. Conceived to bring the officer corps into line, 
staff officers now expected the program to also bolster 
sagging morale and to make up for lack of training and 
efficiency by increasing the nazi outlook of the dispirited 
soldiers.
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In early June, Keitel spent considerable time on 
the subject, and OKW and OKH nazi staff officers told him 
that the Wehrgeistige Fuhrung program was essential, espe­
cially within the officer corps. They expected commanders 
to get personally involved, to emphasize the program, and 
to cooperate closely with the Gauleiter (Party District 
Leaders) through the Ic (intelligence Officer) of their 
staffs. During this period the OKH staff worked on a new 
regulation for the training of the troops in the nazi 
Weltanschauung and researched the measures used by the 
Soviet Politruk^^ while Keitel's promised orders and in­
structions went out in series. On July 3 he borbade com­
manders from assigning clergymen as B.O.s.^^ On July 15 
he wrote the commanders again and established the absolute 
prerequisites for officers selected as B.O.s: they must
have spiritual alertness, self-reliance, good judgment, an
appreciation for political activity, and a strong belief
12in questions of nazi ideology. From April to December
of that year staff work in OKW and OKH concentrated on
13courses of instruction for B.O.s, and soon good nazi 
generals in the field jumped wholeheartedly into the 
program.
l°lbid.. Frames 6063587, 6063603.
^^Ibid., Frame 6o635?4.
^^Besson, "NSFO," doc. no. 2, pp. 84-85.
^^NAM, T78, Roll 134, Frames 6063597-98, 6063603.
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On February 1, 1943, General Ferdinand Schorner, 
Commander of the XIX Mountain Corps on the Russian front 
and a devoted supporter of nazism, published a lengthy 
order of the day concerning the conduct of Wehrgeistige 
Fuhrung. He proclaimed to the troops that Hitler and 
nazism were the means to victory and placed the German- 
Soviet war squarely in the arena of ideology. Declaring 
the conflict a struggle for existence between the Reich 
and the U.S.S.R., he demanded that officers stress that 
soldiers fought for their homes and families and explained 
that the campaign in Russia was totally different from 
previous battles since communists led their troops fanat­
ically and the Soviet army fought bestially. Alluding to 
the need of lebensraum for the future of the German people,
he said the weakest of the combatants would not survive--
the one which possessed the strongest faith in the legiti­
macy of its cause and which ruthlessly followed its beliefs 
would win. It was a case of victory or death, and no of­
ficer had better quit or place himself "outside" of the 
nazi Weltanschauung. Schorner expected all officers to 
make good use of the long winter nights by conscientiously 
establishing soldierly comradery with the troops in the 
bunkers--to answer their questions and instill in them nazi 
confidence in victory. Precluding Soviet-style methods, he 
also added:
The officer as the leader of his men in battle is
also the bearer of nazi training. . . . There is no
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division between military and spiritual leadership.
. . . The iron discipline of the old army isn't
enough to win the war--[we] also need Weltanschauung.
He then pointed out that several divisions and groups had 
already seen results from using party personnel in their 
units as block and cell leaders in bunkers and strong 
points--just as Hitler had done in the earlier days of 
the party. He apparently felt it necessary to also state 
that the troops did not consider these party members as 
secret police agents. Nazi training, said the general, 
could not begin or end with weekly company instruction; 
on the contrary, it had to be conducted on a full time 
basis everyday. He directed that the most capable offi­
cers, those with youthful energy, must conduct weekly 
periods of nazi instruction for the troops, and he ex­
pected regimental commanders to instruct their battalion 
and unit commanders once each month on the execution of 
nazi training. Schorner also rebuked the divisions of
his corps for their reluctance in complying with his nazi
Iktraining requirements. OKH considered Schorner's 
thoughts so important that the Army High Command distrib­
uted copies of the letter to B.O.s throughout the German 
army as an outstanding example of nazi leadership, and 
his correct nazi attitude would lead to his appointment
tion on p. 88.
^^Besson, "NSFO," doc. no. 3, pp. 86-90. Quota-
^^Ibid., p. 78.
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as Chief of the National Socialist Leadership Staff of OKH 
on March l4, 1944.^^ The thoughts expressed in the letter 
undoubtedly formed the embryo for future NSFO concepts and 
methods.
A different spirit, however, existed in the Replace- 
1 *7ment Army; it was not until May l4 that its C-in-C, Colo­
nel General Friedrich Fromm, got around to implementing the 
Wehrgeistige Fuhrung program. Even then he gave his sub­
ordinate commands until July 1 to report the names of B.O.s
to his headquarters, and his order outlined the program
18briefly, without rhetoric.
In September and October an angry dispute developed 
between OKW and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army 
Group South while the Army Group, then withdrawing, made 
desperate attempts to get behind the Dnieper before the 
Russians could crush its overextended divisions. The III 
Panzer Corps and the 8th Army, backed by the field marshal, 
complained that OKW furnished out of date, erroneous, un- 
topical, if not spurious, information in its printed 
Betreuung instructions. Within OKW, staff officers bitterly
Karl Demeter, The German Officer Corps in Society 
and State 1650-1943, trans. Angus Malcolm (New York: Fred­
erick A. Praeger, Publishers, I965), app. 34, p. 365 « This 
appendix contains a copy of the directive issued on "Na­
tional Socialist Leadership in the Army" by Schorner two 
weeks after assuming his new post.
l^NAM, T78, Roll 134, Frames 6063597-98, 6063603.
1 ft
Besson, "NSFO," doc. no. 4, pp. 90-93*
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attacked the complaints point by point and charged the 8th 
Army (furiously pressed by the Russians) with not doing its 
job in the realm of nazi Weltanschauung. The field com­
mands felt that OKW under the circumstances expected too 
much and failed to give them the proper tools to do a 
proper job. Keitel himself wrote Manstein a sarcastic let­
ter, but both the commander of the 8th Army and Manstein
replied immediately with detailed proof of OKW's failure to
19provide indoctrination materials. This dispute may well 
have caused the Armed Forces High Command to henceforth pay 
closer attention to its propaganda publications.
The B.O. of the 1st Panzer Division published the 
concept and methods to be used in that division on Septem­
ber l6, 1943. He gave the goal of Wehrgeistige Fuhrung: 
to instill energy, belief, and faith in the troops, and he 
declared that any officer who failed to work toward these 
goals with all of his vigor was irresponsible. Simple con­
versation between officers and men, without expansive rhet­
oric and great style, he said, worked best. The unit com­
mander himself should talk to the troops during instruc­
tional periods (and not mere weekly periods 1) concerning 
topical questions, the situation at the fronts, the life 
of the people and their faith in German leadership and vic­
tory, and questions of nazi Weltanschauung. The commander 
should also discuss important political, economic, and
^^NAM T78, Roll 134, Frames 6063648-56.
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cultural questions, give the troops unlimited national 
socialist instruction and training, and must remain opti­
mistic and not delegate this duty. The more lively the 
discussion, the better the results. The division B.O. 
cited several tools available to the commander: maps,
newspapers, OKW information sheets, and the regularly 
issued Wehrmacht Bericht (Armed Forces Report). Above all,
behind the words officers must show deeds; they must set a
20national socialist example for the troops to follow. The 
Betreuung Officer evidently felt that not all officers were 
setting the proper example or serving as fit models, and 
there were examples which bore out such feelings.
In April 1944, a Captain Walter Hergel reported to 
the Party Chancellery about his visits to field units over 
an extended period from about February 1943 to March 1944. 
Commenting on the B.O.s in the Southern Area Command, he 
reported that General Friderici, the Commander-in-Chief, 
had selected his personal aide. Captain of Reserves Dr. 
Ameln, as the B.O., and Hergel termed him, as a political 
type, an "absolute nonentity." Ameln's predecessor. Cav­
alry Captain Kirstein was allegedly worse. Kirstein, "a 
rich landowner," supposedly occupied the position just to 
remain on the staff. Actually, Hergel reported, Kirstein 
was in charge of the Officer Club which to some extent he 
managed successfully. His only B.O. duties were in spending
^*^Ibid. , Frame 6063658.
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some time every day with "the effeminate actors in the 
Kharkov theater." He was simply "too lazy" to distribute 
the Betreuung material supplied to him, and the C-in-C 
himself had had to go from Kharkov to Konotop where to the 
shock of everyone, several boxcars were unexpectedly found 
containing games, playing cards, books, and so forth. To 
reduce the congestion, they had to be unloaded with a hay 
fork! Hergel also reported that despite warnings that 
those with religious allegiances should not be appointed 
as B.O.s, he knew of a pastor, a Captain Hunlich, who was 
B.O. of a unit. This sixty-year-old minister in uniform 
was called in officer circles the "Ehrgeistige Pastor"
("Ehrgeistige" was a play on the word Wehrgeistige and is 
translated as "ambitious"), and Hergel said that he was 
certainly no nazi or political leader. Party Member Willy
Ruder of the Party-Chancellery, upon hearing this, directed
• * 21 that Hunlich would be relieved of the duty at once. De­
spite reports of this kind, a giant step toward the NSFO 
had been made through the institution of the B.O. and the 
influence of nazi generals like Schorner, but more party 
involvement was needed to cross the barrier of Prussian 
military tradition.
21BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 360, Hauptmann 
Dr. Walter Hergel, Wehrgeistige Erziehung, April l4, 1944. 
Captain of Reserves Hergel also held the party rank of 
Gauhaup s t el lung sleiter and the SS rank of Hauptsturmfiihr er. 
He was at this time assigned to a unit in Minsk.
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Rosenberg Keeps Tryir.g 
On May l4, 1943, Martin Bormann, Rudolf Hess's re­
placement as Chief of the Party Chancellery (P-K), suddenly 
countered the attempts which Rosenberg had been making for 
several years to control the nazi indoctrination of the 
Wehrmacht. Bormann informed him that it was the task of 
the P-K to supervise the relationship between all party 
offices and the Wehrmacht and that in the future, approval 
had to be obtained from the P-K on questions between Rosen­
berg's office and the military before they could be taken
22up with the armed forces. This began Bormann's deep in­
volvement with the ideological question in the Wehrmacht, 
and his direct intervention should have given Rosenberg 
sufficient warning that his days of independence had ceased. 
This would not be the last time that Bormann would intervene 
strongly in Rosenberg's activities, and the P-K Chief's 
growing influence with Hitler would place him in a critical 
position to move far ahead of all other contenders for the 
job of influencing the armed forces. In fact, a few months 
later, on November 17, 1943, Rosenberg, undoubtedly because
of Bormann's influence with the Führer, would see Hitler
23for the very last time. Nevertheless, Rosenberg failed
O Q
BAK, Kanzlei Rosenberg, NS 8/188, Bormann to 
Rosenberg, May l4, 1943, Betrifft: Gestaltung des
Verhaltnisses Partei-Wehrmacht, p. 43-44.
^^Berghahn, "NSDAP und 'Geistige Fuhrung,'" 
p. 63n. Cited from Alfred Rosenberg, Letzte Aufzeichnungen 
(Gottingen: n.p., 1955), P- 2$0f.
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to take the hint and he stayed in the fray. However, 
since he could not match Bormann's influence with Hitler, 
he decided to make a show of cooperation rather than to 
compete. For his part, Bormann appeared perfectly willing 
to allow Rosenberg to work with the armed forces, but only 
if he did so under the former's supervision. From this 
time onward, Bormann retained his supremacy over party- 
Wehrmacht activities.
On September l8 , 1943, Bormann demonstrated his
newly increased power by inserting himself into a minor
agreement between Rosenberg and Keitel. A conference of
commanders-in-chief of the armed forces units stationed
in the homeland was to be held between the 11th and 15th
of October, and Keitel had asked Rosenberg to talk to the
participants about "The World Struggle, a Struggle of
Ideologies" and "Eastern Policy and Eastern Problems."
Bormann saw this as an opportunity to politically activate
the conference attendees, and on September l8 , 1943, he
requested that Rosenberg also mention the importance of a
politically oriented Wehrmacht and the need for the armed
forces to cooperate closely with the party. He added that
"Wehrmacht and party must be absolutely one in their 'dy-
24namics' and political cooperation." Rosenberg not only 
complied with Bormann's request, but on October 13 at the
24 BAK, Kanzlei Rosenberg, NS8/I3O, Bormann to 
Rosenberg, September I8 , 1943, pp. 40-4l.
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conference at Bad Schachen, he even went beyond Bormann's 
desire. He declared that Germany now was a revolutionary 
state; "the German armed forces [were] a revolutionary 
army" and "Hitler's revolution was the revolution of the 
idea of duty against the absence of honor and duty of the
25
former democratic time period." Regardless of Rosen­
berg's show of cooperation, however, he had not lost sight 
of his desire to control the nazi indoctrination of the 
armed forces if he could.
After a conference on November 17, 19^3i with 
Keitel, Rosenberg presented Hitler with a draft of an order 
designed to amplify the terms of the Keitel-Rosenberg agree­
ment of November 9, 1940. (As stated earlier, this was the 
last meeting that he ever had with the Führer.) Apparently 
Hitler approved the order in principle but wanted it re­
written in a more military style. On November 22, Rosen­
berg wrote Keitel and said that when he and General Rudolf 
Schmundt (Chief of the Army Personnel Office) could agree 
on a final wording of the order, he would send it on to the 
field marshal. He also informed Keitel that he had sub­
mitted various possibilities for the name of a new ideolog­
ical officer to Hitler and that the Führer had decided on 
the title "Officer for National Socialist Weltanschauung." 
With this decision, he believed that the "frequently agi­
tated" subject was settled and was convinced that Hitler
^^BAK, Kanzlei Rosenberg, NS8/I68, pp. 31-32,
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subscribed to the idea that the officer--the future NSFO-- 
should be independent of the la (Operations Officer and 
Chief of Staff) and the Ic (Intelligence Officer) and would 
report directly to the commander. It looked as if Rosen­
berg still believed that he might conduct the forthcoming 
program since he reminded Keitel that the field marshal 
had agreed to release thirty officers to his office for 
the purpose of intensifying ideological training. Rosen­
berg did not seem to be in any big hurry--he promised to 
furnish the names of the officers he wanted "as they came 
to mind."^^ This showed a basic failure in Rosenberg's 
thinking. He did not appreciate the value of speed while 
Martin Bormann did. Another basic fault of Rosenberg's 
was that he could not see the possibilities in the fast 
approaching NSFO program; his draft of a Führer Order was 
innocuous. It merely stated that Hitler approved the 
Keitel-Rosenberg agreement of November 19^0, that the 
ideological training of the Wehrmacht was important and 
urgent, and that the Führer ordered the continuance of the
training on the same basis as before but with a stronger 
27emphasis.
Rosenberg thought that a name for the new political 
officers "appeared to be" of the utmost importance. On
^^BAK, Kanzlei Rosenberg, NS8/174, Rosenberg to 
Keitel, November 22, 19^3i p. 142.
^^Ibid., Entwurf, p. l44.
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November 17 he and Keitel had agreed that he would recom­
mend to Hitler either "Officer for National Socialist 
Training" or "Officer for Weltanschauung Training" as the 
new title for the B.O. At that time, the Führer had de­
cided on the name, "Officer for National Socialist Weltan­
schauung," but now Rosenberg discovered that "after a talk 
with Reichsleiter [Reich Leader] Bormann," Hitler had de­
cided on the title, "Officer for National Socialist Leader­
ship." This disturbed Rosenberg, and on November 26 he 
asked Keitel to try to talk to the Führer about it; he did 
not believe that a "leadership" task could be assigned to 
someone subordinate to the commander; it belonged to the 
commander alone. On the other hand, the title "Officer 
for National Socialist Weltanshauung, " could freely belong.. 
to an officer placed completely and directly under the 
commander because he would only concern himself with nazi 
training--something to which the commander had little time
28to completely devote himself. That same day he wrote 
Hitler.
Reviewing for the Führer what had recently happened 
to the new title, Rosenberg admitted that he did not know 
the reasons for Hitler's change of mind, but he attempted 
nevertheless to convince his nazi boss that the officer 
would be involved only in training. Just as he had told
p . l4l.
28Ibid., Rosenberg to Keitel, November 26, 1943,
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Keitel, he again stressed that the leadership function be­
longed only to the commander. He complained that he and 
his co-workers had worked for many years in this area, and 
he requested a personal interview to discuss the question 
further. Finally, he stated that if the decision was made 
for reasons unknown to him, he requested that another offi­
cer, an "Officer for National Socialist Weltanschauung,"
be appointed on staffs to carry out the nazi training 
29task. The obvious reason for Rosenberg's stubbornness 
was a question of principle. For years he had been able 
to work with the armed forces independently. Now with the 
involvement of Bormann and Hitler himself, he was in danger 
of losing this independence. With a strong stand backed by 
traditional military concepts concerning the status and 
duties of commanders, perhaps he could gain military sup­
port against Bormann's "infringement" of his established 
"rights" which he had built up over the years. As proof 
that this was in essence a campaign against Bormann, he 
also wrote the P-K Chief that same day. Rosenberg said 
he was astonished to learn that on the basis of the party 
chief's intercession with hitler, the title had been 
changed, especially since Bormann had made no comment when 
he, Rosenberg, had informed the party boss of Hitler's
BAK, Kanzlei Rosenberg, NS8/I76, Meldung an den 
Führer (Rosenberg to Hitler), Betrifft: Weltanschauliche
Erziehung der Wehrmacht, November 26, 1943, pp. 21-22.
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decision. He requested that both he and Bormann go to see 
Hitler together.
Four days later Bormann responded to Rosenberg's 
letter and admitted that the Führer had changed his mind 
after talking to him. "Moreover," he wrote, "I must ob­
serve that the recommendation you made to the Führer was 
submitted without previously checking with me; I had to 
deliberate independently and immediately." Bormann warned 
that Hitler wanted to make it very clear that ideological 
schooling was only a part of political leadership. There­
fore, the Führer had chosen the new name and let the other 
one, which signified only part of the entire task, fall by 
the wayside. He added that the P-K had concerned itself 
"for some time" over these officers "whose creation and 
development resulted from its inspiration." [Emphasis 
added by the author.] He already had developed the general 
principles for the NSFO, he said, and the NSFO would be re­
sponsible to the commander for the entire national social­
ist leadership in the unit just as the la was responsible 
to the command for tactical leadership. Besides, it was 
"self-evident," he added, that the commander held the over­
all responsibility. Then Bormann described his concept of 
the NSFO's duties. Only one part of the officer's work was 
concerned with indoctrinating the troops in the nazi Weltan­
schauung; there was also the extensive task of providing 
political instruction and orientation, answering questions
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of the day, and discussing topical themes. Above all the 
NSFO would have to politically activate the troops and in­
still in them a nazi "will" for victory. The political 
officers would have to explain political questions for 
soldiers and their families and combat enemy propaganda 
through "preventive political explanation." They would 
constantly handle practical questions such as "fashioning 
party-armed forces relationships; party activity in the 
homeland, cooperation between party and Wehrmacht for the 
conduct of the war, etc." Bormann reminded Rosenberg that 
many political suggestions and demands had been sent out 
by the P-K which had been weakened by military orders and 
regulations; in the future the NSFO would distribute them 
to the officers and the troops. Then in a more personal 
vein, Bormann pointed out some of the practical problems 
involved in the nazi direction of the program.
The P-K must represent all party offices in armed 
forces matters. Where would we end up if, in addi­
tion to you, Reichsminis ter Dr. Goebbels, Reichsleiter 
Dr. Ley and the remaining concerned Reich Leaders,
Reich Ministers, and other political leaders of the 
Reich, side by side, and all too often in opposition, 
would deal directly with the High Command of the 
Armed Forces and with the individual High Commands!
Bormann appealed to Rosenberg for his understanding and 
said that only one official could answer to the commander 
for political activity. The P-K could not accept responsi­
bility for the double apparatus Rosenberg had suggested-- 
one for political leadership and the other for schooling in 
nazi Weltanschauung. It would cause conflicts of comp cence
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in the Wehrmacht like those repeatedly occurring in the 
party. To soften the blow somewhat, the party chief 
assured Rosenberg that the ideological orientation and 
development of the NSFOs would be the latter's responsi­
bility within the limits of the Keitel-Rosenberg agreement 
of 1940 and that he would personally support the effort 
"as before." Nevertheless, and in spite of the agreement, 
the P-K "obviously" had to have responsibility for the 
entire party-armed forces relationship and this would in­
clude issuing suggestions and instructions for moderating 
the politically guided orientation of the troops and for 
the management of current political factors. Further, the 
P-K would help OKW in the orientation of the officer corps 
and especially of the NSFOs. Finally, he revealed that he 
had been sitting on Rosenberg's letter to Hitler of Novem­
ber 26 by asking whether, after this explanation, Rosen-
30berg still wanted it to go to Hitler. Although most 
people would have probably surrendered at this point to 
the brutal Bormann, apparently Rosenberg was not the type 
to give up so easily; he became a constant thorn in Bor­
mann' s side on the subject until months after the NSFO had 
been instituted by Hitler.
BAK, Kanzlei-Rosenberg, NS8/I89, Bormann to 
Rosenberg, Betrifft: Offizier fur nationalsozialistische
Fuhrung (abgekurzt: NS-Fuhrungsoffizier), November 30,
1943, pp. 31-35- To the author's knowledge, this document 
was the first in which the initials NSFO were used.
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On December 8, 1943, Rosenberg wrote Bormann in 
an attempt to salvage some of his lost prestige. He said 
he had no doubt at all that the P-K should serve as the 
central representative between the Wehrmacht and the party 
offices and asked the party chief to question Party Member 
Hermann Passe of the P-K to ascertain that on every occa­
sion Rosenberg's office had cooperated fully and had al­
ways shown consideration to members of the P-K. Further, 
he did think that he should only be held responsible for 
what his office did and not for what other offices did. 
After all, he had only done what Hitler had commissioned 
him to do and had only followed the Keitel-Rosenberg agree­
ment of 1940. Then he moved to the attack. "In any case," 
he wrote, "I fail to recognize that an abundance of other 
questions have [to be] treated by the P-K with 0K¥." He 
complained that an entire month had been given over to a 
very concrete designation for the officer concerned with 
ideological training. Various names had been recommended 
and turned down and the subject had been a constant topic 
of conversation with Passe. Insofar as his work was con­
cerned, Rosenberg merely wanted to answer the questions 
which officers had about the significance of the war, the 
nature of the enemy, and the German national ideal in the 
struggle with other ideologies.
After touting his past successes and services to 
the party chancellery and the military, he said that it
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appeared to him that the questions which the P-K had 
settled with the Wehrmacht were those pertaining almost 
exclusively to matters concerning the Party Chancellery 
and OKW; they had hardly any relation at division and 
certainly not at regimental level. He conceded that the 
P-K should serve as a clearing house between the armed 
forces and party offices and added that this would cer­
tainly be the P-K's frequent function in questions of 
employing "Officers for National Socialist Weltanschauung." 
(He just could not give up the use of this title.) He 
believed that if a special OKW Propaganda Staff could work 
closely with the Propaganda Ministry and in a "personal 
union" with the Reich propaganda leadership, the nazi 
ideology itself would be sufficient to enable the already 
existing "Wehrgeistige Betreuung" officer to handle the 
job under the guidance of Rosenberg's office. The man 
who showed such a stubborn concern for proper titles 
seemed to be confused on the proper title of the B.O., 
and this mangling of the full title with the short title 
indicates that perhaps Rosenberg actually knew very little 
about the program in effect at that time. It surely could 
not have raised his prestige in the eyes of Bormann who 
prided himself on exactness. After this obvious attempt 
at gaining support from Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the Propaganda 
Minister, Rosenberg turned to his last conference with 
Hitler. It was not his fault, he said, that Bormann had
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not been present. He had wanted to talk to the leader of 
the P-K, but it had not been possible; therefore, he had 
asked Field Marshal Keitel for his views. As far as he 
knew, his various recommendations to the Führer contained 
no prejudgment on any question relating to current coopera­
tion between the P-K and the Wehrmacht. He reminded Bor­
mann that they had discussed these points before and that 
the leader of the P-K had not said anything which would 
indicate that any misunderstanding had taken place. Fi­
nally, he recommended again that they both go to see Hitler
31on the question.
Ignoring Rosenberg's desire to see the Führer, on 
December 12, 1943, Bormann sent Rosenberg a telegram which 
stated that the nazi thinker's assumption that the inter­
view with Hitler on November 17 had settled the entire 
matter was "false." "Instead," the message continued,
"the Führer, as I already told you, had not definitely 
chosen one of the original designations and not even one 
[recommended] by you." Bormann made it very clear through 
repetition that Hitler made the final decision on the NSFO 
title and that OKW had already communicated this decision 
to the armed forces. "To stress it again," Bormann wrote 
tersely, "the title was not chosen by Hitler because of
31Ibid., Rosenberg to Bormann, Betrifft: Ihr
Schreiben vom 30.11.1943, Offizier fur nationalsozialis­
tische Fuhrung, December 8, 1943, pp. 26-28.
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the distribution of tasks which exist outside the armed
forces but only to make the all-embracing mission clear
32within the armed forces.
On December 13 Bormann and Hitler had a philo­
sophical talk on the subject of "Wehrgeistige" versus 
"National Socialist" Leadership. Rosenberg had apparently 
come up with the idea of an Academy for Wehrgeistige Re­
search and Training, and the Führer flatly turned down the 
concept. He told Bormann that the entire party had to get 
involved in the new NSFO program and said that his posi­
tion on Wehrgeistige leadership was the same as that pub­
lished by Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler on October 20, 
1942--a publication which he himself had approved. This 
publication by Himmler stated that the term "Wehrgeistige" 
was not national socialist, but liberal in thought, con­
tent, and origin. It had come forth from bourgeois class 
society and furthered a class concept. Class consciousness 
also related to the military profession which for 200 years 
had created great prestige for itself through its accom­
plishments; however, these accomplishments found their ex­
pression in a special social form and decorum. The armed 
forces became politically and ideologically neutral and 
laid no special duty on the individual other than main­
taining the prescribed social form. Without prejudice to
32Ibid., Telegram, Bormann to Rosenberg, Betrifft 
NS.-Fuhrungs Offizier, December 12, 1943, 14.37, p . 20.
71
this form, wrote Himmler, one could still be liberal, 
clerical, "unbiological," and unsocialistic. As long as 
princely houses were at hand and approved of this form, 
the military profession could retain this neutrality.
However, the officer corps forgot that the liberal por­
tion of its membership had destroyed its inner structure 
and that, through difficult political exactions on each 
individual professing political neutrality, the entire 
military profession was shattered. A second way to be 
"fashionable" in the manner of the bourgeoisie was secured 
through membership with or nearness to the "intellectuals" 
(Geistigen). At the same time, the intellectual profes­
sion of faith demanded nothing from them in the bourgeois 
period since they were pronounced as "free." In particular, 
one could remove oneself, in the name of the "geistigen" 
profession of faith, from the hard and ugly political strug­
gle with "sub-humanity." When the new nazi state was cre­
ated in Germany, Himmler continued, many people who were 
apathetic or even opposed to nazism saw the possibility of 
cooperating with the new state when their special interests 
were involved, but they held themselves completely aloof 
from the state's ideological demands. Those people who had 
still not realized that the Third Reich was totalitarian in 
its ideological concept should now realize it, he wrote, 
because the war with the Soviet Union made it profoundly 
clear that liberal, ideologically neutral individuals could
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not survive in a conflict with an enemy like the fanatical 
bolsheviks. The communists and their sub-humanity could 
only be beaten by a better ideology which was sufficiently 
totalitarian to fanaticize and permeate its adherents to 
the last fiber of their bodies with its essence. He wrote 
that Hitler had prophesied that "No bourgeois state will 
survive this war." Himmler concluded by prophesying also. 
He said that in the future no bourgeois, ideological neu­
tral soldiery would exist anymore and that the future be­
longed to the political soldiers; "Wehrgeistige" concepts 
in the liberal sense were not sufficient. Hitler's un­
qualified support of this fuzzy theory, of course, defi­
nitely meant the end of the army's "W ehr geistige Fuhrung" 
program. Bormann notified Rosenberg about the Führer's
decision, and to make his point stronger, he sent him a
33copy of Himmler's publication.
It was not until December 29, 1943, that Bormann 
answered Rosenberg's letter of December 8. Apparently he 
had done some checking. He told Rosenberg that, according 
to reports by some of his underlings, several instances of 
agreements between Rosenberg's office and the Wehrmacht had 
taken place without the approval of the P-K. Further, some 
of his people had told Rosenberg that the P-K could not
3 3Ibid., Bormann to Rosenberg, Betrifft: Verein-
barung uber die Akademie fur wehrgeistige Forschung und 
Erziehung, December 13, 1943, pp. 13-l4. Also Abschrift, 
"Anlage zum Befehl des Chefs des SS-Hauptamtes vom 
20.10.1942," pp. 15-18.
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accept the titles suggested by the nazi thinker, and Passe 
had informed staff members of the Amt Rosenberg on one 
occasion, before Hitler made his decision, that the P-K 
intended to push for the title of "Officer for Political 
Leadership." He then reminded Rosenberg that at Bad 
Schachen the nazi ideologist himself had recommended to 
the Chief of the General Armed Forces Office that this 
title should be expanded into "Officer for Political Lead­
ership and Weltanschauung Training." After this, the sud­
den recommendation to Hitler on November 17 had been com­
pletely new and previously unknown to either himself or 
Passe. Furthermore, Bormann said, he had never advanced 
the idea that Rosenberg's office would have any say in the 
selection of NSFOs; only the P-K could make such recommen- 
dations. Thus, by the end of the year Bormann had 
clearly established his predominance over Rosenberg in the 
question of party-armed forces relations. In the meantime, 
however, Rosenberg and Bormann were not the only ones in­
terested in the nazification of the armed forces.
Colonel Huebner and the SS 
The Führer also got involved in the ideological 
indoctrination of the armed forces through the medium of 
a pamphlet written by an army colonel. Colonel Huebner,
34Ibid., Bormann to Rosenberg, Betrifft: Offizier
fur nationalsozialistische Fuhrung, December 29, 1943i
pp. 1-2.
74
while an army regimental commander associated with an SS 
division on the Russian front, had become acquainted with 
the literature used for the ideological and political in­
doctrination of Waffen-SS units. Impressed with this ma­
terial, he turned to Obergruppenfuhrer Gottlob Berger of 
the SS Main Office with the request that the SS place some 
of its chief publications and collected materials at the 
disposal of his regiment. Berger complied with the re­
quest. Then on September 1, 1943, Huebner went to see 
Berger personally to ask for assistance in composing a 
memorandum on the training of the German officer corps, 
specifically a text for ideological indoctrination. The 
army colonel had already explained his project to General 
Schmundt, and the general agreed with the plan. At that 
time the new Waffen-SS service regulations on this subject 
had not yet been published, and Himmler had them in his 
possession. Berger, "out of a little vanity and also some 
personal egoism" wanted to wait until the SS published the 
regulations first so that the "Black Order" would receive 
credit for the ideas. Therefore, he maintained a cool 
reserve at first, but after considering "the ideological 
distress in which the army in particular finds itself," 
Berger decided to cooperate. In this way Huebner and the 
SS Main Office collaborated in writing the pamphlet, Wofur
^^BAK, Sammlung Schumacher 36?, Abschrift, Berger 
to Himmler, June 3i 1944.
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katnpfen wir? (What Are We Fighting For?). When completed, 
Berger sent a copy to Himmler with a comment that the SS 
Chief would very often find his own phrases and reasoning 
in the document. Huebner submitted the work to General 
Schmundt who first discussed it with Himmler and then pre­
sented it to the Führer. On the express desire of Schmundt, 
the cooperation with the SS was never mentioned, except 
perhaps to Hitler, so as to obtain an easier acceptance of
36the work by the armed forces.
Huebner himself revealed some of the concepts and 
reasons for the memoir. He had sent an early treatise of 
his ideas, dated "Russia, May 19^3i" through military chan­
nels to Generals Schmundt and Burgdorf (Burgdorf also 
worked in the Army Personnel Office), and both generals 
liked it. At that time Huebner lacked full confidence in 
his ability to convert his ideas into a concrete training 
program. He believed that an assignment to the "Truppen- 
betreuung" Office in OKH in Berlin was imminent and wanted 
a chance to put his ideas into action--a thing he felt 
about most strongly. His faith in nazism appeared emo­
tional and mystical; he declared that "his nazi image of 
the world" was strongly established at the moment he dis­
covered that nazism was an inherent element of German
36
Ibid. See also: BAK, Personlicher Stab Reich-
fuhrer SS, NS19/neu 750, Berger to Himmler, Betrifft: 
Denkschrift uber die Erziehung des deutschen Offizierkorps 
von Oberst Dr. Huebner, September 11, 1943.
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history. This was the heady stuff on which the nazi leaders 
thrived, so he had a good opportunity to receive their sup­
port if he could only put his ideas down on paper. He be­
lieved that ideological schooling in the army should make 
it clear to the soldiers that nazism was not only a time- 
conditioned political demand which one could fathom with 
the intellect, but "national socialism must be felt with 
the heart, with the soul . . . and bring one consciousness
of his ancestors, ancestor worship, etc." With the promul­
gation of such ideas in the army, he believed the existing 
differences between the Waffen-SS and the Wehrmacht would 
vanish. In his mind the SS stood as a "solid block" which 
should play the main role in the permeation of the German 
nation with nazism. Naturally, this would interest Himmler, 
but Huebner did not want his SS connections known since 
this might cause him to encounter difficulties in the army.
Therefore, he wanted to submit his text to the SS Chief in
37an unofficial and personal way. His method was to work 
through Berger, and he kept the SS-Obergruppenfuhrer fully 
informed.
On October 1 Huebner wrote a lengthy progress report 
for Berger which demonstrated how fanatical an idealist can
BAK, Personlicher Stab Reichsfuhrer SS, NS 19/neu 
750, Chief of Amt W VII, SS Wirtschaft-Verwaltungshauptamt 
to RFSS, Betrifft: Oberst Huebner, July 15, 19^3- See
also: ibid., Denkschrift (Entwurf) uber die weltanschau­
liche Schulung in der Wehrmacht (Heer), von Oberst. Dr. 
Huebner, Kommandeur Grenadier-Regiment 529i Mai 1943.
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be when he sets out to convince others of his ideas. He 
had given a copy of the report to Schmundt the previous 
day, and the general had given it his heartiest approval; 
Schmundt also agreed to present it to Hitler whom he had 
already briefed on the subject. Now, however, Huebner 
worried about how to introduce his ideas to the army. He 
thought that the only profitable way was to issue an uncom­
promising order to all officers requiring them to engrain 
vigorously the various themes, especially the ideas regard­
ing the nazi Weltanschauung, into every soldier. Musing 
over the various officers who would have a responsibility 
in the matter, he thought some of them lacked sufficient 
energy to force an ideological breakthrough; others had 
little conviction, if any, of the need for training the 
troops in nazi ideas. Thus, only an order by Hitler him­
self which unmistakably spelled out the duty of each offi­
cer to be a fertile and active bearer of the nazi Weltan­
schauung would work.
Huebner knew quite well that traditionalist atti­
tudes dominated the army, but he expected no serious re­
sistance since the officer corps lacked unity on the sub­
ject. The young officers, to include even members of the 
general staff, would support the effort, he believed, and 
would be glad finally to hear a clear word on nazi indoc­
trination. As for older officers, he predicted that not 
one of them had sufficient courage to risk disturbing the
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nation's fighting strength by opposing the indoctrinational 
effort. After all, he thought that the officer corps' op­
position to nazism existed because of a misunderstanding 
anyway; up to now the officers had just not received proper 
instruction. The Seecktian inheritance had turned the of­
ficer corps into a "pure, military monkdom," he decided.
Asserting that General Schmundt had charged him 
with the preparation of an order to accompany the nazi 
treatise, he declared to Berger his intent to draw up a 
Führer Order because of his conviction of the "greatness 
of our national socialist world." He asked if Himmler, 
his "great hope," could obtain the sanction for such an 
order and asked Berger to approach the Reichsfuhrer-SS in 
his behalf. At the moment Huebner was waiting for Hitler's 
decision. Berger, eager to help, asked Himmler to speak to
38the Führer as soon as possible. Berger also told his SS 
Chief that he had assured Huebner of the fullest support 
and that he had told him the Reichsfuhrer-SS would "attend 
to this matter in particular and would never leave him in 
the lurch." At this time Berger also expressed his atti­
tude toward the army generals. "This entire monstrous 
situation in which the higher officer corps finds itself" 
originated, he said, in the fact that for the first time 
in recent history an officer corps existed which did not
n Q
Ibid., Berger to Himmler, Betrifft: Brief des
Obersten Huebner, October 10, 1943. Enclosure: Huebner
to Berger, October 1, 1943.
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align itself with its highest commander--Adolf Hitler.
Berger noted that all officers had sworn a personal oath
to Hitler, but he had a strong conviction that although
they had done it with "sober and pure consciences," they
lacked an "inner affection for the ideas of their highest
commander." As a result, he judged that they lacked the
strength demanded by an unprecedented bitter and unrelent- 
39ing war.
On October 13, 1943, Huebner reported to Berger
that Hitler had passed judgment. The Führer gave the
pamphlet (Vofur kampfen wir?--What are We Fighting For?)
his "greatest approval" and had decided to establish it as
the foundation for ideological instruction in all three
military services. He further declared his willingness to
write a personal introduction in which he would explain
"the biological development of national socialism." The
Army Personnel Office would publish it in 300,000 copies
for the officer corps, and a Führer Order composed by
Huebner would accompany it. After outlining the plans for
his next work, Huebner demonstrated a messianic complex
buttressed by egotism. He wrote,
I am extraordinarily happy in the realization that 
now the lofty and holy world of Adolf Hitler will 
stride forth in the numerically strongest frater­
nity of men [namely] in the German officer corps 1
39Ibid., Berger to SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr. 
Brandt, Betrifft: Brief des Obersten Huebner, October 10,
1943.
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. . . The spirit of Horst Wessel and the heroes of
the 9th of November, 1923 will now step out bravely
in the army also and accompany our army in its
titanic strugglel Now victory cannot be denied us.40
The pamphlet was based primarily on the compendium of ideas
Huebner wrote in Russia in May 1943. This earlier work
shows without doubt that Huebner's ideas were influential
in some of the NSFO thinking and structure, and thus it is
even more important than Wofur kampfen wir? to this study.
The central idea of the May 1943 memorandum was 
that Hitler had resurrected former deeply rooted German 
ideas which Rome and the Jews had suppressed and that most 
of the German people, generals, the officer corps, and 
troops did not really understand Hitler's Weltanschauung. 
Nazism had taken very slow root in the Wehrmacht because 
most officers saw in it only a political movement. The 
distaste of the officer corps for all politics, especially 
for socialist parties, created a strong inner defense 
against the National Socialist German Workers' Party. The 
words "socialist," "workers," and "party" automatically 
created distrust. Accordingly, the officer corps fell back 
on neutrality and indifference as their defense against
4oIbid., Abschrift, Huebner to Obergruppenfuhrer 
(presumably Berger), October 13, 1943. See also: BAK,
Sammlung Schumacher 36?, Abschrift, Berger to Himmler, 
June 3, 1944. Horst Wessel was a nazi hero killed in 
street fighting with communists before Hitler came to 
power, and the heroes of the 9th of November, 1923, were 
those nazis killed in the abortive "Hitler Putsch" in 
Munich on that date. The text of Wofur kampfen wir? can 
be found in Sammlung Schumacher under the title of 
Inhaltsverzeichnis.
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nazism. "The officer corps lived in the world of Frederick 
the Great," not realizing that the "German way of living" 
(i.e., nazism) had received a strong impetus from Freder­
ick's reign. As a result, the officer, although honored 
for his character and readiness for combat, became separ­
ated from the nation. "In spite of universal military 
service, the army was still no peoples' army," and the 
officer corps failed to realize that nazism was not only 
a political movement, but above all, it was a German way 
of looking at the world conditioned by blood; it had the 
goal of renewing all aspects of German life. Especially 
the older officers, Huebner warned, had to be filled with 
enthusiasm and must be convinced of this idea. However, 
this could not happen just by sending higher party leaders 
to deliver speeches in officer circles. It amazed Huebner 
that the older officers continued their neutral stance 
even when Hitler himself was the supreme military commander 
of the armed forces. The only solution to the problem was 
that the party and the armed forces, "uniting in a single 
Weltanschauung," had to provide an extremely strong im­
pulse for imbuing the armed forces with nazi idealism. 
Within the Wehrmacht, it was "the great and holy task of 
each officer, from the commanding general down to the 
youngest lieutenant" to further this task. The noncom­
missioned officers also had to get involved to build a 
nazi Wehrmacht. He wrote:
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An army of millions was fighting for the great Ger­
man cause of Adolf Hitler against the old, perpetual 
ancestral enemies. And only a small number of sol­
diers know [anything] about the deepest significance 
of this struggle. . . . This struggle can never be
decided with weapons alone. At the front always 
stands the idea . . . We have set ourselves the task
of wanting to recover German Europe, while the major­
ity of our nation still does not know much about the 
German world.
Huebner also criticized the sporadic ideological 
training of the past when unit commanders had used methods 
and content according to their own opinions. This alone 
created danger, and uniform concepts were needed. He cited 
a case of 100 recruits of whom not one had a clear under­
standing of national socialism; they could only spout mean­
ingless phrases. On the other hand, Soviet deserters and 
prisoners of war reported a very intensive ideological 
schooling program in the Soviet army while the German army 
had little, if any. A first lieutenant of Huebner's regi­
ment reported on his return from a company commander’s 
course, that in addition to one single lecture on an ideo­
logical theme, a clergyman spoke to them once.
The colonel wrote that the majority of the soldiers 
had an interest in the nazi Weltanschauung and desired in­
struction in it. Thus, the only requirement was to make 
the instruction interesting and to do it properly. To 
carry out a uniform program, he recommended the assignment 
of a Betreuungsoffizier to "every regiment, independent 
unit, military school, course of instruction, garrison, 
etc." The B.O. should be an older qualified officer (First
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Lieutenant or Captain) who was not confessionally committed. 
If the supply of officers permitted, these officers should 
have full time B.O. duties on the regimental staff. Under 
supervision of the commander, they would be responsible for 
ideological schooling and Betreuung and could offer valuable 
assistance to commanders in officer and noncommissioned of­
ficer training. He recommended that B.O.s should attend 
three to four week courses at army or army group level 
within the homeland where party and SS speakers would par­
ticipate. Their task would include indoctrinating the en­
tire officer and noncommissioned officer corps as well as 
the troops in the nazi Weltanschauung and "to enthuse them 
for the world of Adolf Hitler." He warned that the B.O. 
should not follow the example of the Soviet Politruk; in­
stead he should act as an assistant to the commander who 
had little time to devote to ideological indoctrination.
He would forward an experience report through normal serv­
ice channels quarterly. Huebner laid great emphasis on 
making nazi literature available to the officers and troops 
and specified certain books and information which should be 
readily available at company level. Every newspaper at the 
front should contain at least one article of ideological or 
historical significance, and above all, articles should ap­
pear about "our German ancestors." He conceded that a great 
number of soldiers would exhibit indifference and lethargy 
but believed that this would no doubt arise partly because
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of a "lack of racial substance," partly through religious 
commitment, and partly through "an almost traditional in­
difference" inculcated in the family and school system.
After the war, the state would have to conduct a Kultur- 
4lkampf, he said.
The party itself would have to give a new and 
much stronger impulse to the indoctrinational effort, and 
it would be "the great mission of the Wehrmacht" to be 
the handmaiden of the party. "Wehrmacht, party and its 
organizations, and SS have to become one single ideologi­
cal block," he wrote. Again referring to the Russian 
example, he cited communist party members and function­
aries as the single support for the moral fighting 
strength of the Soviet army; he noted that each Soviet 
company always had fanatic party people who upheld the 
communist idea. Although the Soviet example showed how 
only a couple of men could affect others, it would "ob­
viously" not apply to the German circumstances "since 
the German people and the German Wehrmacht exhibited an 
essentially higher compactness." Huebner believed that 
the officer corps, especially the younger officers, 
showed a deep interest in the nazi Weltanschauung, and 
even the noncommissioned officers were ready for it.
4lKulturkampf--cultural battle--was the name given 
to Bismarck's attempt to eliminate the influence of the 
Catholic Church in Prussia in the latter half of the nine­
teenth century.
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He concluded, therefore, that the men would surely
4 2follow.
The Threads Converge 
So far, the threads leading to the NSFO had in­
cluded: the army's own initiatives in Army Group Center
through the ideas of Lersner, in OKH with the backing of 
the Army Personnel Office, and through the ideas of a 
solitary army colonel with SS backing and help; the 
Keitel-Rosenberg thread at OKW where the two contracting 
parties showed unmistakable signs that each wanted to 
control the nazi indoctrinational effort with his own 
hands; and the intervention of Bormann and the Party 
Chancellery. It was the latter thread which loomed as 
the most ominous. Eventually, Bormann would be able to 
shove the others aside and have his own ideas adopted 
as the basis for the creation of the NSFO, but in the 
meantime the army continued its cooperative attitude.
On October 24, 19^3, the subject of Wehrgeistige 
Fuhrung filled the greater part of Field Marshal Keitel's 
daily calendar, and he had the OKW and OKH staffs busy 
coordinating with Hermann's Party Chancellery on how to 
either turn the B.O. into an "officer for political lead­
ership" or start from the beginning. Military staff
BAK, Personlicher Stab Reichsfuhrer SS, NS 19/neu 
750, Denkschrift (Entwurf) uber die weltanschauliche 
Schulung in der Wehrmacht (Heer), von Oberst Dr. Huebner, 
Kommandeur Grenadier Regiment 529, Mai 1943.
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officers now looked into creating official positions for
political officers and in giving them extensive school- 
3ing. Considering the political inexperience and 
naivete of the general staff officers, it is doubtful 
whether many of them, even the most nazi inclined among 
them, knew the potential of what they were spawning.
^^NAM, T78, Roll 134, Frame 6063557-
CHAPTER IV
ESTABLISHMENT AND CONCEPT OF THE NSFO
Hitler and Bormann Set the Guidelines 
In a June 1943 address at Breslau to Commanding 
Generals in the Replacement army. Hitler had emphasized 
the urgent need for stronger political-ideological leader­
ship of the soldiers, and as seen earlier, he personally 
made the decision to entitle the officer charged with this 
task, "Offizier fur National Sozialist Fuhrung"--short 
title, NSFO. On December 8 OKH, not waiting for a formal 
announcement from OKW, showed its independent spirit by 
formally announcing the new name and by stating that the 
change decidedly widened the former concept of military 
leadership. To the normal job of leadership, the announce­
ment stated, the Führer had now added the building of a 
political will to increase the striking power of the entire 
Wehrmacht by making all soldiers national socialists. Not 
mere speeches, but a clear knowledge of what Hitler had 
given the German people in his ideology would be necessary 
for national socialist leadership (NSF) work. Wehrgeistige 
Fuhrung had had a basis in ideology, OKH "mistakenly"
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declared, and this would continue, but now the Supreme War
Lord demanded a more grandiose goal--to awaken the deepest
energy of the nation which was embodied in every German
soldier.^ The OKH announcement could only have been a
formality, since the very next day the Commanding General
of Wehrkreis VII published two letters to his command on
the new program and announced that a Wehrkreis "primer"
for weekly NSF instruction had gone to the publisher that 
2
same day. This indicated that the move toward the new 
program had been no great secret and that subordinate army 
commands must have known of the new program before its 
formal announcement.
Despite the army's immediate response to the 
Führer's desires, the real driving force in the creation 
of the NSFO program was the Chief of the Party Chancellery 
rather than military men. In a series of handwritten notes 
which he drafted on December 21, 1943, Martin Bormann made 
it clear that he had no intention of letting each individ­
ual military service operate its own NSFO program. In­
stead, he wanted a central office to be created in OKW to 
supervise and control the entire scheme. Bormann, however, 
was concerned about finding the right man to head the of­
fice. Keitel was not the one because his authority was 
insufficient, and the field marshal was already causing
^NAM, T77, Roll 1039, Frames 6512892-93- 
^NAM, T79, Roll 80, Frames 615-I6 .
89
problems. Keitel had told Bormann that there were already 
5000 people in OKW and that, because of the need for econo­
mising on personnel, no more "leadership officers" could be 
added. Bormann felt that the field marshal's attitude was 
"characteristic" and wrote that Keitel was "much too anx­
ious, too overworked, [and had] too little drivel" In 
fact he doubted the competency of both Keitel and Reinecke 
and complained that it often took months to get an order 
published because of the weakness and political unrelia­
bility of these two generals. In Bormann's opinion, the 
main problem was that orders published by Keitel and 
Reinecke lacked "striking force." He added that within 
the competence of the service personnel offices, neither 
the Inspectorate for Educational Matters (Inspektionen 
fur Bildungswesen) nor the military schools had adequate 
influence. He also doubted the efficiency of the air force 
in general and called Admiral Rogge of the navy a "hybrid." 
With such unreliable people to deal with, Bormann concluded 
that a new office with new people--an "extraordinary in­
strument" as Reinecke called it--would have to be created; 
it should be the sole focal point for all political mat­
ters in the Wehrmacht.
Bormann expected opposition from the army to his 
plans for establishing an NS Leadership Staff in OKW. Com­
manders had always considered themselves independent in 
this sort of thing, and he doubted even if orders would
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change the situation. He felt that the Army Personnel 
Office was the center of this opposition, but strangely 
enough Bormann was considering General Schmundt, the head 
of that office, as one of the candidates for the position 
as chief of the new leadership staff. This strange factor 
arose time after time in party-Wehrmacht relations; party 
members often saw those like Schmundt who did the most to
further the nazi cause as obstructors or as anti-nazi.
It may well have been that these -military individuals 
would accept nazism only so long as the military could 
stand independent of the party and rule in its own realm. 
When the party appeared to endanger soldierly tradition, 
a military bulwark went up. To overcome this opposition 
from the army, Bormann considered that the chief NSFO in 
OKW should answer directly to Hitler; if farther down the 
chain, he would probably encounter political opposition. 
Still, he doubted that Keitel could endure Reinecke, or 
whoever else got the job, reporting directly to Hitler. 
Because of the opposition, a party liaison office would
have to watch over the armed forces.
Bormann was determined to shape the new program, 
especially when it came to the NSFOs themselves. They 
should definitely be commissioned officers, he felt, and 
only those who had been previously active in the party 
should be selected. With the Soviet Politruk idea obvi­
ously on his mind, he decided that the NSFOs should not
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conduct investigations "as [Ministerial Director] Passe 
wanted [them to do]." Also Reinecke was getting "skittish"; 
the general believed that the authority of the new NSF 
Chief had to be settled before personnel could be selected
3
to fill the NSFO positions. Since Reinecke's actions pre­
sented a danger to the speedy implementation of the program, 
Bormann had to see Hitler quickly. As proof that the Party 
Chancellery Chief succeeded, the very next day a Führer 
Order, based largely on Bormann's ideas officially estab­
lished the NSFO program in all three of the armed services.
Establishment of the NSFO 
On December 22, 19^3, Hitler, in his capacity as 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, legitimized the new 
name for all services and established a powerful organiza­
tion to oversee the NSF system. To carry out the leader­
ship and training of the troops in political ideology, he 
ordered OKW to cooperate with the party chancellery in 
order to establish uniform handling of the NSF task, and 
he instituted a new NSF Staff in OKW, the Chief of which 
would have direct access to him and would work closely with 
the party, "the bearer of the political will." He author­
ized the Chief of the NSF Staff to dictate instructions to 
NSFOs, high level officers and officials of the armed
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 1$1, Unterhaltung 
(3 pages) and General Reinecke (2 pages) in Hermann's 
handwriting, December 21, 19^3»
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forces, and to conduct or supervise courses of NSF instruc­
tion. By directing the NSF Chief to confer with officials 
of the NSF Staffs of the army, navy, and air force high 
commands in filling personnel positions in the new OKW 
staff, he automatically created the requirement for similar 
staffs in the three services. The OKW Staff Chief, in co­
operation with Bormann, had the right of approval or veto 
in selecting NSFOs nominated by field units and the party. 
Lastly, the Führer appointed General Reinecke as the new 
Chief of the NSF Staff/OKW and instructed the three serv­
ices to comply with Reinecke's personnel requirements in
kfilling the newly created positions. The Führer Order, 
used as the basic authority for the program throughout the 
short history of the NSFO, gave Bormann a huge share in 
the Wehrmacht program, but it still left much unsaid, so 
Hitler called a conference for early January 1944 at his 
headquarters in East Prussia--the Wolfsschanze (the Wolf's 
Lair).
On January 7 Hitler met with Reinecke, Keitel, 
Schmundt, and Bormann to hammer out the details. The im­
portance of the meeting lay in the fact that the NSFO 
stopped far short of becoming a true political commissar. 
All of Reinecke's ideas met with full approval from the
Waldemar Besson, "Zur Geschiclite des National- 
sozialistischen Fuhrungs Offiziers (NSFO)," Viertel.jahrs- 
hefte fur Zeitgeschichte, doc. no. 5 (January I961), 
p. 94. Also in NAM, TÜ4, Roll I60, Frames I526902-O3.
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Führer who immediately decided that the NSFOs would conduct 
their work through normal military channels instead of 
through a separate NSF channel of communication. Hitler 
placed tactical and personal leadership on the same level-- 
one held as much importance as the other--and declared that 
NSF personnel must have strong nazi convictions as well as 
combat experience. The Nazi War Lord stressed that he 
wanted no intellectuals in the program and that all school­
ing for NSFOs must have a uniform quality. Reinecke re­
ported that combat veterans--all men with nazi experience 
(old political fighters, or young fanatics)--would com­
prise his staff which would remain small. The general 
also reported that Bormann had already furnished a list 
of nazi officers for OKW's NSF Staff, and they all had 
distinguished combat records and wore the Iron Cross, First 
Class. Reinecke, holding the Waffen-SS up as an example 
for the NSF system to follow, informed Hitler that Himmler 
had offered his full support for the program. The Führer 
agreed to the establishment of official NSFO positions 
down to division level and directed the OKW NSF Staff to 
ensure that these positions ^ ;crc constantly occupied. The 
conferees decided that some of the current B.O.s of the 
former Wehrgeistige Fuhrung program could be used, but 
only if they were purged of all intellectuals and undesir­
ables. Because of the shortage of officers, regimental 
and battalion NSFOs would have to perform NSF work as an
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additional duty. Above all, Hitler would hold the commander 
--advised by the NSFO--responsible for the NSF program, and 
Schmundt added that the commander, rather than the NSFO, 
must himself perform commissar duties. This decision defi­
nitely held the NSFO back from the Politruk concept.
Predicting resistance or indifference from the 
officer corps. Hitler referred to his own experience as 
an Education Officer in the Reichswehr, and this precipi­
tated a discussion concerning the relationship between the 
commander and NSFO and how both would handle their jobs.
The Führer recalled how commanders had always squashed in­
doc trinat ional efforts whenever they so wished and thus 
showed his lingering distrust for the officer corps. Keitel 
believed that field inspections by High Command representa­
tives and the proper selection of NSFOs in cooperation with 
Bormann's P-K would help forestall any efforts aimed at 
scuttling the new program, and Hitler threatened to punish 
any grumbling about the NSF task. No one dare criticize 
any order, he said, since experience showed that such ac­
tions by commanders lowered unit morale; criticism of this 
nature would cost the culprit his position and his neck. 
Reinecke stressed that the NSFO must work closely with the 
other staff officers and keep the commander fully informed, 
and Schmundt added that the NSFO should advise the com­
mander in the NSF sphere just as the Intelligence Officer 
or the Ila (Adjutant for Officer Personnel) advised in 
theirs. In other words the generals present insisted on
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maintaining traditional staff procedures. Reinecke com­
mented that the NSFO must see his goal as imparting ideo­
logical skill to officers and actively leading soldiers to 
a nazi political consciousness--not as a preacher or re­
ceiver of complaints, but as the commander's advisor. All 
conferees, Hitler included, agreed that the NSFO must not 
be a Politruk. The Führer desired that NSFOs assigned to 
armies, corps, and divisions should receive an eight or 
fourteen day course of instruction, and those present at­
tempted to work out a way of calling higher field com­
manders in for NSF schooling. Wehrmacht schools would have 
to establish uniformity in their Weltanschauung instruction, 
and Bormann, inserting more party involvement, stated that 
Goebbels had offered his assistance in this endeavor. Con­
spicuously, he never mentioned Alfred Rosenberg. Hitler 
defined his goal as one of permeating the entire Wehrmacht 
with national socialist thought so that a man who gave his 
last breath in battle would know why he did so. The ideo­
logical struggle, he said, involved the principle of the 
very existence of the German nation, and the German fight­
ing man had to know that the war centered around either the 
destruction or continued resistance of races. In closing 
the conference, both the Führer and Keitel praised General 
Schorner as a fanatic--as the ideal model for a nazi
5
general.
^Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Adolf Hitler und der
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The records of the January 7 conference fail to 
reveal why those present so adamantly refused to establish 
a Politruk system. It is unclear whether Hitler agreed 
with the generals for tactical purposes or whether he ac­
tually preferred to retain the traditional supremacy of 
the commander. If Hitler is considered as a pure oppor­
tunist, as he is by many historians, he was probably 
searching for a way to increase the combat effectiveness 
of the armed forces and/or to intensify his own control 
of the officer corps by means of the NSFO. Since even 
nazi generals opposed any stronger measures by stressing 
traditional command and staff methods, he probably pre­
ferred to take what he could get at the moment to further 
his own purposes. He would face tomorrow when it came.
If aware of various plans by members of the Army General 
Staff to arrest or kill him or attempt to limit his power, 
the War Lord may have decided to go slowly, but his deci­
sion to establish the NSFO as only an advisor to the com­
mander definitely fit in with his own Führer Prinzip 
(leader principle) through which he established a leader-- 
follower relationship within the party and state, very 
much like leadership principles in the military services. 
Furthermore, his normal tactics of divide and conquer by 
which he allowed his underlings to establish their own
NS-Fuhrungs--offizier (NSFO)," Viertel.jahrshefte fur 
Zeitgeschichte (October 1964), pp. 445-56. Cited from 
NAM, T120, Container 2621, Serial 5489, Frames E38l869-99-
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empires under his supervision and thus ensured their com­
petition with each other rather than with himself may also 
have had a bearing on the authority given to the NSFO. If 
the party had gained control of the army by means of a 
fully-empowered NSFO, Bormann would have exercised more 
power than Goring's air force, parachutists, anti-aircraft 
units, and air force units fighting as infantrymen or Himm­
ler 's Waffen-SS, police network, and terror squads. Any 
individual or group holding immense power unchecked by 
similar strength would always stand as a threat to Hitler's 
own position as supreme arbiter and leader. Such a stand 
by Hitler could still account for later changes in the NSF 
concept which brought the NSFO closer to the Politruk idea 
since Himmler's power also grew exhorbitantly in the last 
months of the war. Also an imminent threat of defeat would 
push an opportunist to any measure which might forestall an 
ignominious end to his own power. On the other hand, if 
Hitler truly believed in the nazi ideology, he would take 
any step he could get away with to ensure the security of 
that ideology, and the NSFO would represent a step to fur­
ther it; NSFO authority then could increase whenever the 
Führer saw safe clearance for such a move. Although many 
events in Hitler's life showed his willingness to cast 
ideology aside in favor of opportunism and personal power, 
the establishment of the NSFO did fall within the pattern 
of the nazi attempts to permeate the army with its ideology.
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Hitler was quite willing, for example, to use existing 
technicians, such as the state civil servants, but he would 
cover them with nazi watchdogs. Thus it cannot be stated 
that the institution of the NSFO differed from the normal 
Hitlerian pattern or that it was not an ideological move.
In view of his prediction of resistance to the NSFO program 
within the officer corps and the insistence of the nazi 
generals that a Politruk system should not be established, 
there is more support for the view that Hitler, whether an 
opportunist or an ideologist, refrained from establishing 
a Politruk system at least partially because of such re­
sistance. This concept would also coincide with the all 
out propaganda effort soon unleashed by OKW and OKH to 
sell the NSFO idea to the officer corps as an expression 
of the true German military spirit. In any event, the 
Führer established an NSFO with limited powers.
At the conclusion of the conference the partici­
pants set to work to carry out his orders. That same day 
Bormann notified the party members of the new program^ and 
set up a "work staff" in the Party Chancellery to handle
it.^ The next day Hitler directed schooling in the nazi
8Weltanschauung for all soldiers, and in the following
Ibid., p. 443. Cited from Der Sammlung der Partei- 
Kanzlei: Verfugungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben, Bd. VI
(1944, Teil n  (München : n.p., 1944), pT 256.
^Ibid., p. 444. Cited from Verfugungen, Anordnun- 
gen 6/44, pp. 258-59.
g
Ibid. Cited from Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden und
99
weeks he assembled the senior generals to discuss nazi
9
training in the army. By early February the NSFO program 
began to assume shape, and OKW busily published a news­
paper for indoctrination p u r p o s e s . O n  February 6 Keitel 
briefly informed the military services of the appointment 
of General Reinecke as Chief of the NSF Staff of OKW 
(NSF/OKW) and directed the establishment of a similar 
staff in OKH and the other services. He sketched the re­
lationship between commander and NSFO, gave out the guide­
lines as laid down in the conference the previous month, 
stressed proper selection of NSF personnel, provided basic 
prerequisites for their selection, and said that OKW would
soon publish regulations for execution of the December 22 
11Führer Order. The NSF system did not go into effect 
throughout the Wehrmacht simultaneously; this showed either 
the soundness of Hitler's prediction of resistance from the 
officer corps or that the German armed forces had poor ad­
ministration and communication. The former, in view of the 
evidence, was more probable. One Air Force Anti-Aircraft
12Division did not announce the program until late June 1944.
Proklamationen. 1932-1945. Bd. II (Wurzburg: n.p., 1963)1
p. 20?8f.
9
Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, 
trans. Anthony G. Powell (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,
1958), p. 511.
^^Weinberg, "Hitler und NSFO," p. 444, 444n. 
^^Besson, "NSFO," doc. no. 7, p. 96. 
l^NAM, T84, Roll 160, Frame 1526902.
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On February 23 Bormann defined the program in a speech to
party leaders in Munich and closed with the statement that
the creation of a national socialist "revolutionary army"
expressed the desire of the Führer and showed the nazi
1 3will in action. That same day Hassell made a diary entry 
which showed that the NSFO program received publicity out­
side of military circles- He wrote that Soviet success 
with propaganda among German soldiers, especially those 
captured at Stalingrad, made a deep impression on
Hitler. Now the Führer wjuld institute his own grandiose
program for indoctrinating the armed forces from top to
l4bottom with the nazi ideology.
The Führer's Thoughts 
To adequately understand the goals actually set 
for the NSFO, it is first necessary to understand Adolf 
Hitler's own conception of national socialist leadership. 
The Führer believed that in the future, an "officer who 
does not educate and lead his troops politically in this 
struggle is just as much in the wrong place as an officer 
who fails in the tactical leadership of his troops.
He publically proclaimed Colonel General Eduard Dietl as
^^Besson, "NSFO," doc. no. 11, pp. 104-12. 
l4Ulrich von Hassell, The Von Hassell Diaries: 
1938-1944 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1947), p. 338.
^^NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frame 5597678.
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the epitome of the nazi officer on the occasion of the let­
ter's death on June 23» The eulogy contained the core of 
the nazi leader's concept of the nazi officer: Dietl had
loved the German soldier and always took the trouble to 
care for him, yet the general used ruthless hardness when 
necessary to get the job done. Dietl considered no sacri­
fice too great, but he remained a true friend and father 
to his subordinates. He did not pay mere lip service to 
national socialism but showed his nazism with his entire 
will and heart, and, understanding his men's anxieties, 
he inspired t r u s t . O n  January 2?i 1944, Hitler, as dis­
cussed in the January 7 conference, called all eastern 
fro it Army Group and Field Army commanders plus a large 
number of other senior officers to his headquarters to 
address them on the need for nazi education in the army.
He demanded faith as the necessary ingredient for victory 
--particularly when the going got rough--and stated that 
nazi schooling had now become a prerequisite for high com­
m a n d . H i t l e r  must have meant what he said since Hassell 
noted in his diary that General Enno von Rintelen had to
attend a course in nazi indoctrination before he could take
18over an Army Corps. The Supreme Leader frequently empha­
sized how the permeation of the Soviet army with communist
^^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frame I526383. 
17Manstein, Lost Victories, p. 511»
1 8
Hassell, Diaries, p. 339*
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ideology impressed him and said he wanted something simi­
lar; he told General Jodi that he wanted to train general
19staff officers of the Tito variety.
Hitler was aware of the officer corps' attachment 
to Prussian military traditions, and therefore he was not 
prepared to provoke any greater opposition than that which 
already existed; so he moved slowly. Nevertheless, he did 
not hesitate to express his extreme dislike for these tra­
ditions and to express his opinions. This showed clearly 
after the attempt on his life on July 20, 1944, when he 
accused the Army General Staff of weakening combat offi­
cers who joined its ranks and of spreading pessimism when-
20ever general staff officers visited combat troops. After 
the 1940 campaign in France, the Führer had spoken unmis­
takably about creating a nazi revolutionary army. Many 
times he declared to commanders that a soldier must enter 
the realm of politics since the soldier must execute the 
political mandate and lay down his life for a political 
aim--the nazi idea and its leadership in Europe. The nazi 
chief said that the armed forces existed only as the strong
^^Ibid., pp. 420-21. See also NAM, T84, Roll 175, 
Frame 1544l52--Hassell incorrectly said that Hitler made 
his "Tito" comment to Keitel. Tito was the pseudonym used 
by the communist leader of the partisan forces who fought 
the Germans with guerrilla tactics in Jugoslavia.
on
Felix Gilbert, ed., Hitler Directs His War (New 
York: Oxford University Press" 1950 ) , p"I IO6 . The book
is a compilation of the secret records of daily military 
conferences.
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arm of the political leader who led a nation which had em­
braced nazism in its entirety; he expressed disbelief that 
nazi training which began in the home, which took place in 
school and in the Hitler Youth, and then continued with 
party or nazi organization membership should cease when a 
young man became a soldier. One who divested himself of 
this potential, he declared, gave up a strong instrument 
of force, and he added that drill and obedience could no 
longer suffice for the job at hand. An officer had to
show his loyalty to the party and also devote himself fa-
2Xnatically to the nazi state. On July 29» 19^4, Hitler, 
referring to the U.S.S.R., told an assembled group of NSFOs 
that since Germany was struggling against an ideologically 
aligned enemy which had discipline and obedience, the Ger­
man army must also have ideological training. Whoever 
failed to put his whole heart into the task, he added,
22must "disappear"; whoever did not would be exterminated.
It was obvious in all of Hitler's comments concerning the 
NSFO that the army's resistance to nazification stood up­
permost in his mind. Searching for a cause of this re­
sistance, he no doubt felt that the Prussian military
Besson, "NSFO," doc. no. 11, pp. 105-6. From a 
speech by Hauptbereichsleiter Willy Ruder at the Party 
Leader Conference in Munich on February 23» 1944.
o o
NAM, T79» Roll 80, Frame 603. Present were 
Keitel, Bormann, and von Hengl, plus NSFOs of all Army 
Groups, several Armies, and units of the Replacement 
Army.
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tradition still barred the way toward a thoroughly nazi 
army. Therefore, until resistance died out or was totally 
smashed, the German political officer would have to try 
and blend tradition with nazism instead of serving as a 
Politruk.
NSFO versus Politruk 
The political commissars of the Soviet army had at 
various times held so much power that a commander could not 
issue an order unless the ranking commissar countersigned 
it.^^ The German political officer did not serve as a 
Politruk since the NSFO could not judge or overrule his 
commander. If he encountered difficulties with his com­
mander, he had to turn to the Chief of Staff or the Adju­
tant for Officer Personnel for assistance. Of course, 
this did no good if the commander overruled them also. 
General Ritter von Hengl, after he became Chief of the NSF 
Staff of OKH on May 15, 1944, told military commanders to 
handle such problems themselves and not trouble him or
24neighboring units with their problems. NSF propaganda 
told the German soldier that the Russian method of spir­
itual leadership differed completely from the German system 
because the Soviets placed the commissar above traditional
^^Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battle (New York: Simon
and Schuster, I966), p. 24^
p U-NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frame 5597676. From a speech 
by von Hengl at Sonthofen on May I5 , 1944, shortly after 
his appointment as Chief of the OKH/NSF Staff.
105
military leadership while all German officers combined
25
both political and military leadership in themselves 
this was the key to the difference between the German and 
Soviet systems. Hengl declared that two ideologies clashed 
in the war--the one of the Politruk and the one of the Ger­
man officer, but the latter must embody nazi ideology since 
mere obedience and knowledge of combat drill were no longer 
sufficient in an ideological war. The Chief of NSF/OKH 
also said that faith was more important than knowledge and 
that if the NSFO ever became a Politruk he would dig the 
grave of the German army. The nazi German army needed no 
Politruk, he added, and the Führer himself refused to es­
tablish such a system--the commander would retain his tra­
ditional role. Thus, no special NSFO channel would bypass 
the commander on special questions nor would the NSFO pass 
judgment on his commander. Hengl believed that troop 
leaders and political officers would encounter no insuper­
able difficulties and that Prussian military tradition 
would not only continue but find its raison d'etre in 
n a z i s m . T h e s e  could hardly have been soothing words for 
generals who found their comfort in Prussian military tra­
ditions. There were some military and party leaders, of 
course, who cooperated in the blending of tradition and 
nazism. Keitel, naturally, played Hitler's game completely
^^NAM, T?8 , Roll 135, Frames 6064282-90.
2^Ibid., Frames 6064897-910.
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by trying to show that there was too much reliance on tra­
dition. On July 29, 1944, nine days after the attempt on
the Führer's life, he said:
We speak too much of tradition and have too 
little workable tradition. . . . We talk of uncon­
ditional obedience, but the higher up we go, we 
hear less of that. We have become writing officers 
--officials in uniform--instead of fighters and 
doers. . . . We've gone too far away from old,
sound, soldierly qualities. . . . We've become too
intellectual.
Keitel believed that the officer corps, wrapped up in its 
traditions, had forgotten why a man with a machine gun
fought obstinately, and he felt that the officer corps did
not place enough worth on energy and hardness which com­
prised the core of the comradery needed between officers 
27and men. Nazism, of course, could supply the "energy 
and hardness" needed by the soldiers. A few days earlier. 
Party Member Passe from the party chancellery had already 
told NSFOs that the party and the Wehrmacht must both have 
the same ideology and determination--this meant that the 
armed forces must become political minded. The nazi con­
cept of leader (Führer) and follower (Folgender) must now 
supercede the traditional command (Befehl) and obedience 
(Gehorsam). The long term goal, he stated, demanded con­
sistent ideological alignment while the short term goal 
called for an increase in the readiness to act through
28strengthened "political dynamics. Thus Passe revealed
27NAM, T79, Roll 80, Frames 607-O8. 
Pfi
NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frame 5597501
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not only that military tradition was insufficient for the
task at hand but also that the party considered the NSFO
as a temporary phase in a longer process. The party, a la
Rohm, wanted to permeate the army with nazism from the
bottom up. Now, however, the nazis would work through the
NSFO system; they had long since given up on the higher
ranking officers whom they expected to simply obey during
the period of transition. General Hasso von Manteuffel,
a Hitler favorite, gave substance to the beliefs of party
members who thought that senior members of the army stood
in their way. He commented that the higher generals never
did understand the thinking of the troops under the new
29conditions of the nazi state. So to capture the military 
minds, NSF propaganda urged the army to align itself with 
the prevailing mood of the nation.
Historically the Prussian/German army had accom­
modated itself to a point with the prevailing mood, so nazi 
propaganda tried to instruct the military in the meaning of 
a nazi nation. From the era of feudalism the officer corps 
developed a close, corporate spirit based on the medieval 
concept of loyalty--the chivalric fidelity owed by vassals. 
In the age of absolutism the officer learned absolute obe­
dience to the representative of the absolute state--the 
monarch as a person. In the modern era, under a
B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk 
(New York: William Morrow & Co. , 1945) , p"! 298. Man-
teuffel made this statement after the war.
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constitutional regime, the corps subscribed to the intense
nationalism fostered by liberals but learned to reject or
30remain aloof from liberal ideas. Under nazism Adolf 
Hitler expected German officers to render unconditional 
obedience to an idea embodied in his own person. No one 
was expected to stand aloof from this idea which included 
the Volksgemeinschaft concept--the theory that all Germans 
--civilian and military--belonged equally to a national 
community through bonds of blood, fatherland, and history.
As early as May 25, 1934, Blomberg had cooperated in fur­
thering the concept by publishing the circular, "The 
Wehrmacht and National Socialism," which explained that 
the nazi Weltanschauung derived from the needs of the 
nation and that it was "the bond of blood and fate which 
binds all Germans together." He declared that the nazi 
ideology must form the basis "for the whole of a soldier's 
service" including his off-duty time and social activity. 
Advising officers to establish social contacts with party 
officials in keeping with the idea of the Volksgemeinschaft,
he also furthered this common tie of "togetherness" by
31ordering a closer comradery between officers and men.
NSF propaganda carried these thoughts to extremes and
30Karl Demeter, The German Officer Corps in Society 
and State 1650-1945, trans. Angus Malcolm (New York : Fred-
erick A. Praeger, Publishers, I965), P* 159.
^^Ibid., p. 368. Cited from Part II, "Political 
Handbook," printed in 1938 by the Reichsdruckerei; Berlin- 
Militararchiv.
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blasted out in speeches, letters, proclamations, regula­
tions, radio addresses, handbills, newspapers, pamphlets, 
and regular instruction periods for the troops with the 
purpose of overwhelming all resistance to the nazification 
of the armed forces.
Leading figures in the army called for military 
cooperation with the nazification effort by using a com­
bination of ideological, emotional, and rational appeals. 
Among these figures the Chief of the OKH/NSF Staff, General 
von Hengl, stood in the foreground. Hengl believed that 
the nation having the strongest ideology would win the war 
and demanded therefore that soldiers learn to hate and 
annihilate their enemies. The old Reichswehr, he said, 
produced unpolitical thinkers, but remnants of that Weimar 
army must receive education in the nazi spirit. The army 
must win them over and make them active, and youth and 
time would bypass those who would not listen to appeals 
by heart or reason. Aiming at the hard-core resisters, 
he warned that whoever consciously sabotaged the Führer's 
NSFO order would deserve the hardness of the law. Hengl 
attempted to show that the nazi and soldierly spirits were 
really the same by stressing that the army had developed 
in the thoughts of nazism during the years of peace. Giv­
ing credit to the idea that the establishment of the NSFO 
was an opportunistic act, he announced that only total war 
now demanded the stringent measure of the NSFO. This was
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the first real admission that the basic reason for estab­
lishing the NSFO was opportunism; it was a means for win­
ning the war. The Führer, he said, had faith in the German 
soldiers and knew that true German fighting men could only 
think like nazis because he himself had been a soldier. 
Hitler established the NSFO, Hengl continued, only because 
the commander could no longer do everything himself. Now
the army needed the NSFO simply because the task of indoc-
32trination demanded specialization. Even Gerd von Rund- 
stedt, the very model of the traditional Prussian field 
marshal, told his troops during the Ardennes offensive at 
the end of 1944 that "training for the political soldierly 
spirit in which the best traditions of the past are com­
bined with the idea of national socialism is the challenge 
33of the hour." Much of the new propaganda went deeply 
into the past in an attempt to win over non-political 
officers.
A recurring NSF theme emphasized that the nazi 
ideology had been deeply rooted by history in the German 
army and in the German nation. The propaganda pronounced 
the blending of the soldierly spirit with nazism, and the 
leading of the former to the latter, as the most important 
single thing for the German soldier since the Thirty Years' 
War. For two hundred years, according to the teaching, the
^^NAM, T?8, Roll 1351 Frames 6o64897-910. 
^^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frame 152604?.
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world saw in Prussian/German militarism only a war machine 
and failed to observe the political side of that militar­
ism. The German officer could now combine the soldierly 
spirit of the past with nazism; he could lead Germany out 
of the political weakness of the Thirty Years' War and the 
disunity of the following religious battles to the new com­
munity of the Volk and a greater German Reich. It was the
34
NSFO's duty to make this clear to German soldiers. The 
NSF concept, as opposed to the Politruk system, grounded 
German military tradition in the Volkisch nazi belief which 
supposedly had its roots in German history. Frederick- 
William I of Prussia had led a VoIkisch-political revolu­
tion which changed the concept of fighting for pay to one 
of fighting for honor, and both he and Frederick the Great, 
said the nazis, stirred the soul of the nation by laying 
the basis for the resurrection of the Reich. This meant 
the achievement of the soldierly spirit in the form of the 
Volksgemeinschaft. The Wilheminian era had forsaken this 
line of development by undermining the Volkisch-political 
instinct in the people and partly even in the armed forces, 
but the vigor of the German people then re-established it­
self through the experiences of World War I and Adolf 
Hitler's struggle to save the Reich. The Reichswehr, bur­
dened by its roots in the Wilhelminian time, had stood 
apart from the national movement, and nazism, therefore,
^^NAM, T78, Roll 135, Frames 6064282-90.
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had to come to the army as a gift. Knowledge of the his­
torical oneness of the soldierly spirit and nazism could 
only serve as a bridge toward the innermost fulfillment 
of the German soldier. The fissure between front and 
homeland in 1918, according to the NSF doctrine, arose 
because both soldiers and civilians saw only the military 
task. Hitler, observing this, made the German soldierly 
spirit basic to nazi ideology and led the martial tradi­
tion into a new era of development; therefore, the spirit 
of the soldier formed the very idea of nazism since both 
exhibited the will and life of the nation and were inter­
dependent. Accordingly, opposition to nazism by soldiers 
only showed ignorance, mangled pride, and mixed-up feel­
ings of responsibility to their own martial development.
To overcome military resistance to nazism, the 
NSFO preached that Providence bestowed the ties of blood, 
nation, and historical duty on the Germans and that the 
German soldierly spirit exhibited nothing else but nazism 
in action; failure to understand this caused older offi­
cers to stand aloof and some younger ones to sink into 
frivolity. The NSFO theme cited the Prussian War of Lib­
eration against Napoleon as an historical example of a 
political uprising which moved the Volk to action and 
showed the nazi movement as a reaffirmation of the former 
German spirit which appealed to humanity, the energy of 
Germans, and the ability of the Volk to strike down
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Untermenschtum (gangsterism or those races •which nazis 
considered sub-human). The doctrine proclaimed that the 
German soldier had become a fighter through the influence 
of national socialism and charged that the officer corps 
had failed to bear the nazi Weltanschauung in the begin­
ning only because the officer caste had separated itself 
from the political life of the nation. The NSFO, there­
fore, had to lead the officers back to the German Volks- 
gemeinschaft because God gave the genius of Hitler to the 
German people to rediscover what lay within them. The 
German lines would always remain thin, and the Reich would 
always have less material than its enemies and would fight
on two fronts, but German will, grounded in the past and
315
reinvigorated by Hitler, would win. The NSFO made these 
typical nazi views of the German army and its community 
with the Volk basic to the NSF concept in an attempt to 
make his nazification efforts more palatable.
Under the influence of the idea of the Volks- 
gemeinschaft, the former strict separation between offi­
cers and men began to disappear even before the war The 
flood of lower classes into the officer ranks helped re­
move social distinctions, and even before the war foreign 
observers had noted with surprise that off-duty officers 
and men frequently met on equal terms, often eating in the 
same restaurants--even at the same table. Nazism officially
^^NAM, T77, Roll 1039, Frames 6512882-91.
114
encouraged this general comradeship of all bearers of arms 
and devoted considerable attention to the physical and 
psychological needs of the troops. Many competent ob­
servers believed this stood as one of the most powerful 
factors in maintaining morale despite the grueling exper­
iences on the Russian f r o n t . U n d e r  the impact of the 
NSF system, the trend toward the leveling of rank distinc­
tions could only continue, if not increase. Although the 
NSF idea emphasized comradery and the army's closeness 
with the people, it also stressed the will to fight.
In January 1944 an OKH pamphlet entitled "Unterlagen 
zur Vehrgeistigen Fuhrung der Truppe" (Data for Troop Lead­
ership in Spiritual Defense) received its new NSF title, 
"Unterlagen zur nationalsozial1st Fuhrung der Truppe" (Data 
for National Socialist Troop Leadership). The pamphlet, 
distributed to NSFOs down to division level, gave credence 
to the fact that one of the reasons for the institution of 
the NSFO was opportunistic. Because of the bitterness of 
the struggle, it explained. Hitler had to place the spir­
itual guidance of the troops in the foreground. Since this 
guidance should have the nazi idea as its base, a new and 
clear name for the program--NSF--had become essential. The 
pamphlet, with a new flair, listed the essence of NSF:
(1) A steady will to fight had its roots in the profession
Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (Washington: 
The Infantry Journal, 1944 ) , pp. 138-39 - T^ his book was 
originally published in Great Britain in 1939.
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of arms based on World War I experience, and the will to 
attack and the tough obstinacy of the soldiers now also 
depended on politics. (2) Unshakable faith in the sol­
dierly and spiritual achievement of the German Volk came 
from the same methods used by the leaders of the War of 
Liberation and by the kings of Prussia for two centuries. 
Faith in nazism attained the same importance as powder 
and lead. Through faith and training, the resolute forces 
of the will to fight, courage, community, comradery, loy­
alty, tenacity, exactness, and sobriety of belief would 
drive away all doubt, but the German officer must show 
the nazi way. (3) The preparedness and ability of Ger­
mans glorified the German soldier, and only the master 
race had the ability to fight to the death for its Volk.
(4) Volkische Gedanke (the idea of the people) reached for 
the highest goals of life by working for the entire German 
nation rather than for the individual. NSF based this 
organic concept on the idea of blood, race, and the will 
of the creator rather than the will of men. No higher
37ideal could exist than to sacrifice blood for the Volk.
Nazi ideology had come a long way in infiltrating 
the army. Although the army's leaders had tried to antic­
ipate the wishes of Hitler by instituting a program of 
their own liking, they did so under pressure from the 
ever-encroaching nazi party. Without the party's.
^^NAM, T?8, Roll 135, Frames 6064l32-4292,
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specifically Martin Hermann's, intervention, the army 
would not have accepted as much as it did. Certainly 
without pressure from the party, there would have been 
little direct nazification of the army and certainly no 
NSFO.
CHAPTER V 
THE PARTY ORGANIZES
The Position of the Party 
While leading nazis expressed antagonism toward 
the army and wanted to exercise total control over it, 
military leaders acted as if they were oblivious to the 
nazis' long-range goals and continued to cooperate with 
the party. Dr. Robert Ley, Leader of the German Labor 
Front, was one such leading nazi. In the spring of 1940 
he delivered a speech before the Gau (district) propaganda 
chiefs of the party which best summarizes the contempt 
party officials held for the traditional army. He down­
graded the army's efforts in Poland and said the 55 had 
done everything worthwhile there. The army, he said, re­
tained too many Christian principles and did not know 
enough about nazism.^ Regardless of statements and atti­
tudes of this nature by party officials, the military saw 
only that the commander controlled the program and believed 
this would preserve time-honored Prussian traditions.
Ulrich von Hassell, The Von Hassell Diaries; 
1938-1944 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1947), p. 124 (entry dated March 19, 1940).
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Hengl was one of those who confidently continued to coop­
erate. He paraphrased Schorner by saying that party mem­
bers in the army must now support their commanders as block
2
and cell leaders just as they did before entering service;
he also instructed commanders and NSFOs in the Replacement
Army to cooperate closely with the party District Deputies
for Armed Forces Questions (Gaubeauftragten fur Wehrmacht-
fragen) in order to utilize party help in obtaining speakers
3
and literature. Reinecke was another member of the obliv­
ious military hierarchy; he instructed all services to fur­
nish the names of NSFOs to the local District and County 
party leaders (Gauleiter and Kreisleiter).^ The reason for 
the confidence shown by generals like Hengl and Reinecke 
was that the military looked to the commander for responsi­
bility for the NSFO program while only using the party's 
expertise as an aid to military functions. This view held 
that the army was safe as long as the commander retained 
his supremacy over the NSFO. Any threat to this traditional 
structure, of course, might precipitate resistance to nazism 
by even those who now cooperated. For their part, however, 
party members often saw beyond this view. To some of them 
the activities of the NSFO previewed the final subjugation
^NAM, T?8 , Roll 135, Frames 6064897-910. 
^NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frame 5597714. 
^Ibid., Frame 5597662.
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of the army, and for Bormann the institution of the polit­
ical officer implied a stepping stone to greater personal 
power.
In his order of December 22, 1943, Hitler had des­
ignated the party as the bearer of the political will for 
the NSF program, and on June 19» 1944, he stated that 
Bormann alone held responsibility for the party's activi­
ties within the NSF structure. Hitler went even further 
by making Bormann the supreme arbiter concerning questions 
which should go to him for decision and regarding what 
bound the military services, and the Führer also forbade 
subordinate Reich offices from presenting party views to 
the Wehrmacht without Bormann's consent.^ Through the 
issuance of these orders. Hitler theoretically handed over 
the NSFO program in its entirety to the party and specif­
ically to Bormann with only himself to serve as a check.
He had placed the Prussian/German army in the hands of an 
alcoholic and given direction of the program to the most 
vulgar and cruel man in the top level of the N.S.D.A.P., 
to a man who lacked culture and social graces, and to a 
man who bullied his subordinates. Admittedly, however, 
Bormann was a very capable bureaucrat, and as Leader of 
the Party Chancellery, he was the only man who could open
Waldemar Besson, "Zur Geschichte des National- 
sozialistischen Fuhrungs Offiziers (NSFO)," Viertel.jahrs- 
hefte fur Zeitgeschichte, doc. no. 9 (January 1961),
pp. 96-99.
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Hitler's door--or close it as he saw fit--to a petitioner.^ 
Completely amoral, Martin Bormann often wrote his wife love 
letters and discoursed in detail over a love affair with
7
another woman. Bormann obviously had little use for the 
traditional officer corps which loudly proclaimed its 
strong belief in Christian ethics. Married in a nazi 
ceremony and believing in the principle of polygamy, he 
exemplified the new national socialist man and could hardly 
support traditions of any kind unless directed to do so by 
his lord and master. In the end only Hitler could prevent 
him from using the NSFO for his own purposes, but for the 
moment Bormann was relatively free to direct the program 
in whatever direction he might choose.
On February 28, 1944, the Leader of the Party Chan­
cellery published his instructions to the Party District 
Leaders concerning the political activation of the armed 
forces and the cooperation he expected between the party 
and the Wehrmacht. Calling for close cooperation between 
the party and the military, Bormann gave the District Depu­
ties for Armed Forces Questions responsibility (under su­
pervision of the District Leader) for the party's share in
^"Playboy Interview: Albert Speer," Playboy,
June 1971, p. 84.
^H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed., The Bormann Letters. The 
Private Correspondence Between Martin Bormann and His Wife 
from January 1943 to April 1945, transi r1 hT Stevens (Lon- 
don: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954). The book is replete
with letters by Bormann and his wife concerning his extra­
marital love affair.
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the NSF program. He directed each deputy to establish a 
working commission composed of the District Propaganda 
Leader (Gaupropagandaleiter), Rosenberg's representatives 
at district level (Gauvertreter des Beauftragten des Fuhrers 
fur die Uberwachung der gesamten geistigen und weltanschau- 
lichen Schulung und Erziehung der N.S.D.A.P.), the District 
Schooling Leader (Gauschulungsleiter), the District Press 
Leader (Gaupresseamtsleiter), District Officer Leader for 
Racial Policy (Gauamtsleiter fur Rassenpolitik), the Dis­
trict Guardian of Culture (Gaukulturwart), and the "Strength 
through Joy" Guardian (Kraft durch Freude Wart)--a Labor 
Front official. He added that other offices would provide 
representatives as needed on a case by case basis and that 
the P-K would provide instructions for the joint work with 
the armed forces. In most cases, Bormann said, only the 
Deputy District Leader (Stellvertreter Gauleiter) or the 
District Staff Office Leader (Gaustabsamtsleiter) could 
serve as Deputy for Armed Forces Questions, and he ordered 
those so designated to report to him no later than March 15,
1944.8
On May 21 the party boss requested his District 
Leaders to expeditiously forward evaluations by telegraph 
of those officers nominated as NSFOs. He cautioned them 
to recommend only officers who qualified equally in sol­
dierly and political expertise. NSFOs already serving
®NAM, T?8, Roll 135, Frame 6064895-
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with troops as well as those newly nominated by party
officers would have their qualification checked while
attending ten day schools; this would also help the party
and the Wehrmacht determine the level (battalion, regiment,
g
or higher) at which an NSFO should serve. Although the 
Chief of the Party Chancellery did not make it clear who 
would conduct the courses of instruction, the party or the 
military (in fact both did), this latest order showed most 
clearly that the party (i.e., Bormann) would involve it­
self sufficiently to either veto or approve the selection 
of military officers as NSFOs. Thus, the party, not the 
Army Personnel Office, now theoretically dictated the 
assignment of officers selected as NSFOs. Bormann, obvi­
ously seeing his opportunity to gain political power over 
the armed forces, had already galvanized other party mem­
bers to action. He appointed one of these, Willy Ruder 
(a high official in the Party Chancellery), to head the 
P-K work staff, and Ruder quickly set to work within a 
week of the December 22 Führer Order.
On December 30, 19^3, Ruder explained his ideas 
about the work staff in a note to Helmuth Friedrichs, one 
of the office leaders in the Party Chancellery and a high 
official in the SS. The work staff, as Ruder explained it, 
must constantly provide suggestions and party know-how on 
training and schooling procedures to the OKW NSF Staff and
^Besson, "NSFO," doc. no. 12, pp. 112-13*
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provide speakers and instructional materials. He also 
declared that the party must place itself in a position 
to provide a new political impulse in the leadership and 
training of the Wehrmacht and to activate the nazi align­
ment within the services. The work staff would also serve 
other party and governmental offices which would in turn 
provide representatives to the staff. He also predicted 
resistance from a great part of the military, especially 
older officers who disliked political training and who had 
consistently worked against systematic nazification of the 
armed forces.
Ruder correctly believed that some commanders who 
had refused to allow nazi indoctrination would not recom­
mend known political activists as NSFOs. Instead they 
would tend to nominate officers who agreed with their own 
views rather than officers who would further the cause of 
the party. No doubt they would merely rename the B.O.s as 
NSFOs, and these officers did not possess the necessary 
qualifications. Most B.O.s in the Wehrgeistige Fuhrung 
program, he continued, had never been suitable, and too 
many of them came from the teaching profession; therefore 
the party must find soldierly and political persons--party 
leaders in the service--who had a bent for nazi indoctri- 
national work. It would be useless to order someone to do 
the job; they had to be volunteers. Accordingly, the NSF 
Staff of OKW and the P-K would have to look at nominations
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from the field very carefully, and Ruder mistakenly ex­
pected worthwhile nominations to come from all District 
Leaders and party members.
Ruder wanted NSFOs to be young and of the highest 
type of German men, and he claimed that in most cases 
only reserve officers fell into this category. The party 
should strive to win over more of the professional offi­
cers, however, since the troops should not get the impres­
sion that the NSFOs came to the Wehrmacht as commissars 
from "foreign sources." Also, the danger existed that the 
departure of reservists from the service after the end of 
the war would bring an end to the NSF program. This state­
ment showed that some party members, at least, did not nec­
essarily see the NSFO as an opportunistic measure necessi­
tated by the severity of war; once they achieved party 
dominance over political matters in the armed forces, they 
would never give it up. Ruder, like Rohm before him, 
did not envision any halfway goal; he openly desired to
create a revolutionary army "to carry out the will of the
10Führer."
In a speech to leading party members in February 
1944, Ruder expanded on his ideas for the creation of a 
revolutionary army. The party would, of course, have to 
play the leading role in the NSF program. Ruder believed 
that the former B.O. system could never have been
^^Ibid., doc. no. 10, pp. 99-104.
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instrumental in building a revolutionary army because the 
staff Intelligence Officer, not selected for his political 
views, had not worked exclusively in political training 
duties. But now the establishment of a political and ideo­
logical office (the NSF Staff) in the Wehrmacht signified 
something new to Ruder, and the direct access of the Chief 
of the NSF Staff of OKW to Hitler gave the program special 
significance and importance. In Ruder's mind there was a 
clear link between nazi ideology and a revolutionary army. 
For example, nazis fortunate enough to have taken part in 
the battle of France, he claimed, had seen the victory as 
the breakup of western liberalism, but non-nazis never 
understood this deep significance; not until the invasion 
of Russia did the meaning of the ideological struggle be­
come clear to everyone. The revolutionary bolsheviks had 
taught the Germans that a victorious army had to be fanat­
ically inspired and ideologically indoctrinated. Non­
political commanders found it difficult to answer politi­
cal questions from troops engaged with bolshevik power, 
and up to now the Wehrmacht had not understood the neces­
sity for political training. As a result. Ruder announced 
that Hitler had instituted the NSFO to create revolution­
ary soldiers, and he expected that officers entrusted with 
the task of turning soldiers into nazi fanatics would be 
dedicated nazis with outgoing personalities who could talk 
clearly to commanders on a man to man basis and thus secure
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their trust. As a means of training such officers, Ruder•s 
plans included having NSFOs work at times in party offices 
to accumulate experience; in this way party and military 
could learn more about each other. In addition the Führer 
planned to talk to commanders to emphasize the program and 
overcome their resistance to it. Thus, Ruder acknowledged 
the power of the Wehrmacht and showed his own caution by 
warning his listeners concerning their relations with the 
military.
Ruder took special pains to inform the party offi­
cials that the generals had especially emphasized that the 
party should not intrude in the military sphere and that 
only the work staff should serve as the official point of 
contact. Nevertheless, he told the Party's District Leaders 
to establish liaison offices with subordinate Wehrmacht com­
mands within the homeland while cautioning them not to flood 
the military services with so much indoctrinational material 
that it would end up in the trash can. This material had to 
stay clear, simple, and to the point, and furthermore, ac­
tive party members should maintain contact with party mem­
bers in the service so that nazism could reach and capture 
each man. He failed to mention that "back door reports" 
would also provide important information for Bormann.
Ruder's formula for carrying cut Hitler's orders 
and to create a revolutionary army was highly idealistic. 
Everyone would simply work together and address the hearts
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and political thinking of the men in the trenches, create 
love for the Reich, Führer, and nazism, and instill hate 
for the enemy. Through imparting the party's experience 
and methods to the Wehrmacht, he believed that the nazis 
would bring about less military formality and stiffness 
which he believed "killed the spirit." Drill and obedience 
could not suffice in an ideological war, he said, and the 
senior and subordinate relationship must level off and de­
velop into one of leader and follower in accordance with 
the idea of the nazi community. Calling for an end to 
the "officer club spirit" and the privilege of rank. Ruder 
pronounced the nazi aim for the German military leader: 
the officer should hold himself up as a teacher and as a 
model for youth to follow. The nazi army, he concluded, 
must only execute the nazi will and the desires of Hit­
ler. In this speech Ruder revealed that he was a fanat­
ical idealist who believed in the so-called "nazi revolu­
tion," and as Chief of the Party Work Staff, he was in a 
position to be a real danger to traditional military 
methods.
The Party Work Staff 
Through close cooperation with NSF/OKW, Ruder ex­
pected his staff to stand in a position to provide an "al­
ways new political impulse in the Wehrmacht's leadership
^^Ibid., doc. no. 11, pp. 104-12.
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and training" and to make the armed forces "toe the nazi 
line." After organizing itself, the work staff had to 
find and evaluate party literature for use by the military 
services and to assess the value of material already pub­
lished by the armed forces for officers and soldiers. This 
had previously been Rosenberg's task, so a possible con­
frontation between Rosenberg and the Party Chancellery be­
came probable. For the present, however, the biggest and 
most important job was to appraise the qualifications of
NSFOs recommended by the District Leaders and to recommend
12nominees to Bormann. This would be a frustrating task.
As early as January 23, 1944, Party Member Passe was al­
ready complaining to Friedrichs that as a result of the 
request to all Gauleiter for suitable nominees for NSFO 
positions, the results so far had been meager. Most of 
them reported very little on the personalities of the of­
ficers, and fully half of the Gauleiter had not even re­
sponded. The only thing that Passe could assume from this 
was that the party leaders had lost contact with former 
party members who had gone into the armed services in 
spite of an April 14, 1943, directive from him that party 
officials should maintain close personal contact with 
former party members in the Wehrmacht. He also believed 
that these comrades in uniform themselves were partly at 
fault; through their long years of military service, they
12Ibid., doc. no. 10, p. 99-
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had become more or less politically disinterested. Not
that they were no longer nazis, but they were so involved
with military duties that they could not see the impor-
13tance of concentrating on political matters. But selec­
tion of NSFOs was not the only task of the work staff; the 
training of NSFOs was also important.
So that the staff could begin preparations for a 
training conference with NSF/OKW and the NSF staffs of the 
three services to ensure proper cooperation and military 
uniformity, Ruder established what he called "constant 
measures"--tasks of long-range importance. The first of 
these included bringing NSFOs into alignment with the 
party through nazi courses of instruction, speeches by 
Hitler, conferences, and nazi literature. For this pur­
pose lesson plans and schooling material were required, 
and thus the work staff would have to coordinate the 
production of these materials by Rosenberg's office and 
the Main Schooling Office (Hauptschulungsamt), the latter 
of which had an interest in officer courses, recruit 
training, and various other schools under military juris­
diction. Another long-range measure included: the ar­
rangement for speakers to address recurring courses, con­
ferences, and troops; and the establishment of schools for 
speakers--another former responsibility of Alfred Rosenberg.
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 150, Vorlage fur 
Pg . Friedrichs, Betrifft: NS .-Fiihrungsoff izier , Janu­
ary, 231 1944, IIW, signed: Passe.
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Ruder pointed out that OKW already published several 
usable propaganda items and that they were distributed 
down to company level. They included: Manual for the
Armed F orc es (Richthefte fur die Wehrmacht); Soldier 
Newspaper for Celebrations and Off-duty Time (Soldaten- 
blatter fur Feier und Freizeit); Information for the Offi- 
cer Corps (Mitteilungen fur das Offizierkorps); and Infor­
mation for the Troops (Mitteilungen fur die Truppe). OKW 
also published for officers "What stirs us"--Questions of 
World Outlook, Politics, History and Culttire -- Knapsack 
Writing from OKW ("Was uns bewegt"--Fragen der Weltanschau­
ung , Politik, Geschichte und Kultur--Tornisterschrift des 
OKW) and distributed it to battalion commanders. From 
Rosenberg's office Ruder selected Speaker Service, Reich 
Teacher Association, Party and Armed Forces Schooling 
(Rednerdienst, Reichslehrgemeinschaft, Partei-und Wehr- 
machtsschulung). Ruder also listed several appropriate 
sources from the party. The Main Schooling Office pub­
lished Political Selections from Books and Journals (Polit- 
ische Auslese aus Buch und Zeitschrift), The Nation's 
Schooling Letter (Der Reichsschulungsbrief), and several 
other publications such as Our Nation (Unser Reich), Hitler 
--His Life--His Work (Der Führer--sein Leben--sein Werk), 
The Face of the Party (Das Gesicht der Partei), and Man and 
Community (Mensch und Gemeinschaft). Rosenberg's office 
published "Thought and Deed, " Instructional Sub.ject Matter
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for the Common Ideological Training of the Nazi Party 
("Idee und Tat," Lehrstoff fur die gesamte weltanschauliche 
Erziehung der NSDAP). The party also furnished material 
for use in organizing the free time of the soldiers; for 
this the work staff especially recommended the use of nazi 
songs. Then Ruder turned to his favorite subject, the re­
sistance to nazism in the armed forces.
Ruder hoped through his staff's suggestions to 
NSF/OKW to make a breakthrough in the nazi principles of 
troop leadership and thus stop the "guerilla warfare" 
which "too many people" always seemed to wage against 
ideological indoctrination. The noncommissioned officer 
corps, he believed, produced an obnoxious barracks-square 
training which deadened the spirit of soldierly youth en­
tering the service from the Hitler Youth, and therefore a 
strong hand was needed to show noncommissioned officers 
that more worthwhile things existed than drill and the 
NCO Club, namely building personality through spiritual, 
political, and ideological training. The head of the 
party work staff also believed that "guaranteed suitable" 
officers and noncommissioned officers must receive respon­
sibility as far down as company level to distribute indoc- 
trinational m a t e r i a l . ( N C O s  used in this capacity were 
called Richtmknner [men to arrange things] and frequently
l4
Besson, "NSFO," doc. no. 10, pp. 99-103.
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belonged to the p a r t y . S t i l l  wary of offending the 
Wehrmacht, he added that the use of these assistants in 
this manner would not detract from the troop leader's 
responsibility for NSF. If an NSFO, however, observed an 
officer not using nazi indoctrination in troop training, 
he should go to his commander and ask for the removal of 
the o f f i c e r . T h u s  right at the beginning, the party 
encouraged the NSFO to influence personnel policies and 
to strike fear into the officer corps.
On January 2, 1044, Bormann formally announced the 
establishment of his work staff and ordered several party 
offices to provide permanent representatives to it. These 
were: Rosenberg's office; the Main Schooling Office; the
"Strength through Joy" section of the German Workers Front 
(for Troop Betreuung purposes); the Reich Propaganda Leader; 
the Reich Press Chief; and the Leader of the Racial Policies 
Office- Occasionally, the P-K Leader directed, other party 
offices would furnish representatives when so ordered, and 
he would invite representatives from governmental offices 
to attend conferences as needed. However, he reserved to 
himself the sole right to invite representatives from the 
NSF Staff/OKW. In a statement obviously aimed at Rosenberg, 
Bormann declared that any existing agreements between party
^^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frame 1525966. 
^^Besson, "NSFO," doc. no. 10, pp. 99-103.
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offices and the armed forces remained valid provided they
did not conflict with the party-military cooperation di-
17rected by the work staff. It did not take Rosenberg 
long to recognize the threat to his influence in indoc­
trinating the armed forces, and on January 21, 1944, he 
wrote to Borman, as he had on earlier occasions, complain­
ing that he was being shunted aside.
Rosenberg Loses to Bormann 
Upon receipt of Rosenberg's complaints, Bormann 
reacted quickly. On the same day that he received Rosen­
berg's letter, he telegraphed his response:
Today I received your letter of 21 January and 
must retort that you have completely misunderstood 
me. I must therefore emphasize: Your influence on
the armed forces is without doubt indispensable, 
however, as even the Fiihrer repeatedly said, it 
represents merely one part of the entire work of 
the party. Therefore, the Fuhrer has also pointed 
out that a special agreement between you and the 
Chief of OKW is superfluous. . . . The order of 
the Führer dated 22 December 1943 places the en­
tire work in a completely new framework and in 
completely new paths.
This must have caused a certain amount of indecision on
Rosenberg's part because he wrote at least one letter to
Bormann which he never dispatched from his office. It also
caused him some consternation since he also began attempts
BAK, Kanzlei Rosenberg, NS8/I9O, Abschrift, 
Anordnung Nr. . . . 143, Betrifft: NS.-Fiihrungsoff izier,
January 2, 1944, signed: Bormann, pp. 267-68.
X 8Ibid., Telegram, Bormann to Rosenberg, Betrifft 
Erlass des Fuhrers iiber die Tatigkeit der NS- 
Fuhrungsoffiziere, January 22, 1944, 22.40, p. 214.
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to arrange a meeting with Bormann through the good offices 
of Friedrichs in the P-K. Friedrich's only recorded reply 
was that he wanted to know why Rosenberg wished to speak 
with Reichsleiter Bormann. Among the points Rosenberg ap­
parently wished to make--and he had already beaten most of 
them to death--he complained that the P-K had not given him 
the understanding he had hoped for. He even agreed that 
the Keitel-Rosenberg agreement had now become unnecessary; 
therefore, Hitler should issue a Führer Order to clarify 
his duties. Even after a string of defeats, he still be­
lieved he should have a share in the selection of NSFOs.
19To reiterate, these thoughts never left his office.
By February 10 the nazi thinker had developed a 
new approach. Writing Bormann he said it pleased him that 
his work had received a new basis as a result of the Führer 
Order of December 22, 19431 As he saw it "in summary form," 
he held the responsibility on the party side for questions 
of ideology and political schooling in the Wehrmacht in 
addition to his old duties of furnishing speakers and su­
pervising ideological schooling material for the armed 
forces, to include such material published by other party 
offices. He also conceded a final right of "imprimatur" 
to Bormann whenever the P-K boss so desired to exercise it.
19Ibid. See the documents at pages 209, 212, and 
24l. See also the draft on NSFO thoughts at page 138 which 
was also never mailed and which adds to the idea that Rosen­
berg was getting skittish.
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Finally, he committed a faux pas by stating that it was 
his understanding that his office would organize the 
courses of instruction for the basic ideological orienta­
tion of NSFOs at the conclusion of which his .judgment re­
garding their suitability would be taken into considera- 
20tion. This time Rosenberg went too far, and Bormann 
smoothly put him in his place. On February 2k the party 
boss replied that he and Reinecke would handle nominations 
and final assignments of NSFOs. Likewise, the orientation 
of the service NSF Staffs and the NSFOs fell under the 
same competence. Patiently reiterating the new NSFO con­
cept, he then graciously conceded the necessity of Rosen­
berg's strictly ideological work with schooling materials 
and speakers; but the supervision of political activity 
belonged to him alone. Further, from now on the P-K work
staff would supervise and coordinate all of Rosenberg's
21work, and ijt would set the requirements. Rosenberg 
should have remained quiet, but by now he apparently had 
received the message. Rosenberg's files contain a draft 
copy of a most conciliatory letter to Bormann dated 
March 10, 1944, with Rosenberg's handwritten corrections, 
but it is unclear whether he ever sent this reply to
20Ibid., Rosenberg to Bormann, February 10, 1944,
p. 173.
^^Ibid., Bormann to Rosenberg, Betrifft: Fuhrer-
befehl vom 22.12.1943; hier: Ihr Schreiben vom 10.2.1944,
February 24, 1944, pp. 151-55*
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22Bormann's letter of February 24. After this, Rosenberg
appeared wary of the P-K and Bormann.
Rosenberg suffered another setback to his ambi­
tions when Field Marshal Keitel reneged on their earlier 
agreement. On September 20, 1944, Keitel tersely told 
Rosenberg that the NSFO had now brought forth an entirely 
new situation; therefore, their 1940 agreement was now
obsolete. He enclosed an order from OKW to the military
23services which informed the services of this fact. 
Rosenberg replied, but feebly. Nevertheless, he made 
obvious efforts to ingratiate himself with Keitel. After 
all, the field marshal was a potential ally against Bor­
mann. As usual, he reviewed his accomplishments over the 
years, and he noted that the order of December 22, 1943, 
and Bormann's January 2, 1944, order to the party which 
set up a work staff had now spread the work load which he 
had formerly carried himself. Ignoring Bormann's tele­
gram which declared the Keitel-Rosenberg agreement a dead 
issue, he instead latched onto the P-K Chief's January 2 
order which honored agreements between party offices and 
the Wehrmacht as long as they fell within limits set by
22Ibid., Entwurf, Rosenberg to Bormann, Betrifft: 
Ihr Schreiben vom 24.2.1944, March 10, 1944, p. I58.
^^BAK, Kanzlei Rosenberg, NS8/1?4, Keitel to Rosen­
berg, Betrifft: NS-Fuhrung der Wehrmacht, draft orders en­
closed: Abschrift/K, Der Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehr­
macht to OKH, OKM, OKL, Betrifft: NS-Fuhrung der Wehr­
macht, September 20, 1944, pp. 45-46.
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the P-K work staff. "On careful re-examination," he be­
lieved strongly that the agreement fell within the limits 
of Bormann's order; therefore, abrogation of the agreement 
was unnecessary. Pitting Keitel against Bormann, he rec­
ommended the possible publication of an order defining the 
cooperation between party offices and the Wehrmacht. He 
failed to state who would publish such an order, but he 
probably hoped that Keitel would and that the field mar­
shal would present Bormann with a fait accompli. He 
finally warned Keitel that if the agreement was fully 
abrogated, the functions previously performed by the Rosen- 
berg Office might no longer be performed. Apparently, 
the agreement remained until the end of the war as it was 
on November 22--dead in Hermann's and Keitel's thinking and 
alive in Rosenberg's. Except for occasional speeches to 
the armed forces and a brief appearance toward the end of 
the war, this is the last we shall hear of Rosenberg. Dur­
ing this period, he seems to have done what he was told
while firmly believing the work staff should cooperate
2*5closer with his office. While Rosenberg tried to fight 
the problem before finally capitulating, Keitel put his 
military house in order.
24Ibid., Rosenberg to Keitel, Betrifft: NS-
Fuhrung in der Wehrmacht, November 22, 1944, pp. 19-20.
^^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 360, Abschrift, 
Vorlage, Betrifft: Rucksprache mit Reichsleiter Rosen­
berg, October 20, 1944, IIP, signed: Ruder.
CHAPTER VI 
THE ARMED FORCES ORGANIZE
NSF Staff Organization 
Although fearful of party intrusions into the 
military sanctuary, OKW and OKH, like the P-K, also set 
the NSFO program into action. They had much to define, 
foremost being the place of the NSFO in the staff struc­
ture and his relationship with his commander. But first, 
like the party, they had to organize their own staffs.
OKW established its NSF Staff under General Rein- 
ecke on February 9, 1^44, and instructed the new organiza­
tion to be operational by February 12. Built out of the 
General Armed Forces Office (Allgemeinen Wehrmachtamt), ^  
OKW structured the NSF Staff into groups and sections.
NSF Group 1 (NS-Fuhrungsabteilung 1), which worked with 
the Party Chancellery in planning political guidance and 
regulations, examined all laws and decrees for political 
and ideological importance and coordinated the selection 
of NSFOs with the party work staff. NSF Group 2, with the 
duty of planning, organizing, and conducting courses of
^NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frame 5597694.
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instructions in coordination with the three military serv­
ices and the party, also planned and produced basic and 
topical political and ideological literature for the Vehr- 
macht in cooperation with the party, army, navy, and air 
force; it also supervised the organization of lectures and 
speakers in the armed forces. The Office Group for Domes­
tic Affairs (Amtsgruppe Inland--Ag Inland) had two sub­
groups: I-l and 1-2. I-l (Abteilung Inland 1) handled
individual political offenses in cooperation with the 
Armed Forces Judge Advocate (Wehrmacht Richter). It also 
managed all questions relating to the German Labor Front, 
political handbooks, Volkstumangelegenheiten (matters per­
taining to Germar nationality, i.e., racial matters), po­
litical measures concerning the German population, marriage 
of Wehrmacht members, and church matters; holding the power 
of censorship and imprimatur for all printing of armed 
forces books, brochures, and illustrations, I-l had strong 
authority. 1-2 held responsibility for the well-being of 
soldiers (Truppenbetreuung), and the distribution of nazi 
literature, libraries, and book shops for the troops also 
came under its jurisdiction. The NSF/Gruppe z.b.v. (zur 
besonderen Verwendung-for special projects), placed on the 
same staff level as NSF 1, NSF 2, and Inland, supervised
the public relations of the Wehrmacht plus armed forces 
participation in winter help measures (Winterhilfsmass- 
nahmen--a party charity for relieving civilian hardship
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during cold weather). The NSF Staff also furnished various 
Wehrmacht liaison officers to party organizations such as 
the SA and the Hitler Youth.^ The three service NSF Staffs 
organized themselves similarly. In the army the General 
for Special Projects/Army Affairs Group (General z.b.v/Heer- 
wesen Abteilung) formed the nucleus of NSF/OKH by trans-
  3
ferring its Groups I and J.1 to the new staff. This reor­
ganization, however, was not without some friction between 
OKH and OKW.
The real problem was that General Reinecke, the 
Chief of the NSF Staff/OKW, was not respected by members 
of the NSF Staff of OKH. In mid-March 1944 Colonel Sprengel 
of the army's NSF Staff told SA Brigadefuhrer Girgensohn 
that General Schorner would never serve under General Rein­
ecke. Sprengel had said that he did not think Schorner 
could subordinate himself to Reinecke because Schorner had 
many years of experience as a division and corps commander 
in the east while Reinecke "at least in this war was only 
a 'deskbound general.'" Party Member Sotke, Rosenberg's 
representative on the P-K work staff, heard of the remark 
and concluded that there would be opposition to the NSF
2
Waldemar Besson, "Zur Geschichte des National- 
sozialistischen Fuhrungs Offiziere (NSFO) , " Viertel.jahrs- 
hefte fur Zeitgeschichte, doc. no. 6 (January I96I), p. 95*
^NAM, T?8, Roll 135, Frame 6064336.
^BAK, Kanzlei Rosenberg, NS8/236, Aktennotiz fur 
Stableiter Dr. Stellrecht und Pg. Sotke, March 8, 1944, 
signed: Dr. W. Koeppen, p. 39.
l4l
staff of OKW on the part of the NSF Staff/OKH's Army Af­
fairs Group which had formerly been responsible for the
5Wehrjgeistige Fuhrung program, and he passed on Sprengel’s 
remarks to Party Member Passe.
Passe informed General Reinecke about Sprengel's 
remarks and also sent a report on it to Bormann in which 
he unloaded his complaints against members of the Army 
Affairs Group. Passe had previously warned Bormann about 
that group's unresponsiveness and opposition to party rec­
ommendations and endeavors. He had the impression that 
this army staff group believed it had already done every­
thing there was to do to politicize the army. He had also 
informed Bormann about Colonel Radke's attitude (Radke was 
another member of the NSF Staff/OKH); now officers of the 
staff group were extending their influence to the NSFO 
School at Krossinsee. Colonel Sprengel, Radke's assistant, 
had stood before a group of NSFOs there and had announced 
that the present program had developed directly from an 
order published by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch when he 
was C-in-C of the Army; he added that the Führer Order of 
December 22, 1943, which legitimized the NSFO was merely 
one of the last "links in the chain of developments."
Passe knew personally that the same Colonel Sprengel had 
previously made remarks which indicated that the Army
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 150, Aktenvermerk, 
Betrifft: NS-Fuhrungsstab; hier: Oberst Sprengel,
March 12, 1944, signed: Passe.
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Affairs Group looked on the Führer Order as not only em­
barrassing but even superfluous. Passe correctly observed 
that Sprengel's remark about Schorner and Reinecke involved 
professional jealously and arrogance; he also believed that 
the real reason for the hostile attitude to Hitler's NSFO 
order was that it set up an NSF Staff in OKW which could 
dictate to OKH. As he saw it, the direct placing of the 
NSF Staff of OKW under Hitler and the right of its chief 
to issue orders in the name of the Führer created a golden 
opportunity for many people to criticize this special com­
mand structure. He reported that General Reinecke now had 
his eyes on Sprengel. He also said that he had told Rein­
ecke that the real culprit was Radke since Sprengel would 
not have dared utter such remarks unless they also ex­
pressed the feelings of his chief.^
The next day Ruder reported to Bormann that Rein­
ecke had asked General Schmundt of the Army Personnel Of­
fice to replace Sprengel. Ruder believed that Hitler's 
December 22, 1943, order gave Reinecke every right to do 
this as long as he maintained cooperation with Bormann. 
Accordingly, he now asked his party boss to approve 
Sprengel's removal and to press also for the removal of 
Radke and von Lersner since these two officers, perceiving 
the strong cooperation between OKW and the P-K, had re­
fused to accept the leadership and growing influence of
^Ibid.
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OKW. Both officers, he wrote, should go since they held 
the same prejudice against the party and the OKW NSF Staff 
as Sprengel, Bormann saw this report the same day it was 
written and ordered Ruder to arrange a conference with 
either Reinecke or Schorner to discuss the two army staff 
officers.^ Apparently, this accomplished nothing since 
the P-K was still complaining several months later about 
these army staff officers, and the friction between OKH 
and OKW continued to grow. Most of the problem, regardless 
of ideas in the P-K, seemed to focus on Reinecke personally, 
General Meisel of the Army Personnel Office had 
heard General Reinecke's May I5 , 1944, speech at Sonthofen 
on "The Duties of the NS-Leadership Staff of OKW and the 
Purpose and Objective of NS-Leadership," and he criticized 
it strongly. He thought Reinecke's speech was not suffi­
ciently suitable in either content or form to have any 
lasting effect on his listeners. Meisel*s remarks showed 
clearly that he had a personal dislike for Reinecke; he 
listed the NSF/OKW Chief's sins as his disgusting tone and 
the affected style of his Berlin jargon. Also, Reinecke 
failed to show any conviction in his words that the idea 
involved in NSF was eventually to create a new type of 
officer; he thought that Reinecke overlooked entirely the 
fact that "Nat. Soc. [was] born out of the combat life of
^BAK, Sammlung Schumacher 3671 Vorlage, Betrifft: 
Oberst Sprengel, March 131 1944, II, signed: Ruder.
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the first world war and therefore [was] a product of 
German-Teutonic militarism in the truest sense of the 
word." In Meisel's judgment, the OKW NSF Chief also 
failed to realize that nazism joined old values with new 
understanding and that it rejected the errors of the epoch 
of "Jewish liberalism." To sum up, he wrote that Reinecke 
failed to speak with and to "the heart of the combat sol­
dier." This was really a low blow; Reinecke's lack of 
combat experience always stood in the way of his accept­
ance by the Army General Staff. Meisel did not even have 
the decency to keep his personal thoughts about the top 
NSFO of the Wehrmacht to himself. He wrote a memorandum 
to his chief. General Schmundt, and openly expressed his 
feelings about Reinecke. In turn, Schmundt sent a copy 
to Bormann asking that it be held in the strictest confi­
dence. Bormann wrote on the copy: "Strictly Confidential,
Gen. Schmundt gives it to me--provided it's handled 
strictly confidential--a memorandum of his General MeiselI 
Don't give it to Pg. [Party Member] Passe." By his ex­
clamation point and tone, Bormann was evidently either 
amazed at the break in ranks of the officer corps, or he 
was being derisive. Why Passe should not see it is un­
known, but perhaps Bormann liked to keep his own counsel. 
Schmundt's reasons for forwarding Meisel's remarks to the
P-K Chief were very clear; he could curry favor with Bor-
g
mann at OKW's expense, 
g
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 157» Abschrift,
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Perhaps in self-defense, there were frequent oc­
casions when the upstart OKW complained about OKH to mem­
bers of the P-K. For example, in early August 1944 Major 
Ihlert, a favorite of the P-K and a member of the NSF 
Staff/OKW, complained to Party Member Beringer that the 
Army Personnel Office resisted the idea of giving pref­
erence to NSFOs for promotion in rank. Consequentlyhe 
intended to apply appropriate but sudden pressure on 
General Burgdorf of the Army Personnel Office. Turning 
to the question of personalities, he also commented on 
members of the army's NSF Staff. At the end of April, 
Colonel Radke at OKH had received a list from OKW of 
army officers who had been rejected as NSFO candidates. 
For a full month OKH failed to act on the list. Finally, 
Radke told General Reinecke that the list could not be 
acknowledged because OKW had given no reasons for the 
non-acceptance of the officers. According to Ihlert, 
Radke had still--more than three months later--done
Chef AgP2, Vortragsnotiz fiir Amtchef, Betrifft: Tagung
Sonthofen, May 11, 1944, signed: Meisel. An interesting
story concerns General Schmundt. He must have been very 
much aware of his role in the Army Personnel Office in 
catering to nazism. While visiting Army Group Center 
(ca. 1942), he got very drunk in the Officer Club and told 
the people there that they probably thought he was a "po­
litical Arschloch." Another general replied, "No, only an 
ArschlochI"; and with that Schmundt fell from the table.
No one knew whether he remembered the event when he left 
the army group headquarters early the next morning, but 
his vulgar statement showed his role in the nazification 
of the army and his uneasy conscience with it. Letter, 
Professor Harold J. Gordon, Jr., February 24, 1973, as 
related to him by "a friend."
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nothing more about it. In another situation, on May l6 
Reinecke had directed that all NSFOs down to Corps level 
had to pass through the NSFO course at Krossinsee by 
July 15 at the latest. Radke, again according to Ihlert, 
had sabotaged the order; Radke had claimed that General 
von Hengl had decided that these particular NSFOs could 
not go to Krossinsee at that particular time because they 
were indispensable. On the other hand Ihlert had good 
words to say about Colonel Huebner while simultaneously 
casting suspicion on the other members of the NSF Staff/OKH.
Huebner had established a so-called Richter- 
Abteilung (Justice Section) in which former party members 
expeditiously handled cases involving sabotage of the NSF 
program. Previously, almost without exception, these cases, 
reported Ihlert, had been allowed to come to a dead stop.
He also managed a petty barb against army Captain Dr. Schu­
macher who worked for Brigadefuhrer Hans Juttner in the 
SSFHA (SS-Fuhrungshauptamtes--SS Main Leadership Office-- 
the Command Headquarters for the military leadership of the 
Waffen-SS).  ^ He called Schumacher a braggart and claimed 
that SS Obergruppenfuhrer Berger had told him that Schu­
macher would be replaced as soon as possible by an SS
1 . 10 1eader.
9
Hans Buchheim, Anatomie des SS-Staates, Band I 
(Munchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH & Co., KG,
1967), pp. 210-11.
^^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 36O, Aktenvermerk
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Regardless of all the personal recriminations be­
tween OKH and OKW, from February to April the NSFO staff 
relationship continued to take shape. NSFO field offices 
in staffs down through division level were termed Main 
Offices while those at regimental and battalion level were 
called Sub-offices since NSFOs in the latter performed the 
work as an extra duty to their normal jobs. Formerly the 
B.O. performed his duties from the Intelligence Office, 
and at first the NSFO often worked for the Intelligence 
O f f i c e r . T h i s  procedure, however, lasted only a short 
time. An undated OKW "Provisional Instructions for the 
Officer for National Socialist Guidance" placed the NSFO 
subordinate to the Chief of Staff for disciplinary pur­
poses in higher staffs and to the commander at division 
or lower level. The Intelligence Officer only allotted 
personnel and equipment to the NSFO. The NSFO, operating 
from and living with the Operations Echelon (Fuhrungs- 
staffel), reported directly to the commander or the Chief 
of Staff in all NSF m a t t e r s . O n  March 28, 1944, Schorner, 
as Chief of NSF/OKH, merely stated that the NSFO belonged 
to the Operations Group (PÛhrungsabteilung) without clari­
fying his relations within that group which also included
fur Pg. Ruder, Betrifft: Besprechung bei Major Ihlert am 
3.8,44, August 4, 1944, II F , signed: Beringer.
l^NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frame 5597672.
l^NAM, T77, Roll 1039, Frame 651285O.
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the la (Operations Officer), the Ic (Intelligence Officer), 
and the Id (Training Officer). He further blurred the pic­
ture by declaring that the NSFO must have close and trust­
ing cooperation with the Operations Group and the Adjutant
13for Officer Personnel in the Personnel Group (Ad.jutantur) . 
These attempts to explain the staff position of the NSFO 
must have caused considerable confusion. By May 15 Hengl 
had replaced Schorner, and shortly thereafter he swept the 
problem aside. He announced that it made little difference 
whether the NSFO reported to the Operations Officer or the 
Chief of Staff since the important thing was that the NSFO 
should always have personal access to the commander and 
that NSF work should be on the same level as tactics and 
training. He conceded that different opinions prevailed
l4on the subject. In any event he then defined the staff 
responsibilities and the cooperation required.
Hengl stated that the conduct of the NSFO's duties 
demanded an especially strong cooperation with the Intelli­
gence Officer, the Adjutant for Officer Personnel, and the 
Operations Officer. The Intelligence Officer, working with 
the OKW intelligence establishment (the Abwehr), collected 
enemy propaganda and various political questions which he 
used to keep the NSFO informed. The Adjutant, having staff 
responsibility for all questions of training in nazi
^^NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frame 5597699-
l^Ibid., Frame 5597673-
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principles, especially of officer and noncommissioned 
leaders, acquainted the NSFO with his actions. Likewise, 
the NSFO informed the Adjutant of the practical experi­
ences gained in his sphere which concerned the officer 
and noncommissioned officer c o r p s . T h e  Operations 
Officer kept the NSFO abreast of the combat situation 
and tactical plans, and the NSFO obtained other valuable 
material for evaluation from mail censorship reports, 
reports of sedition, desertion, and poor morale, plus 
courtsmartial v e r d i c t s . W i t h  all the differences of 
opinion which existed at the top of the NSFO system, it 
was no wonder that subordinate units often created their 
own staff procedures.
Sometimes a staff had its own way of doing things 
which depended on the personalities of those involved.
For example, the la of one infantry division during the 
latter half of 1944 related how he, in his capacity as 
Chief of Staff, carefully gave his NSFO unpopular assign­
ments, such as selecting men from non-combat assignments 
for transfer to combat duty. He claimed that this con­
siderably reduced the NSFOs impact; besides, he said, it 
gave him something useful to do, thus saving other offi­
cers for more important tasks. This, however, cannot be 
construed as typical because the division was so reduced
l^NAM, T77, Roll 1039, Frames 651285O-5I.
l^NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frame 5597565.
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in officer personnel that everyone apparently had to wear 
more than one hat. For some time during this period, the 
division did not have a functioning commanding general; 
he had broken down early in the White Russian offensive.
For all intents and purposes, therefore, the la was in 
command.
As an example of a division NSFO Main Office, the 
19th Panzer Division headquarters had two officers assigned 
and on hand. The "First NS Leadership Officer" headed the 
section while the "Second NS Leadership Officer" served as 
his deputy and handled troop Betreuung matters. The sec­
tion's tasks were broken down as follows:
A. Political-ideological leadership
1. Division news sheet
2. Information for unit commanders and NSFOs
3. Assignment of speakers
4. Control of "non-spiritual" Betreuung 
material (games, musical instruments, etc.)
B. Non-spiritual Betreuung material
1. Procurement
2. Distribution
3. Legal advice
4. Division Rest Camp
17'Letters, Professor Harold J. Gordon, Jr., Febru­
ary 13 and 24, 19731 based on testimony to Dr. Gordon of a 
former German army colonel who prefers not to disclose his 
name or the division concerned.
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C. Spiritual Betreuung
1. Films
2. Theater
3» Vocational assistance
D. Publications
1. Division news sheet and reports
2. Assembly of material
3. Distribution of national socialist litera­
ture and newspaper
4. Lending Library
E. Pictures
1. Picture reports
2. Amateur photography
3. Passport pictures
To provide an understanding of personnel and equip­
ment of a division NSFO staff section, Table 1 shows the 
status of the 19th Panzer Division as determined by its 
"First NSFO." The authorized column appears to be on a 
par with requirements of a military staff section, but the 
19th Panzer Division NSFO would seem to have been building 
an empire--a typical failing in any b\ireaucracy--and his 
requirements for four typewriters and five clerks (typists) 
signified without doubt that the staff section conducted a 
"paper war." On a higher level, the NSFO Staff Section 
of the Replacement Army headquarters, after Himmler became
1 0
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 374, Aufgabenge- 
biete innerhalb der Abt. NS-Fuhrung (i9 .Pz.Div).
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its commander-in-Chief, had four officers. The section
leader vas a major, and he had a captain as a deputy and
19two first lieutenants. Much attention was directed at 
staff organization, but even more was aimed at clarifying 
the commander-NSFO relationship and the duties of the NSFO, 
Indeed, the ultimate goal was to involve every German offi­
cer with the NSFO program.
TABLE 1 
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
Authorized On Hand Needed
Officers 2 2 -
Noncommissioned Officers 1 3 -
Clerks 1 5 -
Drivers 1 4 3
Assistant Drivers - 1
Film Projectionist - 1
Automobiles - 5 -
Motorcycle with Side Car 1 -
Trucks - 2 1
Buses - - 1
Typewriters 2 3 1
Reproduction Machine 1 1
19Dr. Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS- 
Staat; Zeit der Indoktrination (Hamburg: R.v. Decker's
Verlag-G. Shenk, 1969), PP* Cited from Militar-
geschichtliche Forschungsamt, H20/107, Akte Heeres- 
Sanitats-Inspekteur (NSF).
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Responsibility of the German Officers 
Almost every order or regulation on the NSFO 
stressed the responsibility of the commander at all levels 
for the NSF program. This served Prussian tradition and 
erected, so the military believed, the highest barrier 
against the introduction of the Politruk principle into 
the German army. As long as Hitler supported this con­
cept, tradition would hold the reins. The "Provisional 
Regulations for National Socialist Guidance in the Armed 
Forces," published by NSF/OKW on February 9, 1944, stressed 
the commander's sole responsibility as "the bearer of na­
tional socialist leadership in the Wehrmacht." The NSFO 
was responsible to the troop leader for the training of 
subordinate NSFOs, for NSF work in subordinate units, and 
for making recommendations and offering assistance to 
senior level NSFOs. Under special circumstances, and then 
only in the presence of the unit commander, the NSFO could
directly influence troops, but otherwise he had to depend
20on the troop leader on the spot. The NSFO, ordered to 
stand by the commander and strengthen him through advice 
and deed and never overshadow him, generally limited him­
self in regiments and battalions to convincing talks with 
officers and left the NSF work in companies to company 
commanders. Regulations warned him not to become a
20
Besson, "NSFO," doc. no. 8 , pp. 97-98.
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21"Wanderprediger" (wayside preacher) and forbade him to 
interfere in the activities or responsibilities of subor­
dinate commanders. Nevertheless he had to inform the 
troop commander of his experiences and of the results of
troop visits, especially in cases where complaints or dif-
22ficulties concerned that commander. In the spring of 
1944, Hengl cautioned the NSFO not to smother troop com­
manders with a paper war since troop leaders could not be­
gin to look at the mass of papers they received. Company 
commanders, especially, would simply throw away what they 
did not care to read. Deviating from the February regula­
tions, Hengl now declared that the main work must consist
23of personal contact and speaking with the troops. By 
this Hengl added more confusion to the program, and the 
NSFO now had to judge when, how, and if he should be a 
wayside preacher. The confusion would last until the 
NSFO disappeared along with the German army. At, for pre­
requisites and selection of NSFOs, the military hierarchy 
passed out clearer instructions.
Although much slowness and resistance took place 
in fully complying with the set standards and in filling 
NSFO positions, OKW followed the party line in establish­
ing the criteria for selecting officers to become NSFOs.
^^NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frame 5597565- 
B^NAM, T77, Roll 1039, Frame 651285I. 
^^NAM, T78, Roll 135, Frame 6064910.
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In January 1^44 Lieutenant Colonel Freiherr von Lersner,
now promoted and assigned to NSF/OKH, after an inspection
trip to France, Belgium, and Holland, complained of the
slowness in those places in setting up the program; even
some of the highest echelons had not appointed NSFOs, and
24many of those appointed were unsuitable. Lersner's re­
port may have prodded OKW into action for on February 6, 
1944, Keitel published uniform requirements for the selec­
tion of NSFOs in all services. The field marshal termed 
proper selection as crucial in politically activating the 
armed forces. He called an NSFO's rank (as an officer) 
unimportant but listed certain prerequisites which were 
important for his selection. Primarily, an officer had 
to have unconditional nazi convictions, but he should also 
have a worthy personality and a distinguished combat record 
so that the troops would have faith in what he told them. 
Keitel listed membership in the party and active experience 
as a political leader as desirable, but he recognized that 
such people would not always be available. At least NSFOs
needed practical experience in ideological guidance and 
2Straining. Keitel ordered that if a staff officer was 
unavailable below division level, the troop commanders of 
Heavy Weapons Companies should have the additional duty of
^^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frames 1526634-41.
^^Besson, "NSFO," doc. no. 7, p. 96.
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NSFO provided they had the necessary ability. Regardless 
of Keitel's requirements, however, the army had difficulty 
meeting them.
When Hengl delivered a speech at Sonthofen that 
spring, he accused the army of failing to follow orders 
on selection and prerequisites. "Based on my short activ­
ity in this business," he said, "I don't believe the greater 
part of the NSFOs I have met are qualified. They must be 
removed." In such cases, he said, the Adjutant for Officer 
Personnel must assert himself to find and nominate better 
men. NSFOs should at least have soldierly qualities and a 
proven combat record; they must be activists and have the 
ability to convince others through clear attitudes and 
speech. Hengl singled out the Replacement Army as having
done a good job in a short time, but it too had a long way
27
to go. He asked those present to pick out suitable of­
ficers themselves to send to NSFO schools as a means of 
obtaining better political officers and to find officers
among doctors and hospital officials to do NSFO work under
pO
the Chefarzt (Chief Physician).
Lersner, after a tour of inspection of Army Group 
North in Russia in February 1944, gave his impression of 
his visits to the l8th Army, L Corps, 11th Division, and a
^^NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frame 5597694.
^^NAM, T78, Roll 135, Frames 6064897-910. 
28
NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frames 5597674-76.
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Battalion Command Post of the 126th Division. They had 
survived some hard battles during which some NSFOs had 
become casualties. He felt that NSF work there needed 
strengthening during crisis situations and observed that 
NSFOs had frequently performed duties as troop commanders. 
Calling for immediate replacement of the casualties, he 
noted that NSFOs should not command troops except in spe­
cial circumstances. Lersner recommended that NSF/OKH 
provide some of its own officers to replace those NSFOs 
who had become casualties. This would help, he said, to
improve the status of the NSF Staff in the eyes of the
29troops during the initial stages of the NSF program.
The Commander-in-Chief of German Forces in the
West, Rundstedt, added additional requirements for his
NSFOs. They should show manly tact, have a flair for NSF
work, and speak from "the heart rather than a cool brain."
Emotion apparently held more importance than reason, but
this fell directly into the methods used by Hitler and the
nazis during the party's rise to power. The Commander in
the West also passed on OKH instructions that any changes
of the NSFO incumbent down through division level had to
have the approval of NSF/OKH; below that level the next
30superior headquarter had to authorize a change. Thus
^^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frame 1526623.
30Ibid., Frames 1526051-52. From the manual, 
"National Socialist Leadership of the Troops," printed 
and distributed by Oberbefehlshaber West.
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the highest echelon of the army, subject to Bormann's ap­
proval, controlled the selection and replacement system 
for Main Office NSFOs, but OKH itself did not always fol­
low the established procedures.
On April 24, 1944, NSF/OKH asked the Westmark 
Gauleiter directly for his opinion on the qualifications 
of Captain Max Schuler as an NSFO. By chance the P-K 
learned of it and informed the NSF Staff/OKH that Schuler 
was in no way suitable to be an NSFO and politely asked 
the army staff officers to refrain from direct contact 
with party District Leaders on such matters. It seemed 
that Schuler, before the nazi era had belonged to a Free­
mason Lodge in which he had served as Master of Ceremonies. 
Also he had served in the Stahlhelm (Steel Helmet--a right­
ist veteran's organization) before it was taken over by the 
SA, and he was not a member of the party. The Gauleiter 
reported these facts to the Party Chancellery and declared
that Schuler obviously was not sufficiently grounded in the
31nazi Weltanschauung.
On October l6, 1944, the Army Personnel Office, 
over General Burgdorf's signature, belately tried to clar­
ify some of the confusion which existed regarding the NSFOs 
and tightened up the rules for nominating them. Hence­
forth, NSFOs had to be fully combat tested officers who
31BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 370. Beringer to 
NSF/OKH, Major Ihlert, Betrifft: Hauptmann Max Schuler,
June l6, 1944, and following documents.
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■were models of military and nazi behavior and bearing and 
who were capable of passing on their uncompromising be­
liefs to both officers and men. Although OKH did not want 
to establish length of service and age restrictions, Burg­
dorf specified that "in general" the attempt had to be 
made to nominate new NSFOs whose birthyear was I9OO or 
later. A decoration for bravery now became an absolute 
requirement with the proviso that it had to be awarded for 
"the present war." If reserve officers were nominated, 
they now had to be party members, and no officer after 
being recommended as an NSFO could then become subject to 
current regulations which gave priority to combat assign­
ments. In other words, nomination as an NSFO automatically 
superceded any other priority of assignment. Whenever pos­
sible, the NSFO of a unit should be an officer selected 
from that unit, and only the best troop leaders--those most 
difficult to replace--had to be selected. Regardless of 
need in the unit, the best men, up to the grade of colonel, 
had to be nominated to the Army Personnel Office of OKH on 
a special form, and the nominations had to be accompanied 
by a short efficiency report on that officer. The suita­
bility of each nominee would be checked out in an NSFO 
course of instruction, and those found not qualified would 
be sent back to their units.
The Personnel Office estimated that it would take 
about three months for the NSF Staff/OKH and the Party
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Chancellery to confirm the appointment of a nominee, and 
Burgdorf warned that any officer disapproved in the process 
would not be allowed to serve as an NSFO. If any such peo­
ple were so serving, they would be relieved at once. Fur­
thermore, the reason for disapproval would not be divulged; 
however, he cautioned that the judgment of the NSF Staff/OKH 
pertained only to qualifications of an officer to be an NSFO 
— it had no bearing on the suitability of an officer for 
other duties. Burgdorf's order, although it stiffened con­
siderably the prerequisites for new NSFOs, did not appear 
to be retroactive.
All changes in assignments of Main Office NSFOs, 
since they required the prior approval of OKH, had to be 
requested through NSF/OKH to the Personnel Office on a spe­
cial form. Likewise, losses through death, wounds, sick­
ness, or extended sick leave had to be reported through 
the same channels. Wounded and sick NSFOs would, as a 
rule, be assigned to the Leader Reserve (Fiihrerreserve/
OKH), and Burgdorf forbade their assignment elsewhere.
After they were reported to OKH and until assignment in­
structions were issued by the Personnel Office, however, 
they could be utilized as additional NSFOs within the 
commands of army groups and independent armies. This may 
have sounded like a policy of "once an NSFO, always an 
NSFO," but this was not the case--at least in policy. 
Burgdorf announced that a goal of the program was to
l6l
assign all physically fit NSFOs to troop commander duties 
in combat after they had served eighteen months as NSFOs.
At this time, Burgdorf also allowed the possibility of 
preferential promotion for NSFOs; commanders could include 
the initial NSFO probationary period--the estimated three 
month time frame during which the NSF Staff/OKH and the
P-K checked out the nominee's qualifications--as time on
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the job. The highest levels also spelled out and con­
trolled tightly the duties of the NSF Staffs, all officers, 
commanders, and NSFOs within the program, and the Führer 
himself, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, directed the 
scope of the duties of the Chief of the NSF Staff of OKH.
Hitler clarified the duties of General Ritter von 
Hengl shortly after the general's appointment on May I5 , 
1944, as head of the NSF/OKH. On May 28 Hitler announced 
the appointment in a Führer Order. Placing Hengl directly 
under him, he authorized the new appointee to conduct his 
NSF duties in the name of the Führer and ordered Hengl to 
maintain close personal contact with the Chief of the Gen­
eral Staff and the Commander of the Replacement Army by 
informing them concerning all fundamental questions regard­
ing his functions as head of the NSF Staff. Instructed to 
work in close cooperation with the Army Personnel Office,
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. l42, Abschrift, 
Oberkommando des Heeres PA/Ag p 1/1. (Zentral--) Abt. 
(lie), Betrifft: NS-Fuhrung, O.U., October I6 , 1944,
signed: Burgdorf.
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Hengl had to follow the orders of its chief concerning 
officer training since such directives were also issued 
on Hitler's behalf as Commander-in-Chief. The Führer out­
lined Hengl's primary duty: to build a political will in
the army and activate it toward a uniform political and 
national socialist Weltanschauung according to the Führer 
Order of December 22, 1943. Finally, Hitler authorized 
Hengl to inspect and investigate the status of NSF work 
throughout the field and replacement armies and to issue
orders, admonishments, and instructions concerning NSF in
33the name of the Führer. The Nazi War Lord was not alone 
in prescribing duties; the military hierarchy also pre­
scribed NSF duties for every German officer.
Schorner, Hengl, and Himmler added their ideas.
On March 28, 1944, General Schorner, Hengl's predecessor 
as Chief of NSF/OKH, had ordered every army officer to work 
toward the goal of an unshakable nazi fighting team. An 
officer's faith and belief in victory should shine out as 
a source of strength to his soldiers. According to the 
will of the Führer, Schorner observed, the officer corps 
had the responsibility for building political determination 
in the troops; therefore, each officer had to show his nazi 
conviction by words and deeds and demonstrate unconditional 
faith in victory and loyalty to Hitler. Every officer of 
the nazi army had to understand that he must oppose any
^^NAM, T78, Roll 135, Frames 6064889-90.
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3kcriticism at every opportunity. Clearly this comment
and others by the military and political hierarchy showed
that widespread criticism of the NSF program existed and
demonstrated that resistance to total nazification of the
army continued. Records of mail censorship, even when
soldiers were aware of the lack of mail privacy, confirmed
this and showed the confusion in some soldiers' minds as
35to the purpose of the NSFO program. Hengl paid tribute 
to Schorner and said he had been an outstanding nazi even 
before NSFOs appeared on the scene. Holding him and Gen­
eral Dietl up for emulation, he tried to show that the of­
ficer corps should not need NSFOs to activate them. Citing 
his own Corps on the Murmansk front where it lost 2000 dead 
during two polar winters, he said that his soldiers fought 
magnificently and held fast only because the command pos­
sessed an officer corps which took the trouble to educate 
the soldiers politically. He also pointed to General 
Specht who had organized his NSF program in a model manner
and who had declared that no officer cadet lacking in the
36nazi ideology would receive an officer's commission. The 
officer corps had received its warning, and after the
g y, • •
Ibid., Frames 6064891-94. Schorner was appointed 
Chief of the NSF/OKH on March l4, 1944, and served in that 
capacity until given a combat command in May.
^^NAM, T78, Roll 134, Frames 6062771-2844. Many 
more frames follow on the same subject showing attitudes 
on nazism. Hitler, the NSFO, morale, and officers.
3^NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frames 5597672, 5597677-78.
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July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler's life, Himmler added his 
words. Appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Replacement 
Army on the day of the plot, he used the occasion of the 
NSFO conference at Hitler's headquarters on July 29 to ex­
pound his views within the concept of the Volkagemeinschaft. 
Each officer, the Reichsführer SS said, held the lives of 
his troops in his hands and had to consciously remember his 
responsibilities to the Reich and the nation which entrusted 
German soldiers to him. Each officer had a responsibility 
to the mothers of sons who died in his care. He said that 
Germany would win the war because of the historical law of
better hereditary factors, but German officers had to un-
37derstand the facts involved in a people's war. Himmler 
also referred to the assembled NSFOs as the "select corps
38of the Führer." This corps, above all, had its duties 
spelled out.
The Duties of the NSFO 
Everyone--Fuhrer, party members, and generals of 
the Wehrmacht--had ideas as to what constituted the duties 
of the NSFO. Basically Hitler directed the NSFO to make 
nazi fanatics out of the soldiers, but it was easier to 
give the order than to carry it out. Accordingly, the 
political officer's province received considerable
^^NAM, T79, Roll 80, Frames 609-12.
^^Ibid., Frame 6II.
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attention. Ultimately a soldier normally follows the last 
order he receives or the orders of his immediate commander 
unless instructed otherwise. The NSFO presumably followed 
this universal military custom and no doubt performed his 
duties differently in various commands because everyone 
seemed to have different ideas on the. NSFOs' duties. The 
NSF/OKW regulations of February 9i 1944, called the NSFO 
the commander's official expert for ideological matters 
and made him responsible to his commander for the politi­
cal activation of the troops. So as to recommend neces­
sary political measures, the NSFO had to understand the 
tactical situation at all times. OKW forbade him to per­
form tasks other than NSF work at division level and 
higher, and ordered regimental and battalion commanders 
to provide their part-time NSFOs with sufficient time and 
opportunity to devote to NSF work. Having no right of 
inspection on his own responsibility, the NSFO conducted 
courses of instruction and made speeches when ordered by 
the troop leader, but he nevertheless had to take advan­
tage of every opportunity to visit the troops. Assumedly, 
this meant that he, like any other staff officer, accom­
panied his commander on troop visits or secured permission 
from his commander and the troop leader concerned to see 
or talk to the troops, as is the custom in most armies.
The regulations encouraged NSFOs to talk to soldiers on 
leave, to visit Soldier's Homes, and especially to talk
l66
39to the sick and wounded in hospitals, but in particular 
NSFOs had staff duties in the headquarters.
Administrative staff duties consumed much of the 
NSFO's time. The NSFO created, processed, and distributed 
NSF indoctrinational material and then supervised its use 
by the troops. He assisted other staff officers or the 
commander by explaining topical questions and measures 
taken by the Reich and party leadership, by clarifying 
orders with political meaning, and by cooperating in per­
sonnel matters pertaining to schooling and training of 
officers, cadets, and noncommissioned officers. Regardless 
of attempts to keep the NSFO free of such things, in spe­
cial cases he handled political investigations and acted 
as counsel. To spread his propaganda he used his unit's 
newspapers, provided speakers who delivered addresses to 
the troops on the nazi Weltanschauung, and ensured a con­
tinuous improvement and replenishment of a "hand library" 
for nazi guidance. To utilize every waking moment for the 
cause of nazism, the political officer assisted in organ­
izing the troops' off-duty hours, planned national anniver­
sary celebrations especially of the nazi era, and published 
instructions for Gemeinschaftsempfange (community recep- 
tions--military receptions for civilians of the local com­
munity).^^ After OKH issued these basic instructions.
^^Besson, "NSFO," doc. no. 8 , p. 97-
^°Ibid., p. 98.
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NSFO duties began receiving the personal touch from members 
of the military hierarchy.
These personal ideas, however, must have caused 
considerable confusion. As could be expected, Schorner 
stamped his own flamboyant personality on the NSFO during 
his tenure. "This is a war of Weltanschauung," he thun­
dered, ". . . The only decisive things are the nation's
highest qualities: bravery, iron discipline, [and]
honor. . . . "  The NSFO's task was to "mobilize these 
qualities for victory, . . .  to make every man a fanatical 
national socialist soldier." Schorner, echoing Hitler, 
proclaimed that a German fighting unit inspired by the 
nazi idea could accomplish anything. The NSFO should act 
as a leadership officer, he declared, not as an organ for 
troop Betreuung or welfare (Fursorge). The NSFO had a 
warlike duty to perform, not the spiritual duty (Seelsorge) 
of a chaplain, and his job stood on the same level as tac­
tics and training. Above all, he must avoid giving the 
appearance of a Politruk. The regimental NSFO, especially, 
had to influence every single soldier, and Schorner in­
structed all officers and NSFOs to stay alert and fight 
any slackness or indifference. Such work, he announced, 
held special importance in isolated units. Cautioning the 
NSFO not to perform his job by remaining in headquarters 
or try to win over men by beautiful and spiritual speeches, 
Schorner insisted that the NSFO set a personal example
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through sober leadership and soldierly conduct. No course 
of instruction, he said, should take place without NSFO 
influence, and it was especially important to begin NSF 
work with recruits. He called for less words and more 
deeds and warned that NSF orders had to be executed whole­
heartedly, just like tactical o r d e r s . I n  May 1944 a 
Captain Hoffman from OKW, addressing an NSFO group at 
Krossinsee, stated that the NSFO at division level and 
higher should concern himself only with ideological lead­
ership. The NSFO's work, he said, did not include welfare, 
but did include morale measures and material care of the
troops (Betreuung). However, Betreuung should not dis-
42tract the NSFO from his primary task. Either a change 
had taken place since Schorner ordered the NSFO not to 
act as a B.O., or else OKW and OKH disagreed on the matter. 
One of the groups of NSF/OKW (1-2) had responsibility for 
Truppenbetreuung, so it is more probable that the issue 
merely reflected a difference in emphasis between the 
ideas of Schorner and OKW. Also, in May Lersner hinted 
at the probability of this difference in a report concern­
ing an inspection trip to Italy. Complaining that NSF work 
there had reduced itself solely to Truppenbetreuung in some
4lKarl Demeter, The German Officer Corps in Society 
and State 1650-1945, transi Angus Malcolm (New York: Fred-
erick A. Praeger, Publishers, I965), app. 34, pp. 365-67 
(quotations from p. 365)* For the complete text in German 
see NAM, T?8 , Roll I35, Frames 6064891-94.
^^NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frames 5597564-65-
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units, he compared units where the NSFOs concentrated only
on the well-being of the troops with those in which NSFOs
and commanders stressed the nazi will to victory. The
latter, he said, performed better. Overemphasized concern
for the troops' material well-being, he reported, too often
emphasized indecent pictures and bordellos to keep officers
and troops happy while decent Germans complained of the
obscenities. To Lersner, this approach seemed too much
like that used by former filthy Jewish newspapers and
smacked too much of Americanism. Since Hitler never used
obscenities even among his circle of friends, he continued,
the Wehrmacht should forbid obscene pictures and films and
43
bring back naturalism and beauty. Moral measures, he 
recommended, must be proper and should be done with good 
material. An NSFO reading Schorner's directive, attending 
Hoffman's lecture, and then reading Lersner's report must 
have been confused as to what extent he should concern him­
self with the physical, mental, and emotional well-being of 
the soldiers. In August 1944 a mail censorship report 
showed that a soldier in Italy commented in a letter home 
that his unit never knew the real object of the NSFO's
44visit to his company. Comments of this nature were rare 
since letter writers normally took precautions through fear
^^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frames 1526602-04. 
Uh
NAM, T?8, Roll 134, Frame 6062?86.
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that negative comments would get them into trouble.
The confusion showed unmistakably in Grenadier Regiment 
917 where the true title of the NSFO did not settle down 
until the summer of 1944. In January the political offi­
cer still called himself the B.O. Two days later his 
title became la (Operations)-NSFO, but in April he was 
the Ic (Intelligence)-NSFO. In May one of the regiment's
46battalions reverted back to the title of B.O. However, 
most of the negative comments came from officers.
Lersner pinpointed the reason for the officer 
corps' resentment of nazism after a June trip to France. 
Based on his troop visit, he reported that officers re­
sented any intrusion into their handling of the war; they 
considered any transgression into their traditional mili­
tary responsibilities as an obstacle to success. Such 
interference, he continued, demonstrated to them a lack 
of faith in their leadership and efficiency, and officers
did not want "novelties" nor directions coming out of OKW
47on how to do their jobs. The odd part of all this was 
that Lersner himself was charged by the Party Chancellery 
with some of the same attitudes which he reported after 
his inspection trip to France. Before Hitler established 
OKW, the army had traditionally held sway in all military
^^Ibid., Frame 6062807.
A6
NAM, T84, Roll 160, Frames 1526745-58.
^^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frame 1526595-
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matters, and at one time an army general had been in 
charge of the navy. The army's fall from preeminence no 
doubt explains why much of the resistance or indifference 
to the NSFO program occurred. Tradition had allowed the 
officer corps to run the army, but the NSFO carried a 
danger of party interference in the officer corps' busi­
ness. Further, the upstart OKW was deeply resented.
Keitel, the Chief of OKW, clouded the issue on duties 
just a little more in his July 29 address at the NSFO 
conference at Hitler's headquarters. He said that the 
NSFO must stand for the troops like an immovable pillar
of strength and should not become entangled in daily
+ 48events.
Special Duties and Super NSFOs 
One of the special duties of an NSFO was to serve 
as on-call advisor to so-called "Mixed Commissions." These 
commissions, composed of military, Waffen-SS, police, and 
party members at local levels, examined and coordinated the 
activities of the represented organizations. Toward the 
end of the war. Ruder suggested that NSFOs should be as­
signed as permanent representatives to these commissions, 
and Party Member Herrmann of the P-K discussed Ruder's idea 
with OKW and the three military high commands. At first 
none of the military staff officers raised any objections
/, o
NAM, T79, Roll 80, Frame 605.
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to the idea, but then considerable difficulties arose over 
the formulation of the orders which would be required and 
the manner of notifying party District Leaders. As will 
be seen, this technique appeared to be a favorite military 
way of frustrating the party. The OKW representative also 
feared that if the NSFO served permanently on the commis­
sions, it might call attention outside of the military of 
shortcomings in the military units. The NSFO reported de­
tected shortcomings through normal military channels, he 
added, and they should not be aired elsewhere; it could 
even undermine the NSFO's position of trust. In the end,
Ruder agreed that the NSFOs would merely be called in for
49committee deliberations by the commander involved.
Again the commander had retained his status against party 
intrusion.
Another part of the NSFO program included the as­
signment of professional military officers to party of­
fices. Ruder was in charge of this, and he outlined its 
main purpose as letting the regular military establishment 
get to know the party better and acquire the party's "art" 
of leading men. After this experience. Ruder felt that an 
officer could better answer questions from other officers 
and soldiers about daily life and work of the party. It
BAK, Sammlung Schumacher 36?, Vermerk fiir IIF-Pg. 
Ruder, Betrifft : Überprüfung der Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS und 
Polizei; hier: Beteiligung der NSFO an den gemischten Kom-
missionen, March 20, 1945, III STK, signed: Herrmann.
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•was an eight week assignment at three levels: three
weeks at Landkreis (county); three at Stadtkreis (larger 
cities); and two at Gauleitung (District). In the Land­
kreis the officer became acquainted with political leader­
ship questions in the party block, cell, and local branches 
through visits, inspections, conferences, and attendance at 
local party functions; special emphasis was placed on the 
situation of the farmers. The cooperation between local 
party leaders, mayors, and farm leaders was especially 
pointed out to the officers. At the Stadtkreis, they were 
expected to see the real influence of the party on the 
people and observe the many functions the party performed 
for the welfare and benefit of the inhabitants. At Gau-
leitung level, the officers spent most of their time in
50conversation with Gau officials. Ruder required a short 
report from the District Leaders on the visits which had 
to include an evaluation of the officers themselves and 
their nazi attitudes. Ruder used the reports as bases 
for appropriate recommendations to OKW on the officers in 
case some of them might be nominated as N S F O s . A m o n g  
other special duties and assignments was one in which some 
NSFOs had more power than a Soviet Politruk.
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 150, Anlage fur 
. . . , Betrifft: Kommandierung von aktiven Offizieren zu 
Parteidienststellen, August 15, 1944, IIF, signed: Ruder.
51 .Ibid., Ruder to Gauleiter, Betrifft: /Lommand-
ierung activer Offiziere zu Parteidienststellen, Novem­
ber 11, 1944.
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As the war became more grim and when there was im­
minent danger of a battle front collapsing, the nazis em­
ployed groups of Super NSFOs on special assignment (Sonder- 
einsatz) to stabilize the front. The first indication of 
Super NSFOs discovered in the meager party records of 
Sondereinsatz was a document dated November 30, 1^44, which
mentioned that Super NSFOs had been previously employed on
5 2the western front. The next was on January 1, 1945, when 
forty-nine selected army officers set out for special as­
signment in Army Group Harpe on the eastern front. At
Oppeln the Army Group NSFO, Major Hess, instructed them in 
5 3their duties. By February the special program began to 
receive more attention, and Sondereinsatz was ordered on a 
case by case basis when deemed absolutely necessary, but 
even then only as a temporary measure.
On February 17, 1945, Ruder recommended to Bormann 
that special groups of activists and individuals should be 
selected for special assignment on the eastern front to 
stabilize those areas which had collapsed due to a Soviet 
breakthrough. He complained that the soldiers did not 
fight any more as they had in the past and declared that
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 135, Vorlage, 
Betrifft: 12. Lehrgang der nationalsozialistischen Fuhr-
ungsoffiziere in Krossinsee vom l4.11.bis 28.11.1944, 
November 30, 1944, IIF, signed: Beringer.
^^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 360, Vorlage, 
Betrifft: l4. Lehrgang der nationalsozialistischen Fuhr-
ungsoffiziere in Krossinsee vom 5.-18.1.1945, January 19, 
1945, IIF, signed: Beringer.
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previous examples of "special commands" had shown that of­
ten one energetic man was enough to organize a fanatical 
resistance to the enemy. Section II P of the P-K had in­
formed him that "I5OO political people" stood at the dis­
posal of the party for this work. They should all be vol­
unteers, he reported to his chief, and should be brought 
to Berlin for selection of the best men. Ruder did not 
want them placed under Wehrmacht command. Instead, they 
should work with "full powers" directly behind the front 
of threatened areas as agents of Bormann and Himmler to 
mobilize and organize "the strength of the entire nation." 
Sections II V and II F of the P-K were ready to supervise 
their induction into special groups, and their equipment 
would be supplied by Berger from the SS Main Office. Ruder 
also recommended that part of the group should be sent to 
the western front to "prevent" a situation similar to the 
one which had occurred in the east. Bormann approved
the recommendation, and these special groups were used
55both in the west and the east.
After the collapse of German forces in France, the 
NSF Staff/OKW ordered Sondereinsatz of NSFOs under the
5 4BAK, Sammlung Schumacher 36?1 Vorlage, Betrifft: 
Sondereinsatz Politischer Leiter an Brennpunkten der Ost- 
und Westfront, February 17, 1945, IIF, signed: Ruder.
^^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 135, Aktenvermerk, 
Betrifft: Mundlicher Bericht des Gefreiten Helmuth Vogel,
9 . Pz. Div., Feldpost nummer I998OA, March 2, 1945, IIW, 
signed: Stosch.
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leadership of a Lieutenant Colonel Schulz to work toward 
the stabilization of the western front. They were vested 
with the total authority of OKW and the Reichsführer SS, 
Heinrich Himmler. After accomplishing their mission "with 
good results," the group was disbanded except for a few who 
were retained for assignment in Holland where they conducted 
"special missions" in association with representatives of 
the Party Chancellery, These Super NSFOs had checked all 
signs of disintegration through the ruthless use of their 
special powers backed by credentials issued to them by 
Himmler. With such identification, they could even exert 
pressure on civilian officials--a thing which normal mili­
tary identification made difficult. The special credentials 
were made out as follows:
(Name, rank, serial number) acts on my 
behalf. He has full powers in every­
thing, his order will be executed.
Himmler
Reichsführer ,SS 
"Basic Suggestions for the Special Assignment of 
NSFOs," composing five typewritten pages, were apparently 
written around January 19^5 by a Captain Knaak of the Lehr- 
stab (Teaching Staff) of the NSF Staff of the Wehrmacht.
It was written in the second person singular familiar (du) 
--a very unusual thing in the German language where even 
old friends often retain the polite (Sie) form of address. 
Thus, the "Basic Suggestions" strike the reader as direc­
tions to a family or as instructions within a brotherhood
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or secret order. They shed more light on Sondereinsatz 
than any official report could, and the following is a 
condensation of Knaak's catechism for special NSFO assign­
ments, shed of its direct address. The "Special Assign­
ment" of NSFOs was a measure of leadership used only in 
crisis situations where the normal leadership means ap­
peared insufficient and enemy superiority either directly 
threatened the military or governmental structure or might 
lead to the dissolution of the front. In such situations, 
selected NSFOs were given the political task to intervene 
and take drastic measures to boost the willingness to 
fight. These NSFOs were told that their own example cre­
ated the basis for success and that they had to persevere 
to their last breath. They were to consider themselves 
as the personal representatives of Hitler and "handle 
things in accordance with his will." Nevertheless, they 
were cautioned to use their full powers only where other 
measures no longer produced the desired results. They were 
told not to intervene at all if a strong leader led a unit 
since this was seen as a waste of power--a thing which 
could not be tolerated. In working with troop commanders, 
the Super NSFO was to represent the party and state leader­
ship but should act as a "friend and helper." Regardless 
of the rank and position of all concerned. Super NSFOs were 
required to employ brutal and drastic action whenever they 
encountered "abuses, dereliction of duty, and malevolence."
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In each such case, they had to act "lightning quick" and 
with surety since the question of competency would not 
arise until the danger was past. Super NSFOs were not to 
act as executors or administrators since this would waste 
their powers; they were to provide the first impulse, su­
pervise the execution of their orders, and satisfy them­
selves with the end result. Whatever they did they only 
had to answer to themselves as national socialists--pre- 
sumably, they were infallible so long as they spoke and 
acted ex cathedra. The final and sole judge of their 
correctness would be the results they achieved.
They had to keep in mind that they were assigned 
to help win the war and not to gratify someone or relieve 
someone of responsibility. Therefore, they always had to 
keep the total situation in view and not follow their own 
passion or professional background alone. This was one 
of the few times that a cool head was considered more im­
portant than emotion, but nazis could not resist tempering 
this with passion. By being the best oriented man on the 
spot, the NSFO on special assignment could then rely in 
most cases on his political instinct and the strength of 
his intuition. These NSFOs had to guard against the tend­
ency of getting bogged down in units and had to remember 
their main task of working politically to strengthen the 
will to fight--to dig in and hold! Their method was to 
constantly talk to the troops wherever they found them
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and to be "psychologically clever and tactically resource­
ful." Measures of propaganda and explanation should be 
flexible--only what was topical and directly strengthened 
the will to fight was necessary. The Super NSFO, as a po­
litical leader of men, was supposed to be able to adequately 
answer any question in a tactful manner. Defense against 
enemy propaganda was another main task, and the Super NSFO 
was told to denounce openly all enemy agitation by showing 
how the degeneracy of the enemy nullified his words. He 
had to consider every person a comrade. He could make use 
of every office, but the Super NSFO was cautioned not to 
impinge upon its inner structure except in an acute emer­
gency. He also was required to emphasize the status of 
commanders and officials as organs of state and party au­
thority since "the unity and indivisibility of leadership 
is a national socialist principle 1" Although the party 
would try to violate this principle later, it was not his 
job now to take over someone else's duties. Instead he 
should work with others to eliminate lost motion. Super 
NSFO was not to act as a spy or informer, and he was Lo 
remember in dealing with German men that they were basi­
cally respectable. Still, the troops had to be told that 
if one might lose his life to the enemy, certain death 
awaited the one who bolted to the rear. The Super NSFO's 
catechism repeatedly stressed that the main goal of his 
assignment was the results he achieved and that his part
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was only a small bit of the big picture. In crisis 
situations it was not crucial whether he was "'humane' 
or 'nicel'"; it was crucial only that the line should be 
held. There was no doubt that their full powers included 
the power of life and death. The catechism concluded with 
the statement:
Do not shrink from drastic measures. It doesn't 
harm the prestige of the armed forces at all, as many 
falsely think, if once in the course of intimidating 
measures a deserter is hanged to the nearest tree 
with an appropriate sign around his n e c k . 56
Super NSFOs, however, were not commonplace. Most NSFOs
were ordinary officers who had the duty to train the army
in the nazi Weltanschauung.
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 360, Knaak, 
Hauptmann, NS-Fuhrungs-Stab der Wehrmacht, Lehrstab, 
Grundsatzliche Hinweise fur den Sondereinsatz von NS- 
FÙhrungsoffizieren.
CHAPTER VII 
TRAINING AND SCHOOLING
Unit Training 
Both Generals von Hengl and Reinecke attempted to 
impress their training ideas on the army, and neither of 
them liked the traditional method of imparting information 
to soldiers--the lecture. When General von Hengl talked 
to the generals at Sonthofen in May 1944 he said that the 
best way to get through to the troops was through a few 
informal words on every occasion on the part of the leader. 
The worst possible way of all, he declared, was trying to 
get the soldiers attention from 11:00-12:00 on Saturday 
morning. Hengl obviously preferred the personal approach 
in training,^ and so did General Reinecke. On September 29, 
1944, Reinecke wrote the three service NSF Staff Chiefs con­
cerning his training concepts which went into considerably 
more detail than Hengl's. His main fear was that the longer 
duty hours which had been recently decreed for the armed 
forces would be filled in with "make-work" just to keep sol­
diers busy. He cautioned that it would be much more logical
^NAM, T78, Roll 135, Frames 6064897-4910.
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to set the extra hours aside for NSF instruction. He saw 
"the entire service operation" standing under the NSF in­
fluence; therefore, it could not exhaust itself in just a 
few lectures on political themes. The general wanted NSF 
training to be integrated into the normal operations of 
the unit--to use "NSF aspirations" as illustrations to 
explain and support everyday operations. NSF training 
had to be integrated into everything the soldier did. 
Lectures, he wrote, made a mockery of the subject if 
things close to the soldier were ignored. What the sol­
dier really wished to see was the elimination of injus­
tices, and Reinecke listed several: inequity in the dis­
tribution of canteen items; the use of radios only in of­
ficers' quarters or the company orderly room; the assign­
ment of enlisted servants to officers; the distribution 
of movie and theater tickets only to officers and ranking 
sergeants; endless and secluded sojourns of the officers 
to their officer club; and the excess of formal exercises 
such as meaningless close order drill held under the cloak 
of "training in hardness." Eliminate these things, Reinecke 
implied, and a big step would be taken toward winning the 
troops to the support of NSF. Reinecke also wanted to 
bring the noncommissioned officers into the program. Since 
the NCOs always handled "the trifling things," they had to 
be trained in handling these things properly. He wanted 
NCOs, especially First Sergeants, to attend NSFO courses of
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instruction which, in addition to indoctrinating them in
ideological matters, would teach them to handle the per-
2
sonal problems of the troops. Regardless, however, of 
what Hengl and Reinecke wanted, the old, formal instruc­
tional periods continued in general use, but methods dif­
fered from unit to unit and from place to place.
The 19th Army combined the use of lectures and the 
personal approach desired by Hengl and Reinecke. In Janu­
ary 1945 unit commanders in the 19th Army were required to 
conduct two "NSF periods" each week. Main Office NSFOs 
had to give lectures to officers and hold personal discus­
sions and office conferences with staff officers while 
Sub-office NSFOs were expected to help the unit commanders 
in lining up the NCOs politically. In battle, simple and 
direct measures were directed to make the troops "spirit­
ually hard," but when the 19th Army NSFO spelled these
measures out, they merely boiled down to a scheme for im-
3
proving morale.
The C-in-C West, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, pub­
lished an NSF manual for his command which stated that 
direct discussion with individual soldiers was always the 
best way for NSF training, but the manual also outlined 
how the "NSF Period" would be conducted. The NSF Period
BAK, Kanzlei Rosenberg, NS8/1?4, Reinecke to 
Service NSF Chiefs with a copy to the NSDAP work staff, 
September 29, 1944, pp. 24-28.
^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frames 1525995-97.
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would begin with a quotation of Hitler's and would end 
with a nazi song. In between, a lively discussion on 
topical political questions would be held. During this 
discussion the troops were to feel they were not being 
manipulated by propaganda, and officers were to conduct 
the discussion not as officers to men but as men to men. 
Lectures on German history in relation to the nazi Welt­
anschauung and winning the war were also allowed. To 
reach the emotional side of the men, Feierstunde (Cere­
mony Periods) were prescribed to make the troops con­
scious of the greatness of the German people through 
music, poetry, art, and "meaningful speeches." The 
formality involved with such periods, of course, was 
not within the personal approach concept preferred by 
either Hengl or Reinecke.
Wehrkreis VII (an area command with headquarters 
in Munich) directed the content of the Feierstunde in con­
siderably more detail and placed it on a more soldierly 
basis. Nevertheless, it was still more formal than per­
sonal. Festive music whenever possible should introduce 
the ceremony, and a quotation from Hitler should follow. 
Then came a "speech, which must be a blazing appeal," so 
"the hearts of the men could grasp it and lift themselves 
upward." The highpoint of the speech had to be at the end 
with an unreserved accolade to the Führer. A combat song 
(while standing) should close the ceremony, and the
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Wehrkreis NSFO specified that it should impulsively rush 
from the mouths of the men. Most of the time, he wrote, 
"we shall be satisfied with one or two verses." Nothing 
could be more unbelievable, he charged, yet it was true 
that at the end of the Führer's words and in the same 
breath the speaker sometimes said, "We shall now sing the 
song 'Our Lives Only Belong to Freedom,' small song book, 
page 17. . . ." Besides, he added, there were far better
songs than that one.
In January 19^5 in Army Group "B" on the western 
front, its C-in-C, Model, was deeply concerned with NSF 
influence and morale in the rear areas, and his method 
for solving the problem was the personal approach. Since 
units behind the lines were usually spread out, it became 
difficult for commanders and NSFOs to get around and speak 
to all of them in large groups, so leaders of small units 
were told to talk to their men, individually or in small 
groups, wherever they happened to be--in forests, houses, 
or taverns. Another personal approach included the use 
of handbills. They were scarce, warned Model's NSFO, so 
they had to be used to good advantage. They should be 
stuck on walls, telegraph poles, road sign posts, and 
trees on the street. Paste or glue was not available 
and neither was assistance. So the NSFO suggested:
Make the walls or trees wet and put the things on 
there. It works superbly; it is proven. Activate 
the driver; give him a pair of handbills and let him 
put them up when he has to stop. . . . Use slogans.
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Make posters (in so far as camouflage allows) in 
bunkers, living rooms, etc. . . .  If ink runs use 
pencil. Beauty is not the object. The main goal 
is to beat the drum. Cover everything; improvise;
. . . paint slogans on the wall. . . . Lime (for 
white-wash) can be found in destroyed villages.
. . . One can make letters out of a fragment of
a wall or brick. It works I Do not first re­
quest paper and drawing ink; they are not avail­
able. . . . Write slogans in the snow on inclined 
places or trample them--it will remain until the 
next snow fall. One can lay out tree branches.
. . . These measures are not in jest; they were 
used to good effect during the struggle period of 
the party; they produced results.
The NSFO also suggested several slogans: "Victory or
Siberia"; "Idlers are Traitors"; "What are You (du) Doing
for Victory"; and "Believe, Fight, Win." In writing areas
there should be slogans asking soldiers if they had written 
4
home. Everything, of course, was not so informal.
Unit Schools
Schooling in NSF was always on a more formal basis 
than were the methods used in indoctrinating the troops in 
nazism and encouraging them to fight. Units conducted 
their own programs, and the courses were temporary, spe­
cialized, and aimed at a particular audience. For example, 
the 19th Army held a short three day course for commanders 
and staff officers to instruct them concerning the NSFO 
program. The Army NSFO conducted the course, and partici­
pants included one regimental commander, three battalion 
commanders, and sixteen unit commanders and staff officers.
NAM, T77, Roll 1039, Frames 6512753-57-
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Corps and division commanders were invited if they saw fit 
to a IL end. Not all courses were designed strictly for 
commanders, of course; above all they were constructed and 
operated according to the needs of the unit itself, but 
they followed the overall guidelines published by OKH and 
OKW.
The Replacement Army held a course of two days 
length on February 3 and 4, 1945, for selected officers.
On the first day, the schedule included three one-hour lec­
tures: "The National Socialist Leadership of Troops"; 
"Soldierly Spirit and National Socialism" (delivered by 
Lieutenant Colonel Freiherr von Lersner from the NSF Staff/ 
OKH); and "How Does the Officer Speak with His Soldiers."
In addition seventy minutes were set aside for discussion, 
and that evening a social get-together was scheduled. The 
next day called for four and a half hours in the morning
for discussion, presumably over the themes of the preceding 
6day.
On February 1?, 1945, the NSFO of Army Group "B" 
established the guidelines for unit schools which had been 
ordered by the NSF Staff of OKH in order to ease the burden 
of the unit commanders. It would be in three parts. "Basic 
schooling" under the control of unit commanders would be 
based on thirteen themes taken from Wofur kampfen wir (What
^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frame 1525994.
^NAM, T77, Roll 1039, Frame 6512840,
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Are We Fighting For?--the pamphlet written by Colonel 
Huebner). "Continuous schooling" would be held on monthly 
themes established by the NSF Staff/OKW in cooperation 
with the party; Sub-office NSFOs would be in charge of 
this part. The theme for February was "The Movement"
(i.e., The Nazi Movement). The third part was called 
"political schooling of pressing importance at the pres­
ent time." This mouthful of a title included coverage of 
several pamphlets which included What Are We Fighting For?, 
Officers of the Führer, and The Political Soldier plus 
newspapers, leaflets, speeches of Hitler, and various lit­
erature provided by information services of the armed 
forces and the Propaganda Ministry. For this last part, 
commanders. Main Office NSFOs, and Sub-office NSFOs would
7
be jointly responsible.
In March 19^5 the 98th Infantry Division NSFO an­
nounced his "Special Instructions on NSF, Nr. 8/4$." It 
listed the anniversaries which would be celebrated and 
the school themes for April. The two anniversaries were 
Bismarck's and Hitler's birthdays. Even the troops in 
the front lines had to be addressed concerning the signif­
icance of these days, and celebrations were prescribed for 
troops behind the lines. There were four themes for April: 
The Movement (published by the OKW NSF Staff); Chapter 28, 
"What Do We Understand about Socialism," and Chapter 331
^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frame 1525977-78.
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"Wherein Lies the Meaning of This Difficult Struggle," 
from What Are We Fighting F or ? ; and the last theme was 
"Only a German Victory Insures a German Future." The 
Special Instructions also pointed out that units had so 
far not set up "NSF Charts" as ordered. These charts 
were intended to serve as corollaries to the themes and 
consisted of situation maps, newspaper clippings, writ­
ings on NSF, contributions to the division newspaper, and
p
NSF hints. Those familiar with the U.S. Army's "Troop 
Information and Education" boards will recognize the 
German version entitled "NSF Charts."
During the summer and fall of 1944, Wehrkreis XI, 
headquartered in Hannover, conducted two-day courses three 
times monthly. The headquarters announced quotas for dif­
ferent units which then had to report the names of attend­
ees. The area command tried to spread attendance to dif­
ferent types of people, but mainly the courses were aimed 
at company and battery commanders. For example, the 
course for July l8 and 19 contained ten captains from the 
4llth Division and twenty captains and lieutenants from 
the 471st Division. On August 8-9, each division sent ten 
officers and the Hannover Medical Office sent ten, and 
courses beginning on September 11 and September 25 were 
strictly for nurses. The local party District Leader of 
the South Hannover-Braunschweig Gau, on request of
p
Ibid., Frames 1525928-29.
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Wehrkreis XI, cooperated in providing speakers and in 
schooling NSFOs. In addition to holding schools for its 
own party personnel, this party district, during the period 
September-December 1944, held one course per week, lasting 
from Monday through Thursday, for the NSFOs of the Wehr­
kr eis . All of the units training and schooling, formal 
and informal, were, however, insignificant compared with 
the tremendous effort in the courses conducted at Krossinsee,
Krossinsee
Krossinsee was a former party school located near 
Stettin in Pomerania; it was taken over by OKW during the 
war and became the main center for training NSFOs and for 
determining the suitability of officers from all services 
who were nominated as NSFOs. It was the object of very 
close observation by the P-K work staff which kept a 
permanent liaison man there. One could almost call this 
man a spy, because some of the best information and crit­
icism of individuals and the operation there come from 
reports to Bormann from these liaison men. Their reports 
are also significant in showing the party's views of the 
officer corps.
The first NSFO course at Krossinsee took place 
between March 8-21, 1944, with 227 officers attending.
^Ibid., Frames 1526251-314.
^^Ibid., Frames I52626I and I5263O7 .
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Nineteen of these men were selected as Work Group Leaders. 
Of the total, the army provided l4y officers. The major­
ity of all attendees fell in the 30-40 age group, and most 
wore war decorations and were already active in NSFO posi­
tions. At the end of the course, the Work Group Leaders 
rendered efficiency reports on the officers in their groups 
which placed 30 per cent of the officers in the above- 
average category and listed 53 per cent as average; 17 per 
cent were judged unqualified to be NSFOs. Instruction at 
Krossinsee was by means of lectures by party members and 
staff officers from OKH and OKW plus discussion in the 
work g r o u p s . I n  the work groups the lecture themes were 
discussed during the afternoon after the morning lectures. 
Each theme was covered intensively, and suggestions and 
recommendations were solicited. Allegedly open criticism 
was demanded and was not taken amiss when offered. Of 
course there were always officers who invariably maintained 
a rigid silence during these discussions. One of the work 
group goals was to further the working together of the 
three military services and to allow the members of one 
service to experience the outlook of the others. Ap­
parently, the navy and air force representatives had 
higher numbers of professional regular officers in their
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 3^0, Vorlage, 
Betrifft: Lehrgang fur NS-Fuhrungsoffiziere in Krossinsee,
Erfahrungsbericht, March 23, 1944, signed: Ruder. See
appendix A for the first course lecture schedule of 
speakers, subjects, and times.
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midst than did the army, and regulars were rarely party
12members.
A complete critique of each course held at 
Krossinsee is not necessary and could comprise a study in 
itself; however, a condensed version of Ruder's report to 
Bormann for the first course with certain excerpts from 
other course reports will be significant in showing the 
pessimism of Ruder and other leading nazis concerning 
individuals, the Army General Staff, and the effective­
ness of the entire NSFO program in general. There is 
little doubt that the nazi view engendered by events 
at Krossinsee was instrumental in causing developments 
toward the Politruk idea in the last few weeks of the 
war, especially since Ruder himself was deeply involved.
Ruder attended the first course at Krossinsee as 
the representative of the P-K and lectured on "The His­
torical Mission of the party." He felt that many of the 
lectures could be shortened since several speakers tended 
to repeat themselves; he also wanted less talk and more 
discussion. Several party offices had tried to get as 
many speakers as possible scheduled for the course and 
thereby lost sight of the big picture ; accordingly Ruder 
thought the P-K should exercise a more rigid control over 
the assignment of speakers. Besides, he charged, several
12Letters, Captain of Reserves Karl Ducoffre, 
a.D., May 20, 1972 and September 21, 19?2.
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of the speakers were "weak." One of these was General 
Reinecke whose remarks lacked the "striking force and 
power of conviction" required for an introductory address 
at Krossinsee. The fact that Ruder used nearly the same 
words as Bormann when the latter had pondered who should 
be the Chief of the NSF Staff/OKW showed that the two 
must have already discussed Reinecke at length. If this 
is so, then from the very beginning Reinecke had little 
chance for success, as will become clear later in this 
study when the P-K attempted to abolish his job. Accord­
ing to Ruder, who commented on other speakers as well, the 
remarks by the general's assistants. Captains Kolle and 
Presting, were "tired and weak" and not "clear and con­
vincing." Generally Ruder believed that some of the topics 
discussed by the speakers could have been eliminated since 
they covered the same ground as others. The talk by Lieu­
tenant Ziervogel did not seem to set well with the stu­
dents because of its dryness and the lieutenant's lack of 
personal involvement; his comments on "The Military Situa­
tion" gave a resigned impression, and, in Ruder's opinion, 
it was entirely too pessimistic. On the other hand. Ruder 
thought that the interest in the work groups was very ani­
mated; the participants had the opportunity to comment on 
the lectures and those questions which still remained 
"open." As a result, the Work Group Leaders had an ex­
cellent opportunity to evaluate the students, and their
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reports were forwarded to the High Commands of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force. To maintain uniformity among and 
within the work groups, the leaders met every day with 
General Reinecke to discuss all questions and develop 
guidance for their work.
The course did not fail to utilize the students' 
evenings (after 8:30 P.M.) for cultural and propaganda 
purposes. On one of the evenings. Party Member Cerff of 
the Main Culture Office in the party's Propaganda Office 
organized a celebration under the title of "Great Examples 
in a Difficult Time." In this case even a party official 
was not spared Ruder's criticism. Cerff delivered a speech 
which Ruder termed "too long and confused." All was not 
bad, however. The students were also treated to a musical 
portion of the festivities; the Gau orchestra from Pome­
rania played Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, and :t was well 
received. Several films and a comic opera ("la Serva 
Patrona") were greeted with approval, but a comedy ("Vita­
min L") did not go over at all well. On other evenings, 
the students enjoyed a choir and a puppet show. To secure 
the active participation in evening singing, the course 
participants received new songs to practice each morning.
At the close of the course, an evening of "comradery" 
(Kameradschaftsabend) was held, but Ruder, showing a 
straight-laced attitude, thought it was "an undignified 
closing of the course." There was no clear leadership
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given to the evening, and the bounteous flow of alcohol 
resulted in some drunkenness and a few breaches of 
propriety.
Ruder had comments about two other generals also. 
General Voig-Ruschewegh of the NSF Staff/OKW had been in 
charge of quarters, accommodations, transportation, and 
rations for the course. This general presented such a 
"dejected appearance," Ruder wrote, that he soon became 
a focus of everyone's derision. Because of this, he said, 
the general was a burden on General Reinecke and his 
staff. On the other side. General Schorner had shown up 
on March 21 to talk to the army officers in attendance. 
Ruder was very impressed with the robust combat experi­
enced general and reported to Bormann that Schorner laid
out the task of the NSFO in an unmistakable manner--he
13left no doubt as to how the job had to be done. Ap­
pearances were apparently very important to a believer 
in the nazi "superman" theory like Ruder. However, there 
were other nazis like a Dr. Kruger, the District School 
Leader of Southern Westphalia, who were more interested 
in the functioning of the work groups.
Kruger, after assisting with the first NSFO Course 
at Krossinsee, complained to Ruder that all of the Work
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 360, Vorlage, 
Betrifft: Lehrgang fur NS-Fuhrungsoffiziere in Krossinsee,
Erfahrungsbericht, March 23, 1944, signed: Ruder. See
also NAM, T77, Roll 1039, Frames 6512796-99.
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Group Leaders there were not political leaders at all, re­
gardless of their former party membership. One of them did 
not lead the ideological discussion himself, but rather al­
lowed a civilian party member to handle it. Kruger said 
this showed that men who lacked a clear comprehension of 
the nazi Weltanschauung and who did not have much political 
experience were not qualified to lead a work group and to 
pass judgment on participants in the course. In this first 
course, the way those attending the course were evaluated 
was at the complete discretion of the Work Group Leaders.
In the future, he suggested, the NSF Staff of OKW, in coop­
eration with the P-K, should hold a detailed consultation 
with the Work Group Leaders before allowing them to fill 
out the rating sheets. He also bemoaned the fact that only 
10 per cent of the Work Group Leaders had been party mem­
bers before Hitler's assumption of power in Germany. As it 
was, only 60 per cent of them were party members, and ap­
parently 30 per cent had religious affiliations. Kruger 
placed the fault on commanders who thought the "old" party 
members were too radical. At least, it should be possible 
to find such types to serve as NSFOs in units larger than 
divisions, he believed. He, like Ruder, also suggested
that the P-K should have a greater say in the selection of
14speakers and themes for the course. Ruder agreed fully
^^Ibid., Gauleitung Westfalen-Sud, Der Gauschul- 
ungsleiter, to Ruder, April I7 , 1944, signed: Dr. Kruger.
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with Kruger, and assured him that the second course was 
completely different. The Work Group Leaders now had the 
experience behind them from the first course, and thus 
they did a better job. He assured Kruger that he person­
ally talked with Major Ihlert of OKW before an officer 
was either accepted or rejected as an NSFO.^^
The second course at Krossinsee from March 17 to 
27, however, convinced Ruder that the military services 
were not giving sufficient care to the nomination of 
NSFOs. Some of the participants had openly announced 
that they did not want to be NSFOs, and, unfortunately in 
Ruder's view, a proportionally high number was composed 
of teachers and scholars. In this course, nearly 19 per 
cent were found to be unsuitable for NSFO jobs. Ruder 
talked to Major Ihlert again, and the major promised to 
apply pressure on the three services for a better selec­
tion process. Ruder also revealed that cooperation be­
tween the party and OKH was not as good as that between 
the P-K and the other two services. Further, General von 
Heikendorf, who spoke to the students about the "eastern 
troops" (Ukrainians and Russians) serving in the German 
army, offended Ruder when he said that Germany could only 
win in the east with the help of these Slavic troops. 
Ruder was also getting exasperated with General Reinecke
^^Ibid., Ruder to Dr. Kruger, May 3, 1944.
198
for repeated failures in the schooling program, and he 
asked Bormann to talk to the general on its importance.
The services were trying to set up their own independent 
NSFO courses, and if Reinecke failed to intervene as he 
should. Ruder reported, then the party would have to 
take a hand in running the service courses as it had at 
Krossinsee. Yet if it did intervene, he moaned, it 
would require a monumental effort which might fail.
Ruder also revealed that earlier complaints by 
members of the NSF Staff/OKW against members of the NSF 
Staff/OKH had had their intended effect on members of 
the P-K. Since Schorner's departure for a field command. 
Ruder told Bormann, no active nazi was running the army's 
NSFO program, and Colonel Radke in NSF/OKH laid all kinds 
of difficulties in the way of cooperation between OKH and 
OKW. (Hengl was not appointed until May 15, 1944.) This 
was not Ruder's first complaint against Radke, and he 
asked Bormann to get the colonel relieved from his job. 
Most of the problems with OKH, he said, involved personnel 
questions, so this was also an indirect slap at General 
Schmundt (and perhaps also Generals Burgdorf and Meisel). 
On the other hand, OKH complaints against OKW had also 
been effective. If Reinecke would only abandon "his dip­
lomatic line" and "finally assert himself," Ruder com­
plained, things would improve. Furthermore, some of Rein­
ecke 's people were not so good either; there were still
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several politically unqualified people in his Amtsgruppe 
Inland.
The fourth, fifth, and sixth courses viere held 
before the attempted assassination of Hitler on July 20, 
1944, which created a general nazi attack on the Army 
General Staff. Their significance was in the deepening 
distrust of the nazis for regular officers and the con­
tinued complaints about the army's NSF Staff. The fourth 
course. May 19-311 1944, fired Ruder's ire regarding the 
regular officers who attended. They approached all ques­
tions very critically and constantly asked for "instruc­
tions and simple formulations" concerning the nazi Welt­
anschauung. "Even in irrelevant things most of them 
showed a great insecurity," and they were virginal when 
it came to nazi thought processes. The students had 
leveled many criticisms at the speakers because hardly 
any of them had combat decorations, and the regular of­
ficers, especially, believed that no one who had not 
proved his nazism at the front could speak to them about 
national socialism. Ruder's pessimistic conclusion was
17that the course was too short to change these attitudes.
Ibid., Vorlage, Betrifft: Zweiter Lehrgang fur
NS-Fuhrungsoffiziere in Krossinsee, Erfahrungsbericht,
April 28, 1944, signed: Ruder.
^^Ibid., Abschrift, Vorlage, Betrifft: 4. Lehr­
gang fur NS-Fuhrungsoffiziere in Krossinsee vom 19.-31.3.44,
June 1, 1944, IIF, signed: Ruder.
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In June he aimed his barbs at the NSF Staff of OKH again. 
This time, in addition to Colonel Radke, he included Lieu­
tenant Colonel von Lersner. Their lectures to the army 
officers in the fifth course, in his opinion, added noth­
ing to the "enrichment" of the course or to the "strength­
ening of political activation." He reminded Bormann that 
both of these officers had been criticized previously by 
the P-K, and he proclaimed his intent to take up the mat­
ter with the new Chief of the NSF Staff/OKH, General von
18Hengl. In early July, Party Member Nill, instead of 
Ruder, made the reports to Bormann from Krossinsee, but 
he too criticized the regular officers' very strong prej­
udice against the party. Colonel Radke again spoke to 
the army officers of the sixth course, and according to 
Nill, Radke created on the part of almost all of the stu­
dents a feeling of "rejection and disgust" for him. "As 
usual his remarks were 'correct'; however, they were with­
out any positive attitude and personal sympathy for na-
19tional socialist leadership."
The seventh course closed the day after the "20th 
of July," and the reports by the Party Liaison Officer at 
Krossinsee reflected the bitterness against the Army
18Ibid., Vorlage, Betrifft: 5- Lehrgang fur
NS-Fuhrungsoffiziere in Krossinsee vom 5.-17.-Juni 1944., 
June 17, 1944, IIF, signed: Ruder.
^^Ibid., Vorlage, Betrifft: 6. Lehrgang fur
NS-Fuhrungsoffiziere in Krossinsee vom 22.6.-5•7•44,
July 6, 1944, IIF, signed: Nill.
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General Staff for its hand in the attempt on Hitler's 
life. It was the youngest class yet; the average age was 
32-1/2 years. Approximately half were not party members, 
and these, as could be expected, were mostly the profes­
sional officers. Although Nill was impressed with the 
younger officers, he felt they approached questions 
thrown at them with "too much intellect." He also felt 
that even those who had grown up in the Hitler Youth had 
lost much of their dedication to nazism since falling 
under the sway of the "Officer Club spirit." He thought 
that after leaving Krossinsee, they would return to an­
other world which as a rule criticized nazism on an in­
tellectual level. Further, the students, Nill reported, 
could not fathom why NSF/OKW tolerated the continued op­
position in NSF/OKH, a subordinate headquarters; OKW 
should have prevented these officers from appearing at 
Krossinsee and should have them relieved of their duties.
Nill blamed Colonels Radke and Kather in the army's NSF
20Staff for this state of affairs.
By October Party Member Beringer made these re­
ports, and he also complained about the army. Out of a 
quota of twenty general staff officers, only seven showed 
up for a course, and they acted in a cool and temporizing 
manner. One general staff colonel did not want to conform
Ibid., Vorlage: 7* hrgang fur NS-Fuhrungsoff-
iziere in Krossinsee vom 7•7•-21.7.4^ , July 21, 1944, IIF, 
signed: Nill.
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at all, and he complained about his quarters and osten­
tatiously shook his head during lectures. After two days, 
"supposedly because of military reasons," he just got up 
and left; General Reinecke was unhappy over this display 
of general staff arrogance and reported the colonel's
21actions to General Guderian, the army's Chief of Staff.
The twelfth course at Krossinsee caused a small 
furor when general staff officers began to express their 
reaction to the widespread criticisms aimed at the Army 
General Staff. Their actions and remarks resulted in 
Bormann's ordering Ruder to inform General Burgdorf of 
the Army Personnel Office and the SS-Chief, Heinrich 
Himmler, about the events. Beringer reported that 182 
members of the War Academy from Hirschberg attended the 
course scheduled for November 14-28, 1944; their com­
mandant, General Spath accompanied them, and they de­
parted as scheduled after the first eight days. From 
the beginning Spath's general staff officers caused con­
siderable difficulty. They arrived showing visible aloof­
ness and prejudices and exhibited little inclination to 
conform. Not wanting to get involved, they refused to 
take part in work group discussions, and they could not 
tolerate the fact that the Work Group Leaders had fewer 
years of military experience than they. One general
Ibid., Vorlage, Betrifft: 9* Lehrgang ftir
nationalsozialistische Fuhrungsoffiziere in Krossinsee
vom 19.9. bis 2.10.1944-, IIF, signed: Beringer.
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staff colonel called this situation "grotesque," and most 
let it be known on the first day that they already had a 
very good mastery over "the stuff" and were only attending 
for informational purposes.
The general staff members also held themselves 
aloof from the other officers, so no free discussion was 
possible. They critically scrutinized every speech, and 
work groups degenerated into fruitless debates. Anytime 
they could manage to get a speaker to point out or con­
firm changes which had taken place in the conduct of 
"practical national socialism," they appeared very happy, 
and they felt personally attacked by lecti ’"es delivered 
by General Reinecke and Party Member Eckhardt because 
both speakers talked about the events of the "20th of 
July." After hearing some of the ideological speeches, 
they told Beringer that they felt like removing their 
beloved uniforms and forsaking the military profession 
forever. Concerning the Sondereinsatz of NSFOs on the 
western front, one participant openly displayed regular 
officer arrogance; he commented that such a state of af­
fairs was made necessary only because reserve officers 
who had not been selected properly had "unfortunately" 
been brought into the army. (In the margin of the report 
next to this statement, Bormann showed his bias against 
regular officers; he wrote: "Typical attitude!") Many
of the general staff officers demonstrated their dissat­
isfaction with the staff structure of the NSFO program;
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they demanded that NSFOs of division staffs should be made 
subordinate to the la (Operations Officer and Chief of 
Staff), just like any other staff officer, since the la 
had the best information about the spirit of the troops 
and could best judge the kind of national socialist lead­
ership required. Many considered the NSFO as something 
temporary--something born only out of an emergency. Ac­
cordingly, they subscribed to the idea that the purpose 
of the NSFO was not ideological; it was only designed to 
improve the spirit of the troops in order to increase 
their combat effectiveness.
Beringer believed the cause of all this was the 
training system at the War Academy where nazism was con­
sidered only as a subject like any other-~a subject for 
the mind but not taken to heart. He also thought that 
the Commandant of Krossinsee, Lieutenant Colonel Herschel 
had artificially widened the chasm between the Hirsch- 
bergers and the NSFOs by offending the former with crude 
remarks which gave the impression that he thought they 
were all reactionaries. Beringer, without comment, at­
tached a note by Party Member Derr who had been informed 
by Colonel Langmann, on behalf of General Spath, that the 
members of the War Academy, without exception [underlined 
by Bormann twicel], had returned in an enthusiastic spirit, 
thankful that they had had the opportunity to visit 
Krossinsee. General Spath had questioned them again, and
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they, without exception [underlined by Bormann twicel], 
had answered positively. All of the participants [under­
lined by Bormann three timesl] confirmed that Krossinsee 
had been a good experience for them. Spath would ensure 
that in the future all general staff offic.ers would at­
tend the entire course. A few officers [Bormann: "? ?"
and an arrow drawn to here from the thrice underlined 
"All of the participants" abovel] had spoken derogatorily 
about the Work Group Leaders and the course, but after 
this was divulged, General Spath punished them; he sent 
them back to Krossinsee to apologize to the Course Leader 
and Work Group Leaders. "Consideration," Langmann added, 
was being given to their removal from the general staff. 
The general requested that these exceptions should not 
be generalized and affirmed that Krossinsee had been an
experience [Bormann: "??? of what kindll?"] and that he
22expressed his thanks in the name of all participants.
This was still not the end, and Spath continued to clean 
up his reputation by writing a note to Ruder. In the 
future, he declared, "it was foreseen" that every general 
staff course would begin first with an NSFO course in 
order to place general staff officers on a political
2 2
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 135i Vorlage, 
Betrifft: 12. Lehrgang der nationalsozialistischen Fuhr­
ungsof fiziere in Krossinsee vom l4.11.bis 28.11.1944, 
November 30, 1944, IIF signed: Beringer, with enclosure
Anlage, zur Vorlage, Betrifft: Lehrgang Krossinsee, No­
vember 30, 1944, IIF, signed: Derr.
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and ideological level and build up the NSF work at the 
23academy.
The previous day, November 31, the general's NSFO 
had prepared a letter for him to the Chief of the Army 
General Staff in which Spath sang the praises of the 
twelfth NSFO Course at Krossinsee and its beneficial as­
pects for the participants. However, he complained that 
the long speeches there caused "mental overfatigue" and 
that "some inept speakers" (of course Guderian could 
check and find that Reinecke was one of these inept 
speakers) had used the "20th of July" to split apart a 
"resistance" which, he added, did not even exist. The 
participants objected, he wrote, to having this always 
thrown in their faces or to having always to prove their 
loyalty to nazism. Hitler, and the German nation. Of 
the 183 members of the general staff who took part in 
the course. Spath listed 12 with the Knight's Cross and 
60 with the German Cross in Gold. Eight had been named 
in dispatches, l42 had been wounded in combat--8l re- 
peatedly--and 10 were amputees. To further prove his 
point, he said that ll4 had even belonged to the Hitler
Youth, and of these 85 had been Hitler Youth Leaders.
24He also sent a copy of this letter to Ruder.
^^Ibid., Spath to Ruder, December 1, 1944.
24Ibid., Kriegsakademie Abt. NSFO, Hirschberg an 
den Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres. Erfahrungsbericht 
uber den 12. NSFO-Lehrgang im Krossinsee vom 16.-22.11. 
1944, November 30, 1944, signed: Spath.
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The stiff reaction by members of the Army Gen­
eral Staff did not stop all of the attacks on the regular 
officers, but it did convince the P-K that better party- 
Wehrmacht relations were needed. During the fourteenth 
course, from January 5-19, 1945, Major Lindenberg spoke 
to the army and upset the regulars by chiding them for 
waiting too long to come around to the nazi Weltanschau­
ung. In addition, Party Member Kramer, a replacement 
speaker for General Reinecke who was conspicuously ab­
sent, alienated his audience through the use of "inac­
curate and dangerous formulations." One example was:
"'If the armed forces had not lived it up for three to
four years in France, it would not have come to a ca­
tastrophe in the west and the 20th of July as well.'"
As a result of this and other derogatory remarks, sev­
eral students, mostly regular colonels, complained to
the school commandant and requested a conference with 
Kramer and Beringer. "For better or worse," Beringer 
reported to Bormann, "Party Member Kramer had to eat 
several of his own remarks." Nevertheless, even then 
he tried to make himself look important "in absurd ways." 
Beringer, supporting the regular officers for a change, 
reported that he would never allow Kramer to appear at 
Krossinsee again. Again supporting the students, he 
also complained about the new School Commandant, Lieu­
tenant Colonel Schulz of Sondereinsatz fame. Schulz was
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malassigned, Beringer said, because he could not speak
well and had "preposterous" ideas on cooperation between
party and Wehrmacht. Many officers had complained to
Beringer that the commandant censured them like school
children. The Wehrmacht NSF Staff, Beringer reported,
intended to replace him with a Colonel Weller after the
25end of the fifteenth course.
On February 1?, 19^5, Party Member Derr reported 
to Bormann that Krossinsee had had to close down because 
of the Soviet break-through on the eastern front. The 
teaching staff and the Work Group Leaders were placed at 
Himmler's disposal to be assigned to his Army Group 
Weichsel which was being driven back in the vicinity of 
Stettin. War Schools and Battalion and Unit Leader 
Courses were also halted for a short time, but they later 
resumed. Doberitz (Olympic Village), a secondary NSFO 
school, would carry on with Krossinsee forever out of the
26 * * * *picture. Krossinsee and Doberitz, of course, were not 
the only formal schools; NSF instruction was conducted in 
all armed forces schools. Thus, the major schools were 
also frequent targets of the criticism leveled by the P-K 
work staff.
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 36O, Vorlage, 
Betrifft; Ik. Lehrgang der nationalsozialistischen Fuhr- 
ungsoffiziere in Krossinsee vom 5.-18.1.1945, January 19, 
1945, IIF, signed: Beringer.
^^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 135, Vorlage, 
Betrifft: Lehrgange fur NS-Fuhrungsoffiziere, Febru­
ary 17, 1945, signed: Derr.
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Other Schools
Inspection visits to some of these other major
schools showed that the nazis believed that, in general,
the NSFO program had not yet been very successful. The
greater part of the instructors in the Infantry Cadet
school in Neuenburg, near Prague, Czechoslovakia, acted
as if they did not know the aims of NSF, one party report
charged, and they gave the impression that they did not
believe in the themes they themselves taught--they taught
27them perfunctorily in accordance with orders. Also Derr 
made several visits to schools after Krossinsee closed.
He called the Commandant of the Army Noncommissioned Offi­
cer School in Mittenwald, a Major Schiller, a "somewhat 
pig-headed, intellectually inflexible" man who admitted 
that he had never heard of NSF until four weeks previously 
(February 19^51). Derr asked the Office of the General 
Inspector for Leadership Training, Captain Botzelin, to 
remove Schiller. At a school at Luttensee, Derr found 
that the commandant was "young, fresh, and enthusiastic," 
but the NSFO, "a kettle-drummer type," lacked any creative 
ideas and had to be replaced. On the other hand, he found 
everything to his satisfaction at the Cadet School at Mit­
tenwald; the NSFO had a good reputation, his work was
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl, 139> Bericht 
uber Schule X fur FJl . . . , March l6, 1943, signed:
Schaumburg.
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28appreciated, and the commandant supported him. An in­
spection by a Lieutenant Friedrich of the 6th Infantry 
Cadet School at Meseritz at the beginning of October 1944 
revealed that the cadets lacked knowledge of the nazi 
Weltanschauung. There was one NSFO there, but Friedrich 
saw him in an official capacity only once at an insignif­
icant affair. Further, he complained that the younger 
cadets were only interested in jazz; they had no interest
29
in ideological questions.
Even the local nazis got in the act. The Gauleiter
and Reich Governor of Salzburg (Austria) reported to the
P-K the observations of one of his underlings who took part
in a course in January 1945 at the War School in Kitzingen.
A young lieutenant there gave a lecture on "so-called 'NS-
Themes'" which "was an unrivaled catastrophe. He was so
clumsy handling questions and so insecure that his efforts
had only negative results." The school NSFO spoke to the
class only once, and the students never saw nor heard from
30him or a representative again. Some reports, however, 
were highly favorable; one predicted that the greater part
28 • •
Ibid., Vermerk fur Pg. Ruder, Betrifft: Besuch
der Heeres--Unteroffizierschule Mittenwald . . . ,
March 11, 1945, IIF, signed: Derr.
^^Ibid., Erfahrungsbericht uber den Besuch der 
Fahnenjunkerschule 6. Inf. Meseritz . . . , March 29,
1945, signed: Leutnant Dr. Friedrich.
^^Ibid., Gauleiter of Salzburg to the P-K, 
Betrifft: NSFO. der Kriegschule Kitzingen, March 191
1945.
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of the participants in the General Staff Officer Course 
in the NSFO Army School at Egerndorf would follow the 
NSF way.
Oblivious to the possibility that most army offi­
cers were not prepared to commit themselves totally to 
nazism, the P-K believed that the reason for the many fail­
ures of NSF in the army's school system was in the person
who supervised it. The solution, then, was to replace him.
On March 27, 19^5, Oberbannfuhrer Griesmayr complained to 
Ruder that the Army's General Inspector of Leadership
Training, Major General von Hellermann, was an obstacle
in the way of the revolutionizing of the army because he 
was not a nazi. He recommended that the P-K press for the 
relief of Hellermann and his replacement by a Lieutenant 
Colonel Kluver who was an "old national socialist," polit­
ical leader, trainer, and exemplary officer. Griesmayr 
added that he believed the C-in-C of the Replacement Army,
Himmler, had already started some type of action against 
32Hellermann. If so, the nazis had very little time to 
turn the army's training program into a new direction, and 
it appeared that many German officers were just not inter­
ested in nazi training even if it was their responsibility. 
In fact many resisted.
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 137, Bericht uber 
meinen Vortrag vor dem Generalstabsoffizierslehrgang in 
der NSFO-Heeresschule Egerndorf, unsigned.
3^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 139, Griesmayr
to Ruder, March 27, 19^5-
CHAPTER VIII 
RESISTANCE
Passive Resistance 
Much of the resistance to nazism and the NSFO 
occurred because of Prussian traditionalism in the army 
at higher levels, but much of it was based also on po­
litical apathy at the lower levels. A view by a Captain 
Walter Hergel on this subject is enlightening. In Her- 
gel's view, the authoritarian state was founded by Fred­
erick the Great. However, the Prussian king knew nothing 
about leadership, the nation, and the brotherhood of cit­
izens; his system was based on authority at the top and 
obedience below. The king's subjects were not to involve 
themselves in state matters but were supposed to obey and 
carry out the desires of the king. This system was espe­
cially important in the Prussian army where iron disci­
pline prevailed and no soldier dared to question an order 
of the king. In the Wehrmacht of the Third Reich, a large 
part of the officer corps still believed in this attitude 
as an ideal, especially the Prussian or "quasi Prussian" 
officers who had the experiences of the First World War
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stamped in their memory. They found such an attitude not 
only useful but convenient, and Hergel believed it caused 
all of the "pig-headedness" in the German armed forces. 
Furthermore, he did not believe one could really think 
that way any more in the twentieth century. Yet the 
greater part of the officer corps had not grasped this 
fact, and they did not realize: that the 1914-1918 war
was not lost because of military reasons but because of 
political reasons; that the very existence of the new 
Wehrmacht was the result of the political awakening of 
the German people; and that the present war would be, and 
had to be, conducted on both sides with those means ap­
propriate for political struggles. Similarly, a signifi­
cant part of the officer corps, and again especially the 
World War I generation, failed to have any understanding 
of the value and indispensability of ideological training. 
They saw it as something sinister and conducted a "more 
or less passive resistance" against it while others, rec­
ognizing its importance, wanted to conduct a program 
themselves without any cooperation with the party. They 
looked on the nazi party as a foreign influence. Hergel 
believed that it was only a short step from either of 
these attitudes to conscious political reaction, and the 
circles in the officer corps left over from the past would 
not admit the importance and the accomplishments of the 
nazi "revolution." At the same time, he declared, they
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lived by its fruits and owed their military existence and 
"considerable possibilities for advancement" to this po­
litical revolution. Three months before the "20th of 
July," Hergel thanked God that the nazi movement was 
strong, and that no crystallization point existed for 
active opposition such as that provided in Italy by the 
king; otherwise, Germany would certainly have a similar 
situation to reckon withl In other matters, however, 
Hergel was more astute. He believed the passive and 
covert resistance had suffered considerable loss in 
momentum and perseverance and that the introduction of 
the NSFO prepared the way for the enforcement of ideo­
logical training. Still, he did not think the path would 
be easy; he fully expected the higher ranking and older 
members of the officer corps to use every means possible 
to oppose and lessen the impact of the introduction of 
the NSFO and to sabotage the program by every conceivable 
means. Above all, he predicted that they would try to 
avoid assigning active individuals as NSFOs and would at­
tempt to shelve the entire program. He doubted seriously 
whether the NSFO program could ever work unless a deci­
sive part of the "over-aged World War officer corps" was 
removed. Such a step would be a "blessing," but without 
it, as Hergel correctly predicted, the NSFO would remain 
only a "half-measure."^
^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 360, Hauptmann
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On October 17, 1944, nearly a year after Hitler 
established the NSFO program, Ruder, in a report to Bor- 
mann, wrote: "The NS-Leadership work today still stands
in its infancy. . . . The selection of the NSFO has still
not taken place adequately from a political point of view." 
The reason for this in Ruder's opinion was that commanders 
frequently resisted the program on two grounds: first,
the NSFO had to take a position on nazism and therefore 
made himself unpopular; second, the NSFO in professing 
his nazi belief provoked resistance of those with confes­
sional ties to the churches. This caused a cleft to de­
velop in the officer corps; young officers and men who 
were responsive to nazism frequently stood in opposition 
to commanders who were strongly religious. This caused 
much frustration for party members because leading mili­
tary figures, the latest being Grand Admiral Karl Donitz, 
always adamantly insisted that responsibility for national 
socialist leadership should remain in the hands of the 
commanders at all levels. They, Ruder added, would never 
share this responsibility with NSFOs.^
From the nazi side, the charge persisted that 
there were always "irresponsible" superiors who said they
Dr. Walter Hergel, Wehrgeistige Erziehung, Reichenberg, 
April l4, 1944.
^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. l40, Vorlage, 
Betrifft: Vortrag bei Grossadmiral Donitz am 17* Oktober
1944, October I7 , 1944, IIF, signed: Ruder.
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had no time for national socialist leadership--conse- 
quently, they gave a higher priority to technical train­
ing, such as the use of a new weapon or piece of equip­
ment, than they did to ideological training. A strong 
party complaint was that these commanders never under­
stood that political and Weltanschauung indoctrination 
was the basis for all other training. To many, the NSFO 
job was just another extra duty like Gas Officer, Com­
munications Officer, or Supply Officer, and perhaps even
3
less important instead of being a "holy thing." Not 
once, it seems, did nazis, whether military or party 
types, pinpoint another possible reason for passive re­
sistance. It is one which strikes the reader consis­
tently when he reads the thousands of pages of nazi prop­
aganda and nazi thought. Reading nazi propaganda creates 
an immediate impression that it makes little sense and 
that it is boring; listening to it and its emotionalism 
must have been even worse. There is no doubt that it 
caused a few thinking officers and men to stop listening 
to the party's propagandists and to view the propaganda 
itself as alien to traditional Prussian military thinking, 
This passive or negative reaction to the party's propa­
ganda efforts can be documented with some revealing testi­
mony by former members of the German army.
3
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 137, Hauptmann
Hauschild/Frau Kohne.
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Testimony
August Knoll was a captain commanding a training 
company near Rennes, France, when a twenty-one-year-old 
lieutenant from army headquarters appeared one day through 
arrangement made by regimental headquarters. Previously, 
Knoll had paid little attention to the order for the es­
tablishment of the NSFO system. He believed the institu­
tion to be needless and thought such ideas were "only for 
party greats." Besides, he said his troops had no inter­
est in politics. On the arrival in his unit of the NSFO, 
he assembled his company for a prepared speech of some 
forty-five minutes after which he disbanded the troops who 
had showed little interest in the entire presentation.
For that reason, he reported, "they felt a closer warmth 
for their fifty-one-year-old captain." However, he re­
tained the officers and noncommissioned officers for a 
discussion with the NSFO. During his address to the com­
pany, the political officer had said sixteen times, "'we 
must win.'" The captain now asked him, "How can we still 
win?" and referred him to the destruction of the 6th Army 
at Stalingrad. Shrugging his shoulders, the NSFO said 
that that was not his concern. In his speech he had said 
nothing about the need for discipline, so Knoll suggested 
to him that what was needed mostly was comradeship, loy­
alty, and obedience like in the first world war, and he 
compared, by way of example, the differences between the
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two wars. He could not gain any agreement from the NSFO, 
and a senior sergeant turned the discussion back to Stalin­
grad. Again the lieutenant shrugged his shoulder and said 
that it was not his business. Then Knoll pointed out that 
Russia had "three generals": General Winter, General Time,
and General Space and asked the NSFO if God could grant 
the Führer success in winning against such formidable gen­
erals. To this the lieutenant had no response, and after 
a short thanks for his time and effort, Knoll released him 
with a military salute. The NSFO responded with the nazi
4
stiff-armed salute and a "Heil Hitler," and then he left.
A former professional soldier who joined the 
Reichswehr in 1930 and served as the first sergeant of an 
infantry air defense company on the western front during 
the last winter of the war said that the soldiers in his 
unit had "no worthy thoughts" regarding the NSFO--they 
laughed at the program and saw the NSFO as completely 
without influence. His unit, Fliegerabwehr-Kompanie DANK- 
WARD, was newly activated in the early part of 1944 in 
Paderborn. After short stays on the Dutch island of 
Walcheren and along the Albert Canal in Belgium, the com­
pany moved back into Western Germany for the winter in the 
area south of Aachen. The unit was emplaced for air de­
fense in the area eastward on the Rurhohen near Nideggen
4Letter, Major of Reserves August Knoll, a.D., 
March 20, 1972.
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while the battle between U.S. and German troops raged to 
the west. Toward the end of 1944, he, as first sergeant, 
was with the baggage train in Erp, on the road from Zulpich 
to Cologne. It was at this time--one year after the NSFO 
was established and nearly ^  year after the company was 
activated--that he heard for the first time about NSFOsI 
An order came from division headquarters stating that one 
officer in the unit would be appointed as NSFO and that 
his name would be reported to headquarters. The first 
sergeant laid the order on his company commander's desk.
The commander, seeing the sergeant smiling, said, "not me!" 
There were only two other officers in the company; the com­
mander reported this fact to division, and "that was the 
end of it." Some time later an older captain, a veteran 
of the first world war, showed up at the first sergeant's 
desk and asked where the company's units were located and 
whether he might have the opportunity to speak to the men. 
The sergeant complied and assembled some twenty noncommis­
sioned officers and men "for a quiet afternoon" in a small 
village behind some gun positions. On the sergeant's ad­
vice, the captain had brought with him a bottle of cognac 
and some cigarettes. After a "pleasant afternoon," as- 
sumedly with some discussion, the captain departed leaving 
them various propaganda material. According to the first 
sergeant, "we were in need of paper of a certain kind to 
place in that location where a person had to go every day
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alone, and there it was used." From then until the unit 
walked into the POW cages in March 19^5 in Hessen, they 
never saw nor heard from any more NSFOs.^
A former corporal stated that soldiers, without 
distinction of rank, hardly ever thought about the party; 
as soldiers they were "removed from the clutch" of the 
N.S.D.A.P. He said it was well known that the armed forces 
practiced "a kind of defense function which, whenever it 
could, it placed crossways to the N.S.D.A.P." That toward 
the end of the war the NSFOs occasionally carried on a 
"'final victory psychosis'" was understandable, he said, 
because it was their job to do this even if many times the 
phrases looked transparent even to the common soldier. At 
all levels, he added, a "quiet war" took place between the 
party and the armed forces, and the troops successfully 
frustrated attempts by the party to nazify the soldiers.
He thought that the "'flying drum head courtsmartial' set 
up by the party and 'civilian SS' toward the end of the war 
permitted . . . the outflow of the party's hate against the
armed forces . . . ," and he reported that "decent and dec­
orated soldiers from the front, on account of some small 
offense such as a short absence from the troops or over­
staying the length of their leaves, were ignominiously 
hanged 'for cowardice before the enemy.'" "Here," he ob­
served, "seems to me the real distinction between the
^Letter, Oskar Bittner, March l6 , 1972.
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genuine soldierly point of view and the party-political 
concept in the view of the N.S.D.A.P."^
One former Sub-office NSFO provided information 
for this study but requested that his name not be published. 
In the spring of 1944, after a long illness during which he 
was assigned to the Replacement Army, he obtained the com­
mand of a company on the eastern front. Whether his prede­
cessor had been the battalion NSFO or not, he did not know, 
but he was immediately pressed by his battalion commander 
to take over that job as an additional duty. He attempted 
to evade the task but finally had to bow to a direct order. 
His entire activity as NSFO involved distributing one sin­
gle document from higher headquarters to the several com­
panies. Whether he could or should have done more, he 
could "not say with certainty." To the best of his recol­
lection after some twenty-eight years, the best he could 
remember about the document was that it had something to 
do with "certain 'hold-on' slogans." After the outbreak 
of the hard battles somewhere around 20 January 1945, he 
noted, hardly any time existed for such things as NSFO ac­
tivity. "How far officers and soldiers still believed in 
the so-called 'final victory' or only acted like they be­
lieved it is still another question," he said. This offi­
cer believed that there was certainly plenty of opportunity
Letter, Egon Denzel, April 6, 1972. Denzel is an 
official of the "Traditionsverband der Adler-Division-- 
21. L.w. Felddivision."
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for a nazi officer to preach the ideas of the party through 
lectures and discussions with the companies of a battalion, 
"however, that laid in the hands of individual personali­
ties." As an afterthought, he theorized that if he had 
admitted on a questionnaire required for admission to uni­
versity studies in 1955 that he had been an NSFO, he would 
probably not have been admitted. Since he is still employed 
by a West German university, he asked that his name not be 
used in this study.^
Major Walter Fellgiebel, presently Chairman of the 
West German Association of the Wearers of the Knight's Cross 
and son of the General Fellgiebel executed for his implica­
tion in the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler's life, related 
that NSFOs were frequently non-political and that some were 
anti-nazi. Those who did not appear to be 100 per cent re­
liable were sometimes sent in the course of a year to three, 
four, or more NSFO schools. He claimed that NSFOs at regi­
mental and battalion level were generally "quite harmless 
people, especially if commanders could select the officers 
in question themselves." If, for example, a regimental 
commander was not a convinced nazi, he also looked for an 
NSFO with similar thoughts. However, if he was "a 150 per 
cent nazi," his NSFO would likewise be as radical. He told 
about a close friend of many years--an Austrian--who was 
selected as NSFO of the Artillery School but who "damned
^Letter, April 11, 1972.
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and hated the nazi regime." Nevertheless, the Austrian 
had to keep up outward appearances; he gave a lecture 
every Monday morning for all soldiers and officers. 
Fellgiebel pronounced the NSFO program as unsuccessful 
and said that in most cases the NSFOs were hated very 
much by the officers and men if they took their duties 
at all seriously. He felt that the hour was simply too 
late for the NSFOs to have any effect on the war; the 
mass of soldiers had had enough and no longer believed 
in final victory. "Anyway, it was also clear that the 
war could only be ended if the nazi regime disappeared.
On these grounds alone, the NSFOs could not change the
g
course of the war as Hitler hoped."
Before his army service. Sergeant Gunter Stegel- 
mann had been a District Main Officer Leader (Gauhaupt- 
stellenleiter) in the Hamburg District School Office 
(Gauschulungsamt), and at the beginning of 1944 he was 
assigned to the NSF Staff/OKW. By order of General Rein- 
ecke, and with the sanction of the P-K, he had visited 
sections of the front and furnished important experience 
reports. Several of these reports had been brought to 
the attention of Bormann, and in two cases they were for­
warded on to Himmler in his capacity as C-in-C of the 
Replacement Army. Party Member Stosch who wrote the re­
port which provided this information did not believe that
g
Letter, Major Walter Fellgiebel, a.D., June 23,
1972.
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Stegelmann had received any special assistance from NSF/OKW 
since he had become embarrassing to them because of his 
views and actions. In March 1945 Stegelmann was assigned 
to a replacement unit in Spandau and made the following 
self-congratulatory report to the P-K.
Stegelmann's battalion commander, in the absence 
of a qualified officer, had asked him to take over the 
battalion NSFO work. The situation as he found it was 
that political instruction was not cqnducted because no 
time was available. Appropriate materials were not on 
hand, but occasionally the officers heard a lecture from 
the NSFO. The officers claimed they were not qualified 
to conduct political instruction and since they had just 
come out of combat, they lacked the material to work with. 
Richtmanner (men to arrange things) were still not assigned 
in the companies. His first recommendation to the battal­
ion commander was to issue the order that each company 
would conduct political instruction three times weekly 
during the first duty period of the day; on the fourth day 
What Stirs Us would be discussed. He also recommended that 
the battalion commander assemble all company officers and 
the battalion staff each Friday so that Stegelmann could 
issue the guidelines for the following week's instruction. 
After long opposition and many excuses, the battalion com­
mander finally issued the orders. The officers, Stegelmann 
claimed, were exceedingly happy and thankful for the manner
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in which he instructed them and with the material he fur­
nished them. They declared that they did not know polit­
ical instruction could be made so easy. One afternoon 
each week the company noncommissioned leaders were as­
sembled informally for political instruction on how to 
answer the questions of their men. Stegelmann declared 
that he could never end these sessions in less than two 
and a half to three hours because of the interest and 
emotion shown by the noncommissioned officers. At the 
conclusion of the sessions, the NCOs were required to go 
back and instruct their sections. Furthermore, they were 
required to discuss the Wehrmacht Report daily with their 
sections during pauses in training. It affected him bit­
terly, he said, that no one had used these methods earlier, 
and he declared that the prerequisite for such practical 
"little work" was an organized Battalion NSFO.
Stegelmann had taken part in one NSFO conference 
where only military things were talked about and the regi­
mental and battalion NSFOs received no guidelines for the 
coming week. They departed as ignorant as when they ar­
rived, he reported. But the main failure concerning po­
litical work in the armed forces as Stegelmann saw it 
arose from the fact that company commanders could not 
convey a speech which they heard or a sentence which they 
read in their own words ; he suggested that this art should 
be taught to them in their officer training. In the
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meantime he recommended that the regimental NSFO should 
be declared superfluous in organizational work. Instead 
he should be the schooling assistant of the division NSFO 
for the supervision and improvement of the political in­
struction of officers and noncommissioned officers so as 
to unburden the battalion NSFO in his schooling duties. 
Stegelmann felt that officers did more harm than good in 
giving political instruction. Therefore, the battalion 
NSFO must rigidly supervise them and critique them on
9
their failures.
That the NSFO program was not doing too well by 
the fall of 1944, at least at the lower levels where it 
counted, was well-known to former party members serving 
in the various military services. They bemoaned the fact 
in letters to party officials back home who in turn in­
formed the P-K and gave their versions of what was wrong. 
The Kreisleiter of Berchtesgaden was one such official.
He thought there were several things either wrong or 
needed. Men should be appointed in the armed forces, he 
said, who were empowered to act directly for OKW, and 
without interference from any intervening command or staff 
level, in order to watch over the conduct of national so­
cialist schooling in any regiment, battalion, or company.
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 1351 Vermerk fur 
IIS, Pg. Hess, Betrifft: NS-Fuhrung in der Truppe. Hier:
Anregung des Uffz. Stegelmann, April 7, 19451 IIW, signed: 
Stosch, with enclosure: Gunter Stegelmann to the Partei-
Kanzlei, Abtlg. W2, March 28, 1945.
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The reason for the failure at these lower levels, accord­
ing to many reports he had received, was because of those 
who were selected by the regimental commander to act as 
NSFOs. His remedy was simple--actually too simple--merely 
select qualified p e o p l e , b u t  there were more radical 
solutions offered.
Radical Solutions 
There were always party men who pressed for radical 
solutions to the problem of resistance. Dr. Grassmann, an 
official in the Gauleitung of North Westphalia, reported 
that many individuals in the military service had written 
him about the NSFO. They believed that many NSFOs and 
commanders had the best will and eagerness for the task. 
However, there were others who, mostly because of confes­
sional commitment, tried to sabotage the program. Too 
many catholic and protestant officers were called on to 
politicize their units, he reported, and these gentlemen 
were not suitable for such a task since they did not sup­
port the nazi cause to begin with. Grassmann thought that 
even if non-nazi commanders were outstanding soldiers, 
they should either be removed from the officer corps or 
have a political leader at their sides. He conceded that 
this Politruk-like method would be a radical solution, but 
in his opinion, the radical method was "always the simplest.
^^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 36O, Kreisleitung 
Berchtesgaden-Laufen to Ruder, September 20, 1^44.
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the least painful, and the most e f f e c t i v e . I n d e e d ,
radical solutions could be used by both sides as the events
of July 20, 1944, would demonstrate.
The German resistance movement and the story of the
July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler's life are too well-known
to be taken up in this study. However, the "20th of July"
shows without doubt that ranking members of the German
army were willing to overthrow Hitler and. his nazi gang,
but it also shows that they were amateurs next to the nazi
toughs who had learned their lessons in street battles
where no one paid any attention to niceties or tradition.
Where a field marshal like Erwin Rommel merely criticized
12Hitler in private with his son, and a group of aristo­
cratic officers bungled an attempted assassination and 
coup d'etat, top nazis were willing to take any means, 
quickly and effectively, to preserve their power.
Aftermath of the "20th of July"
On the day the announcement came over the radio 
that Heinrich Himmler had been appointed as Commander-in- 
Chief of the Replacement Army (Fromm, its earlier C-in-C 
was executed for complicity in the plot), officer cadet 
Hans Simon was listening in the writing room of his
^^BAK, Sammlung Schumacher 367, Grassmann to 
Stellrecht, Betrifft: NSFO-Arbeit, December 29» 1944.
12B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers, 
trans. Paul Findlay (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Com­
pany, 1953), p. 496.
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replacement company in Turken Barracks in Berlin. When he
heard the announcement, he loudly exclaimed,
Thank God, now we have the right man to clear 
out all the shirkers in the [areas behind the front 
lines] and in the replacement troops. The war would 
have been over in 19^3 if this treason had not been 
going on. . . .
With these words, his company commander. Captain Bohner,
came out of the adjoining room and said in amazement, "But
Simon, Himmler has never had any kind of tradition in the 
13Wehrmacht." These two statements significantly show two 
highly different breeds of men which existed side by side, 
or perhaps above and below, in the German army; they also 
show the conflict between the two extreme views of nazism 
and conservative traditionalism. The young cadet repre­
sented that section of German youth which had accepted the 
nazi Weltanschauung; most of these young men had swallowed 
the nazi drivel and had little area of agreement with the 
older officers. They were ready to follow and support any 
action, criminal or otherwise, which Hitler and the party 
desired. On the other hand, the picture of Captain Bohner, 
as the representative of the older members of the officer 
corps, is a pathetic one; still tied up in tradition, he 
hardly knew what had happened. He failed to recognize 
the significance of Himmler's appointment or what might 
lay in store for the Prussian/German army. He probably
13BAK, Sammlung Schumacher 367, Notiz fur Pg. Ott, 
Betrifft: Wehrmacht, December l4, 1944, signed: Rogler.
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thought that nothing had really changed. Nazis, however, 
had other views of his archaic type.
A party member named Rogler who had served in the 
armed forces for four years told Party Member Ott of Sec­
tion IIP of the P-K in a letter that "arrogance and bully­
ing [was] the conspicuous picture of the officer class in 
the replacement troop units." Rogler felt that, for the 
most part, the officers in the replacement army had been 
removed from the front because of inefficiency. Officer 
cadet Simon had told him, he reported, that after the 
"20th of July," the officers began outwardly to play the 
game. They were very careful of their image in front of 
the men, but at political lectures some of them still 
"laughed with amusement." Simon believed that only a 
"Political Commissar" could bring about any change; he 
also felt that these commissars would have to be taken 
and bred predominantly from the ranks of the noncommis­
sioned officer corps. In other words, he had written off 
the officer corps as hopeless and proposed a radical and 
revolutionary solution. Rogler agreed with Simon’s view 
of the officer corps. He said that his many years of 
military experience had taught him that, from the company 
level up to the highest staffs, the place to find the 
"disease germ" was within the officer corps; it would be 
the officers, not the simple soldiers, who would force 
the party to create a political commissar system to put 
them "on a wire."
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Rogler recalled that it had been no secret to the 
soldiers on the eastern front in 19^2-43 that the strength 
of the Russian assault divisions had been due to the Poli- 
truk. These Soviet political officers liquidated unsuit­
able officers and thus prevented any symptoms of weakness 
or degeneration from arising. Just as the Germans had 
imitated the simplicity of Soviet weapons, he declared, 
they could also take over the successful Soviet political
commissar system. "The common man," he wrote, "will cer-
l4tainly understand itl" Top nazis also had their views.
Passe, serving as liaison man between the P-K and 
OKW, made a series of comments and recommendations to his 
boss, Bormann, in the July 20 aftermath. What he proposed 
was a drastic housecleaning, and he had strong criticisms 
of the army general staff. On July 22 Bormann forwarded 
the information and recommendations to Himmler. He marked 
them "Very Confidential" and asked the new C-in-C of the 
Replacement Army to keep the information strictly to him­
self so as not to get Passe into difficulty with the armed 
forces. "An overhaul of the general staff's own orders 
and communication channel used up to now appears proper," 
Passe judged. In this same connection, he insisted that 
the NSFO must report directly to the commander and not to 
the Chief of Staff as many did. Furthermore, a readjust­
ment of NSF on a purely political system of "will building"
^^Ibid.
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was now necessary in order to get to every single man. 
Basse's whole point was that something had to be empha­
sized, thus he intimated that NSFOs had spread themselves 
too thin in an effort to cover too many things and ideas. 
Still, however, party members like Passe hesitated from 
making the NSFO a pure Politruk.
He recommended that all NSFOs from the eastern 
and western fronts should be called in "suddenly" to have 
their spirits lifted in a short and blunt orientation 
after which they would return immediately to their mili­
tary organizations with a definite mission. He did not 
identify this mission, apparently preferring to leave 
that up to Bormann. During the brief conference, quali­
fied representatives of the party (like Himmler and 
Goebbels) along with trusted men of the Wehrmacht would 
"fanaticize" them "by referring to conditions and events."
Passe also proposed that the party conduct a 
grandiose investigation of the officer corps. All offi­
cers in key positions would be examined to discover whether 
they were for or against party efforts at indoctrinating 
the armed forces. This inquiry would especially strike 
deeply into personnel offices. Passe believed this was 
necessary because of the demands made by the party in the 
past which had never been fulfilled; he could furnish 
names, he said, of the people who had sabotaged party ef­
forts. Further, he advised that up-to-date records should
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be kept on individuals who failed to cooperate. He sug­
gested the appointment of independent "inspectors" who, 
representing the Führer directly, would conduct inquiries 
into grievances reported by the troops. Also, a thorough 
combing out of the staffs and units in the homeland and 
the occupied countries by politically reliable and force­
ful military people vested with sweeping and full powers 
was needed, and the high living in the occupied countries 
and behind the front lines, he continued, had to cease.
As an example, he cited the officer clubs; they should be 
abolished because they furthered the caste system and seg­
regated the officers from the troops. Passe advocated 
more democracy in the army. He wanted soldiers, noncom­
missioned officers, officers, German workers, clerks, and 
officials to commune with each other in starkly furnished 
"good fellowship houses.
That same day the Commanding General of the 242nd 
Infantry Division, in his instructions on NSF, described 
what had happened on July 20. Naively, he announced that 
the clique which had tried to kill Hitler was rounded up 
in six hours "without bloodshed" and that now law and order 
reigned at home. All soldiers would have read to them: 
Hitler's speech to the nation about "the 20th of July"; 
Goring's speech; Donitz' speech; and the speeches of the
BAK, Personlicher Stab Reichsfuhrer SS, NS 19/neu 
750, Bormann to Himmler, July 22, 1944, with enclosure: 
Abschrift.
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Commanders-in-Chief. The troops would also be informed 
that each instance of insubordinate conduct would be pun­
ished by a disgraceful death. There would not be another 
1918 "Dolchstoss" (stab in the back)1 Then the division 
commander covered his own back--he ordered "again" that, 
as directed by the Führer on several occasions, pertinent 
national questions would be discussed by the unit com­
manders weekly with their t r o o p s . T h e  tone of the let­
ter was perfunctory; the general had done his duty.
The next day, July 23, 1944, Bormann sent the fol­
lowing message to all party leaders:
As a sign of unbreakable faith in the Führer 
and stronger affection between the Wehrmacht and 
the NSDAP the German greeting [nazi stiff-armed 
salute] has been adopted by the entire German 
Wehrmacht. Heil Hitlerl
And on July 29 the new Chief of the Army General Staff,
General Guderian, branded the general staff--the elite of
the officer corps--with guilt for its involvement in the
assassination attempt and directed that each general staff
officer must henceforth become an NSFO. Anyone who ob-
17jected could apply for immediate transfer.
l^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frames 1520529-30.
17Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General 
Staff, 1657-1945, trans. Brian Battershaw (New York: Fred-
erick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1953), P- 476. Source not 
given. Part of the text of this order can be found in 
John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German
Army in Politics, 1918-1945, Viking Compass ed. (New York: 
The Viking Press, I967 ) , 678-79. Allan Bullock in his
Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, rev. ed., Harper Torchbooks
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A few days after the "20th of July," Bormann and
Ruder met with Reinecke concerning Hitler's express desire
that the NSF work had to be strengthened. The party leaders
reported that the Führer was upset because Colonel Radke of
the NSF Staff/OKH had issued an order, afterward rescinded
by Hengl, which placed the NSFO under the la/Chief of Staff
Hitler wanted to ensure that NSFOs would answer to no one
18but the commander. Then on August 2 General Reinecke dis­
patched an order. Pointing out that with the elimination of 
the "20th of July" traitors the last opponents of a resolute 
politicization of the Wehrmacht had disappeared, he declared 
that he expected no more obstacles to the NSF program. 
Reinecke ordered that NSFOs should not, in consideration of 
the current situation, intervene in the training of the 
troops; instead, they should concentrate their entire energy 
toward the utmost activation and fanaticization of the sol­
diers. He said he would accept no more schoolmasterly ad­
vice concerning long-range goals. On the contrary, NSFOs 
had to summon the troops to the highest achievement, and 
they could now disregard standing operating procedures.
The XIII Army Corps took no chances with this directive;
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 752 also comments
on this order, but he erroneously implied that the idea for 
the NSFO came only after "the 20th of July."
1 ft
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. l40, Vorlage an 
Herrn Reichsleiter Bormann, Betrifft: Fuhrerbefehl fur
Verstarkung der nationalsozialistischen Fuhrung in der 
Wehrmacht, October 10, 1944, IIF, signed: Ruder.
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the headquarters distributed the directive all the way down
19to company level.
At about this same time, Himmler, as Commander-in- 
Chief of the Replacement Army, told the NSFOs of a grena­
dier division:
I give you full authority to seize every fellow 
who dawdles and to throw him, tied up if necessary, 
into a baggage wagon. Take them to an Engineer Com­
pany and let them perform hard labor. . . .  I give 
you full authority and the order to arrest anyone 
who rushes toward the rear.
He told them to put "the most brutal, most energetic, and
the best officers of the division" in charge of capturing
the mass of stragglers, and he gave the division's NSFOs
20permission to shoot anyone who opposed them. The NSFO 
had come a long way, and it appeared that he might be un­
leashed since the July 20 traitors no longer openly op­
posed the program. Himmler also had come a long way. By 
July 1944 he had charge of military government in occu­
pied areas and commanded the Replacement Army with its 
extensive responsibilities for training, supply, schools.
19Waldemar Besson, "Zur Geschichte des National- 
sczialistischen Fuhrungs Offiziers (NSFO)," Viertel.jahrs- 
hefte fur Zeitgeschichte, doc. no. 13 (January I961),
p. 113.
20
Karl 0. Paetel, "Die SS: Ein Beitrag Zur Sozio-
logie des Nationalsozialismus , " Viertel.jahrshef te fiir 
Zeitgeschichte (January 1954), p. 20. Cited from Stoff- 
sammlung, Heraus^eber Nationalsozialistisher Fuhrungsstab 
der Wehrmacht, Fuhrungsunterlagen Folge 3 , part of the 
Sammelmappen "Der nationalsozialistische Fuhrungsoffizier," 
pi 160. See also Gerald Reitlinger, The SS; Alibi of a 
Nation, 1922-1945, a Viking Compass Book (New York: The 
Viking Press, I968), p. 385.
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and transportation for the entire German army. By the end
of the war, he would also command an Army Group in combat,
and his Waffen-SS would stand as a strong rival to the
army with thirty-seven elite divisions, many of them ar- 
21mored. Even though he often cooperated with Bormann, he 
still remained, a^ la Rohm, in the race with the party boss 
for the subjection of professional soldiers within a nazi 
revolutionary army. On August 3, 1944, in a speech at 
Poznan, Himmler made his intent clear; he told party mem­
bers that the generals had repeatedly frustrated nazi pol­
icy by their reservations and opposition. But once, he 
said, the army had been remade into a national socialist
people's army and had been reorganized under SS direction,
22then it could reconquer the lands in the east.
Even OKW naturally opposed radical solutions like 
Himmler's but was willing to promote the NSFO concept. 
Typical of OKW's attitude was an article by Reinecke pub­
lished in the October 1944 issue of Der Politische Soldat 
(The Political Soldier) which was published by OKW in co­
operation with the party. Calling the NSFO the "reminding 
conscience of the Wehrmacht," he said that the German sol­
dier should act as if Hitler himself stood always at his
^^Ibid., pp. 1-33.
22Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship:
The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism, 
trans. Jean Steinberg (New York: Praeger Publishers, I97O ),
p. 412. Cited from Viertel.jahrshef te fur Zeitgeschichte 
1 (1953): 35?ff.
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side. Reinecke cited belief in Hitler and the nazi idea 
as the inexhaustible source of confidence. He told NSFOs 
to give up the writing tables and offices; they should 
abandon trifles and get out and talk to officers, noncom­
missioned officers, and men as the only way to fulfill 
their task. He encouraged NSFOs to "let the songleaders 
sing" and to have the troops repeat their oaths of alle­
giance to Adolf Hitler. NSFOs should grab a sub-machine
gun or rocket launcher when battle came and fight side by
2 3side with the troops.
The Commanding General of the 19th Army told his 
NSFOs at division level and above to always take part in 
the counterattack and to meet replacements and reinforce­
ments as they came up from the rear to the point of battle. 
The NSFO should speak little, encourage through a few per­
sonal words, and guide the thinking and conversation of 
the troops, but he could not do this with paper instruc-
24tions alone--he had to personally go to the focal point. 
Hengl had previously encouraged this type of approach by 
suggesting that the NSFO could do the most after heavy 
fighting involving numerous casualties; he had also pre­
scribed rest halts, awards ceremonies, and meeting troops
in transit as occasions for the NSFO to talk directly to 
25soldiers.
^^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frames 1526572-73- 
24
Ibid., Frame 1525999-
^^NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frame 5597674.
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By January 19^5 OKW admitted that NSFOs frequently 
had their own ways of doing things : some wrote articles
for the use of troop leaders in haranguing the soldiers; 
some preferred to talk to the troops; and a third group 
concentrated in recruit instruction. All types, said OKW, 
worked with goodwill and energy. Stating that each NSFO 
had his own personality as an individual, OKW approved 
variety as long as it produced results.
The aftermath of the "20th of July" was highly 
significant for the NSFO program. The NSFO was expected 
to bring the officer corps into line and to exercise direct 
influence on the troops. Methods were no longer as impor­
tant as the results achieved. The "20th of July" also 
seemed to panic the nazi hierarchy, and as a result, the 
party attempted to give the NSFO ever-increasing authority 
to overcome the remaining military traditionalism. It was 
ultimately a losing battle, however, because traditionalism 
and apathy were deeply entrenched in the German army, and 
most NSFOs were just average German officers.
^^NAM, T84, Roll 1591 Frame 1526123, Die Politische 
Soldat (Issue dated January 1945).
CHAPTER IX
THE NSFO IN ACTION
The Reluctant NSFO 
Karl Ducoffre, partly Belgian by ancestry but 
thoroughly German in manner and spirit, joined the nazi 
party in 1930 and soon became the SA leader in his adopted 
town of Dormagen in the Rhineland. Even before then, how­
ever, a uniform had always lifted his spirits. In 1922 he 
joined the Reichswehr as a volunteer and served for two 
and a half years in a Westphalian infantry regiment. Dur­
ing the 1930s he attended drills and summer exercises as 
a reservist while on vacation from his firm, the Farben- 
fabriken Bayer A.G., where he worked as a commercial em­
ployee. "1 was a passionately interested soldier," he 
said; "1 came back from each exercise in high emotional 
and physical form to my desk." When the war began, he 
was a second lieutenant of reserves and was called up for 
active service. He served in the French and the Balkan 
campaigns and then after eleven days of fighting in Russia, 
he was badly wounded in the leg.
In March 1944, after fifteen months' hospitaliza­
tion and several assignments in replacement units in the
240
241
homeland, he was sleeping one night in his adjutant's 
quarters in a replacement battalion. At around two in 
the morning his telephone rang. It was the regimental 
adjutant who told Ducoffre that he had to leave for 
Krossinsee that morning to attend a course for NSFOs; 
the adjutant had already dispatched a motorcyclist to de­
liver his travel orders. He apologized that regiment had 
forgotten this all-important matter until now and said that 
the regimental commander, Count von Gengerski, requested 
that Ducoffre not embarrass them by making an issue over 
the late receipt of orders; would he please just go on to 
the school and accept their apologies I First Lieutenant 
Ducoffre did not resist too much on the phone but asserted 
his objections to his contemporaries before leaving. He 
decided that he would act so inept at Krossinsee that he 
could not possibly become an NSFO, and he set off for the 
first NSFO course there- It was not until after the war 
that he learned that Gengerski and his adjutant had not 
forgotten the date of the summons at all; they saw in 
Ducoffre "a delivering angel," and it was all a contrived 
performance; they wanted him as the regimental NSFO and 
knew that he would pull every string he could to scuttle 
the idea, so they waited until the last hour before the 
inevitable departure. Neither the Count nor Ducoffre 
realized that he would never return to the replacement 
regiment; instead, he would start his NSFO career as a Work 
Group Leader at Krossinsee.
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When Ducoffre arrived, the work group to which he 
was assigned had no leader. There was, however, one first 
lieutenant in the group who upon being questioned stated 
that he had been an SA leader. For his part, Ducoffre re­
frained from disclosing his SA rank of Sturmbannfuhrer; he 
still intended to play the "stupid game." This, however, 
only succeeded for one week. The other SA man always gave 
out with such drivel that Ducoffre began giving him tit 
for tat to show the other man's lack of intelligence. After 
this happened a few times, Ducoffre had to confess to being 
a true party member, in fact an SA leader. This virtually 
delivered the work group into his hands, at least during 
discussion periods after the morning lectures. He was soon 
officially appointed Work Group Leader, a job he held for 
three courses.
Meanwhile, one of Ducoffre's earlier regimental 
commanders. Colonel von Doehring, after receiving wounds 
in combat, had spent some time working in the Personnel 
Section of OKW; he was now the Adjutant to Field Marshal 
Kesselring and needed an NSFO for Kesselring's army group 
in Italy. Unknown to the reluctant NSFO, Doehring through 
his connections with the Army Personnel Office had arranged 
to have Ducoffre assigned to Kesselring's army group. So 
one day an air force major from OKW arrived at Krossinsee 
and methodically began to investigate Ducoffre's entire 
political and military past. Apparently finding every­
thing in order, he told Ducoffre:
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I want to be entirely open with you. You have 
been asked for by name as NSFO on Field Marshal 
Kesselring's staff, and you know that we cannot do 
it unless we ourselves are able to confirm you.
But now everything is alright. You will receive 
your travel orders to Italy in the next few days.
He also disclosed that OKW was naturally suspicious of any
individual asked for in this manner.
His orders did arrive quickly, and he traveled out 
of Munich by airplane. In Florence a car awaited him along 
with another old regimental comrade whom Doehring had re­
quested as his assistant adjutant, and that evening they 
were both guests of Doehring for a bottle of wine. At this 
time, the colonel disclosed that a captain had been assigned 
as NSFO to the army group just a few days previously and 
that Ducoffre would move on down to the Ligurian Army--a 
joint German-Italian field army concerned with construction 
of the alpine Foreland Line in northern Italy. The next 
day he was the honored guest of Kesselring for lunch and 
was "naturally very impressed." However, he never received 
the answer as to why his orders had been changed. Reflect­
ing on this years later, he assumed that OKW had either 
found "a hair in the soup cooked by Colonel von Doehring" 
or else had decided that a first lieutenant had too little 
rank to serve as an army group NSFO.
By this time Ducoffre was frustrated, and his period 
of service with the Ligurian Army did not help his morale. 
The Chief of Staff there. General Nagel, a former Military 
Attache in Moscow, "was anything but a friend of the
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institution of the NSFO." The general had himself obtained 
an insight into it "by taking pains to play the role of a 
guest at Krossinsee." On Ducoffre's arrival at the army 
headquarters, on July 1, 1944, he was met by a lieutenant 
colonel from the staff with the words : "Oh— you are our
NSFO? Colonel von Doehring at the army group has already 
notified us and said that we should be nice to you, you 
earned it I" Such a welcome in the German army was unheard 
of in the close officer brotherhood existing before the 
nazi era. All officers were assumed to be capable and of 
upstanding character and were received as brothers upon 
reporting in to a new assignment. In this case the welcome 
implied that they would try to be nice to Ducoffre even if 
he was an NSFO, but only because Doehring had asked them 
to 1 The army commander at that time was General von Zangen 
who shortly thereafter received a transfer so that the 
Italian Marshal Graziani "could be won over to the German 
cause by having an important command over German and Italian 
troops." Ducoffre learned later from the headquarters com­
mandant that at least he had gained the sympathy, and with 
that the necessary confidence, from Zangen through his 
ideas, his initial interview with the commander, and his 
answers to questions posed by the general. Fate, however, 
stepped in again. Shortly after Ducoffre's appointment as 
army NSFO, his mentor, Doehring, was mortally wounded when 
the car in which he was riding was strafed by a low-flying
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airplane. Ducoffre felt "utterly alone and ignored" with­
out the colonel's protection and had several unpleasant 
experiences. When he first went out to give a talk to a 
large circle of officers in outlying units, he was received 
during the afternoon preceding the scheduled lecture cor­
rectly, but he felt the aloofness and coldness so much that 
that night he wrote one of his closest regimental comrades 
that he would rather go into hopeless combat than to give 
the scheduled address the next day. Nevertheless, the 
strong feeling of alienation helped him find introductory 
remarks by the morrow which apparently convinced his lis­
teners that no Politruk stood before them. Such things 
happened time after time in Italy.
Ducoffre felt it was not at all easy to be an NSFO, 
not even if he took on the burden at the pressing wish of 
his superiors and was received cordially by his listeners. 
On another occasion he went to a battalion to give a talk. 
When reporting in to the battalion headquarters, the clerk 
there informed him that the battalion commander was absent; 
however, they had prepared an upstairs room for him in 
which to spend the night. The room was very spartan; it 
had an iron bed, a stool, and a small table--nothing else. 
He knew that the battalion commander could have easily 
found him a decent hotel room, and should have, but he ac­
cepted what was offered. A little while later, he was 
looking out of the window and saw a young captain wearing
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the Knight's Cross entering the headquarters. He was ab­
solutely certain that this was the commander. Shortly the 
captain left again and Ducoffre assumed that he had asked 
if the NSFO was there; when told yes, he immediately left 
because he did not want to talk to an NSFO. (It was con­
sidered correct military protocol for a commander to inter­
view a visiting staff officer.) That evening, he gave his 
talk, but the commander did not attend; this was un unpar­
donable breach of military etiquette. If Doehring had 
still been around, Ducoffre knew that he could have re­
ported the commander's discourtesy and that the colonel 
would have had a friendly and tactful conversation with 
the young captain without causing trouble for him. As it 
was, he reported it to no one since he did not want to 
cause problems for what appeared to be a capable and highly 
decorated officer. One day when visiting a division, the 
NSFO there, a very young lieutenant and former Hitler Youth 
Leader, requested that Ducoffre arrange to have his division 
commander relieved for defeatist comments and an anti-nazi 
stance. Ducoffre merely cautioned the immature NSFO not to 
be impetuous. He said, "You're just a young man. Let it 
pass and forget it." Such experiences convinced him to re­
quest a transfer to his old l6th Panzer Division where he 
was well-known and where he could expect no more unpleas­
antries, but meanwhile, he dutifully performed his assigned 
job.
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Ducoffre asserted that when he joined the Ligurian 
Army, he at first performed Betreuung duties exclusively. 
This tallies with the Freiherr von Lersner's complaint 
from his Italian tour of inspection in May 1944 that en­
tirely too much emphasis was placed on Betreuung in Italy 
at the expense of the NSFO's major job of indoctrinating 
the troops. Apparently, the emphasis there was still 
placed on the well-being of the troops rather than on the 
"nazi will to victory." Ducoffre had little help in his 
efforts to improve the well-being of the soldiers. He 
distributed schooling material for the NSFOs of subordinate 
units himself through the field mail system and wrote cir­
culars, suggestions, and correspondence himself on an old 
typewriter placed at his disposal. Reproduction was done 
for him by one of the other staff sections. Since after 
a short while he thought he had better start visiting sub­
ordinate units, he finally asked for and received a cor­
poral to do his clerical work. Because of the danger 
caused by partisan warfare in northern Italy at that time, 
he frequently combined his tours with courier runs.
Placed under him in accordance with regulations 
was the Army Rest Camp (Betreuungslager), which was in­
stalled in a villa on the edge of Verona and was adminis­
tered by two sergeants who also had responsibility for the 
supply of Betreuung materials. These two highly qualified 
sergeants managed their supply function by making occasional
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trips to the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin where they re­
ceived in quantity: playing cards; popular games; record
players; first-rate record selections of popular and clas­
sical music; musical instruments such as accordians, vio­
lins, flutes, and harmonicas; and printed material. Books 
were very hard to come by for the troops; therefore, 
Ducoffre saw to it that he would himself serve as a "float­
ing library." Although the rest camp in Verona had a li­
brary, it consisted mainly of books for vocational improve­
ment. The library contained very little popular literature 
and absolutely no books with ideological content because, 
as Ducoffre said, he felt that the "clever and ponderous" 
influence of Dr. Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry--"the ideo­
logical over-feeding"--would not interest the troops at 
all. Most of the Betreuung material went into the unit 
"rest homes" or was turned over to the divisions for dis­
tribution; he never distributed such materials personally 
because he felt that too much of the printed matter, such 
as Santa Claus spouting victory slogans, was too crude for 
his taste. He also exercised influence over the portable 
movie theaters the German army employed for its combat 
troops.
Ducoffre's visits to subordinate units stayed in 
his memory as one of the few pleasant recollections of his 
assignment as an NSFO. This was not only because they led 
him to some of the prettiest places in Northern Italy (and
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later in the Carpathians) but mainly because they brought 
him into contact with the soldiers. After an evening of 
singing and of either serious or cheerful conversation, 
the next morning he would give his talk which never lasted 
longer than a half hour and which aimed at stressing the 
necessity to keep fighting. The allied demand for uncon­
ditional surrender provided the grounds for his strongest 
argument in these talks. After each such address to the 
troops, a discussion followed which most of the time was 
very lively since the open conversation the evening be­
fore had already prepared the troops and lightened the 
atmosphere. On many occasions, the troops let him know 
their desires and needs, and he then passed on the infor­
mation to the appropriate unit or staff agency which could 
do something about it. One source for much of the content 
of his speeches came from excerpts from soldier's letters 
furnished by the censor to all NSFOs as far down as corps 
level. As a general rule, he said, no "discomforts" usu­
ally developed for the letter writers themselves for de­
featist comments, but the soldiers soon learned of the 
censor's activities and "one no longer got an open picture 
of the situation." Ducoffre claimed that a recurring and 
constant theme appearing in the soldier's letters was "a 
downright emotional" belief in Adolf Hitler. Even when 
soldiers complained about their superiors or about cases 
of corruption, they would comment that if the Führer only
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knew about it, he would take care of the matter properlyI 
To this day, Ducoffre sees in this simple faith in Hitler 
the reason why the German soldier fought to the bitter end.
In October 1944 Ducoffre received his desired travel 
orders to rejoin the l6th Panzer Division on the eastern 
front; however, again fate stepped in. When he reported in 
to General Harpe's army group in Crakow, the NSFO of the 
army group judged that an NSFO who had been assigned to a 
field army headquarters could on no account serve as an 
NSFO at mere division level. Consequently, he received 
orders to the XXIV Panzer Corps of General Nehring. Mean­
while, however, Nehring had already decided to appoint a 
companion of many years who held the party rank of SA 
Brigade Führer as his NSFO, so again plans went awry. 
Ducoffre was finally assigned as NSFO of General von 
Bunau's XXXVII Corps. This too would not last long. Suf­
fering from physical overexertion brought on by his old 
war wound, in January 1945 the reluctant NSFO was sent to 
the corps' "Front Recovery Home" where he was given the 
opportunity to rest. He was expected, however, to address 
the officers and men who passed through for medical treat­
ment and recovery from illness and wounds.
At the end of February and the beginning of March 
1945, he was on his way to the Leader Reserve in Berlin 
where he shortly received command of a Volkssturm company. 
Apparently, General Burgdorf's instructions that NSFOs
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assigned to the Leader Reserve would be subsequently as­
signed again as NSFOs was not always followed (Chapter VI). 
In any event, this was the end of his NSFO career and would 
also be the end of his military career. Taking part in the 
battle of Berlin, he ended the war in a Soviet POW camp. 
Because of his war wound and a weakened condition brought 
on by hunger, on February 9, 1946, he was released. He 
returned to his defeated homeland, bedridden, age 43, and 
weighing 97 pounds. He would shortly face de-nazification 
proceedings for his pre-war SA activity, but this is another 
story. If it was any consolation for the reluctant NSFO, 
during the turbulent days of the battle of Berlin, he had 
been informed by telephone of his promotion to captain with 
rank from March 1, 1945-^ A postscript occurred in the 
spring of 1973i when this writer discovered in the Bundes- 
archiv in Koblenz that Karl Ducoffre had been slated to be 
a member of Bormann's NSF Staff if that organization had 
replaced the NSF Staff of the Wehrmacht in the closing days 
of the war. If the plan had gone through, he would have 
found himself in Section 5, working for a Colonel Weller in 
supervising NSF courses of instruction in the three mili­
tary services instead of leading a Volkssturm Company in
2
combat against the Russians. This showed, of course, that
^Letters, Captain of Reserves Karl Ducoffre, a.D., 
July 25, 1972 and September 21, 1972, and interview April 22,
1973.
^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. l44, Entwurf,
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he was well thought of by the party and that the reluctant 
NSFO performed his job well. He has never denied that he 
had been a loyal nazi, and he felt during the Hitler era 
that nazism offered a way out for a "tormented Germany."
Looking back on the institution of the NSFO, 
Ducoffre places it in historical perspective with its pred­
ecessors. The institution and duties of the NSFO, "except 
for the designation 'National Socialist,'" was not limited 
to the Wehrmacht of the second world war, he pointed out. 
In the first war, since the combat morale of the German 
soldiers threatened to crumble under the pressure of the 
powerful material and numerical superiority of the allies, 
the hunger blockade, and allied propaganda leaflets, the 
High Command assigned certain officers to talk to the 
troops in order to refurbish units even in the remotest 
places and to counter the destructive tendencies. These 
officers, he said, were called "Officers for Fatherland 
Instruction" in order to avoid the fatal designation of 
Propaganda Officers. Then in November I918 when the navy 
mutinied in Kiel and the revolt threatened to spread over 
Germany and to exert influence on the soldiers returning 
home, reliable and simple soldiers were assigned to ad­
monish their comrades to be sensible and to maintain dis­
cipline in the Soldiers' Advisory Councils allowed by the
Gliederung und Geschaftsverteilungsplan des NS-Fuhrungs- 
stabes der Partei-Kanzlei.
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new socialist government. These "Bildungsoffiziere"
(Education officers) included Adolf Hitler in their number.
As Hitler described it in Mein Kampf, this was the begin-
4
ning of his political activity.
Ducoffre believed that the "unhappy N.S.-called 
P.O." was established in late 19^3 on similar grounds as 
in 1917" The name itself, he said, caused discomfort to 
the troops and to even most of the officers assigned as 
NSFOs, and the institution was "not needed" to sustain the 
will to endure of the German soldiers and civilian popula­
tion since, in opposition to 1917, there was no real hunger 
or no flu epidemic to cause morale to disintegrate. He 
felt (and other witnesses have made the same statement) 
that the activity of the NSFO did less to sustain the com­
bat morale of the German soldiers and the endurance of the 
civil population to the bitter end than did the demand for 
unconditional surrender from the allies and the air attacks 
on German cities. He believed these facts caused front and 
homeland to hold out en masse and that the assassination 
attempt on Hitler did not change this. In fact, he pointed 
to an incredible faith in Hitler which lasted until the 
very end; even those who detested the party placed their 
faith in Hitler as an individual who would somehow lead
3
Letters and interview, Ducoffre.
4
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1939), p . 289.
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them safely through the war. The purpose of the NSFO, as 
he remembered it, was purely military; he was not supposed 
to be a preacher of ideology but was supposed to strengthen 
the will to fight. Those who delved too deeply into the 
realm of the nazi Weltanschauung, he claimed, only created 
resistance and perhaps sabotage; and they certainly brought 
on problems for themselves. This view was only partly cor­
rect since Hitler himself stated that a political will must 
be developed in the Wehrmacht and that all soldiers had to 
become national socialists. This may have been a most un­
realistic goal since Hitler was quite aware of the resist­
ance to nazism in the military services, but it is diffi­
cult to see how an NSFO could strive for it without trying 
to sell the nazi Weltanschauung. In any event, Ducoffre 
saw the goal differently and avers that most NSFOs were 
realists who saw the task as he did. After all, he said, 
it was difficult to get the job done if the commander and 
the NSFO could not agree. Accordingly, one can assume 
that the goals of the NSFO program were watered down in 
execution. The NSFO, Ducoffre asserted, invoked the appre­
hensions of the troops and was viewed with scepticism from 
the beginning because of his "party-political designation." 
Accordingly, in courses of instruction it was always "ham 
mered into the heads of NSFOs" that they must labor above 
all else to win the confidence of their sceptical superiors 
and that they could only fulfill their task if they awakened
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trust through tact and exemplary deportment. Ducoffre 
believed that most NSFOs, although they might have been 
fine officers, were unqualified for their jobs. If an 
officer had been a party member, the chances were good 
that he would automatically become an NSFO. The prerequi­
sites, he believed, did not stress sufficiently the char­
acter traits of tact and diplomacy. Fanaticism was deemed 
more important, and emotion was rated higher than reason. 
Basically, each NSFO was supposed to be a party man and 
an experienced combat soldier who was recognizable out­
wardly as such through his war decorations. Ducoffre him­
self wore the Iron Cross, first and second class, belonged 
to the party and the SA, and although highly intelligent, 
he often allowed his emotions to gain the upper hand even 
though he was a realist. A charming and immensely likeable 
man, he was perhaps a cut above the average NSFO.
Ducoffre believed that "little by little" the NSFOs 
gained the trust of commanders, staffs, and the troops and 
were supported by them. Nevertheless, the NSFO could not 
work in great depth if the combat troops had other fears, 
such as death, mutilation, capture, or air attacks on their 
families; furthermore, lower level NSFOs had enough to do 
with their primary duties. He believed that every NSFO 
had a difficult time ("Schwer hatte es jeder NSFO!"), es­
pecially those on higher staffs who had to give addresses 
to those who did not know them personally. Their first
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task demanded that they demolish a considerable barrier 
of coldness, if not outright rejection, at the very begin­
ning of their talk. Thus, success hinged strongly on the 
personality of the NSFO himself. Concerning statements 
from those who declared that people merely laughed at the 
NSFOs, Ducoffre said that that was "an old wives' tale."
On the contrary, the NSFO "was taken seriously, since most 
NSFOs were conservative soldiers, conservative in the sense 
that most fanatical national socialists considered them re­
actionaries. . . . They never needed to be earnestly feared
by the military--as it unfortunately happened." He con­
ceded that some NSFOs were fanatics, but he believed these 
were exceptions. He referred to one of General Schbrner's 
decrees which he said contained so much pathos that it 
failed to depict reality. "I observed no NSFO who was 
not painfully affected [by it]," he declared. "There were 
surely some who agreed with him, but only an imperceptible 
minority." Ducoffre gave an example of how some nazis 
felt about some aspects of nazism; a first lieutenant 
friend of his who was also an SA Leader told him sarcas­
tically and in all frankness: "My son can become anything,
even a thief, but if he comes home and says, 'I want to be 
an SS-Fuhrer,' I'll strike him deadl" There were others, 
he said, who looked at the party as a substitute for their 
first love--Imperial Germany. As one of Ducoffre's friends, 
while comparing the old German National Party of the Weimar
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period (which favored the restoration of the Hohenzollern 
Emperor) with the nazi party, told him: "With the [nazi]
party, for me it is like a man whose first wife died. He 
then married again a very ordinary woman who also pleases 
him. But his first love is she who is no more." This, 
said Ducoffre, expressed his views also, since both he and 
his friend had been part of the German National Youth Move­
ment before the advent of national socialism and the elimi­
nation of all other parties in Germany.
To properly understand the mentality of an assumed 
average or perhaps better than average NSFO and his feel­
ings toward nazism and Hitler, his thoughts, although tem­
pered by some thirty years, are instructive. Ducoffre 
wrote this author that:
. . . the Versailles Treaty . . . was the root of
all evil. It above all made Hitler possible. It was 
not to be foreseen that he would lose . . . and fi­
nally succumb to megalomania. His inhumanity, which 
appeared more and more with the start of the war, has 
made us as a people barbarous before the whole world 
for generations. At least our people have still not 
been able to overcome its past. It sometimes incites 
agonizing and painful [results]. We did something 
more dignified and upright somewhere. We are inclined 
to be an unhappy people. From one extreme to another. 
And even so, I love this people. There can be gran­
deur in its accomplishments. Not only in warfare, but 
also in music and technology. We have a big load to 
carry in our nazi past. It still doesn't become any 
better because of it, since the entire world has still 
not learned, and there is still racism, extermination, 
and oppression. Even those who suffered under these 
evils employed them if they gained power.5
^Letters and interview, Ducoffre.
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Ducoffre, of course, was not the only one with views on 
the NSFO.
Views from the Top
In the course of researching this study, the author 
corresponded with a number of civilian and military offi­
cials of the nazi era. These included: a high governmen­
tal official and friend of the German Führer who served 
twenty years imprisonment after the war in an allied prison; 
the most highly respected German field marshal in World 
War II; several well-known German generals; plus senior 
field-grade officers with years of combat experience. To 
a man, they all claimed that the NSFOs had little, if any, 
influence on the German troops. The overall impression 
gained from their comments was that the troops had little 
time and interest for nazism and the NSFO and that tradi­
tion, at least from the side of the more senior officers, 
played a strong role in the covert resistance which impeded 
the nazi efforts at indoctrinating German soldiers in nazism.
In July 1944 Albert Speer, Hitler's architect and 
armaments expert, delivered a lecture on mobilization at an 
NSFO course of instruction. Reporting afterwards to Hitler, 
he stated that his impression of the NSFOs was very nega­
tive. "Neither the selection qualification nor the defi­
cient leadership qualification (decorationl) were suitable 
to expound the thoughts of nazism in the Armed Forces," he 
told the Führer. In January 1972, Speer mused over the
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reasons for his negative impression of 1^44 and theorized 
that the regimental commanders probably had "no great in­
clination to dispose of their good officers or perhaps there 
was also little inclination at hand for [the officers] them­
selves to volunteer for these posts." In any case, he said, 
NSFOs "were in no way fit for the arranged task.
In January 1972 Field Marshal Erich von Manstein 
also commented on the NSFO program. Having been relieved 
by Hitler of his command of an army group in Southern Russia 
in April 1944, he admitted that he was unable to observe the 
functioning of the NSFOs at first hand; the NSFO appointed 
to his army group did not show up until the day he turned 
over the command to his successor. Model. Nevertheless, 
he said that he felt qualified to make general comments be­
cause of his knowledge of Hitler, other personalities, and 
the German soldier. He did not know for sure whether the 
idea of the NSFO was Hitler's or Bormann's, but it was "cer­
tainly not Keitel's." It seemed to Manstein that the pro­
gram fell in line with Hitler's way of doing things since 
Hitler "wanted to directly imbue the army with nazi spirit 
because he believed that this would guarantee resoluteness 
under all the difficulties of the situation and even final 
victory." On the whole, the field marshal discounted the 
NSFO's influence on the troops and declared that they and
^Letter, Albert Speer, January 21, 1972.
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commanders had other things besides national socialist in­
struction to care about.^
In January 1972 General Walther K. Nehring gave his 
personal thoughts on the NSFO based on his experiences as a 
corps and field army commander during the war. He believed 
that the date of the establishment of the NSFO--December 
19^3--was significant since the strategic turn of the war 
had occurred during that year. Thus, he labeled the crea­
tion of the NSFO as pure opportunism rather than nazi 
idealism. Nehring blamed Hitler for having denied victory 
to the German army because the Führer believed in the in­
fallibility of his own leadership which in fact was faulty. 
He also asserted that Hitler suspected ill will or defeat­
ism from the higher and middle leadership ranks of the army. 
As early as the fall of 1939i according to Nehring, Hitler 
had already turned against the army leadership because it 
had opposed the offensive against France. (As Chief of 
Staff to General Heinz Guderian, Nehring personally heard 
Hitler berate the generals in a speech to the assembled 
leaders of the entire Wehrmacht on November 23, 1939, in 
the Chancellery Office in Berlin.) He believed that Hitler 
intended to use the NSFO to instill in the minds of the 
troops the idea of fighting for final victory in the manner 
he and the party desired. From that idea, Nehring astutely
7
Letter, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, a.D.,
January 17, 1972.
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believed that it soon became a mere play with words-- 
with "ringing, windy rhetoric." However, the general 
said
it was too late. One cannot conduct any war at the 
greatest intensity for six long years without the 
armed forces and people suffering more and more 
damage. This fact was already discovered in the 
first world war. The thoughts of Hitler and the 
party to change this around through the NSFO were 
naiv e.
The general added that through enormous losses of all 
kinds, especially among trained noncommissioned officers, 
the army became "a kind of people's army which Hitler 
wanted to shore up morally and [to] influence through the 
NSFO." He did not remember any particular problems aris­
ing because of the NSFOs. The reason for this was because
one did not take the NSFOs so seriously or be­
cause they, as soldiers, had sufficient understand­
ing of military things. . . .  A good NSFO did not 
limit himself to his theory but tried, within his 
province, to cooperate helpfully. . . . Ultimately,
it depended mainly on the personal attitude of the 
NSFO and the satisfaction the commander and troops 
had in him and he in the troops.
General Nehring did not think that the NSFO helped the
esprit de corps of the troops nor that the results strived
for by Hitler and the party were in any manner achieved.
The only reason the war was prolonged as long as it was,
in his opinion, was because of the demand of the allies
for unconditional surrender; everyone, from general to
the youngest soldiers wished for the end of the war, he
declared, but all Germans refused the allied demands as
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long as any hope at all remained of negotiations which
Q
might rescue Germany from a menacing fate.
General Heinz Guderian, son of the famous German 
tank leader of the same name and now one of the senior gen­
erals of the West German Bundeswehr, gave his interpreta­
tion of the NSFO in February 1972. From his experience 
during World War II, he recalled that he had seen the NSFO 
first and foremost as the advisor and intermediary in ques­
tions of spiritual leadership (geistige Fuhrung); in his 
opinion, being an intermediary for the nazi Weltanschauung 
and a catalyst to strengthen the will to resist was only a 
secondary task. At least Guderian believed that this re­
flected the concept of Hitler's military advisors. He con­
ceded that some party members, and perhaps Hitler himself, 
might have cherished far-reaching thoughts in the direction 
of turning the NSFO into a political commissar. However, 
Hitler's military advisors definitely wanted no Politruk; 
and the NSFO never became one "except for a very few ex­
ceptions." Further, he believed that there was never much 
chance that a Politruk system could have ever come to pass 
in the German armed forces; Hitler was well aware of the 
opposition to such a system on the part of the military 
services and even feared himself to create a political com­
missar. Guderian thought that the NSFO was instituted
Q
Letter, General Walther K. Nehring, a.D., Janu­
ary 25, 1972.
2 63
because of the emergency at the front and discounted the 
idea that it was a welcome possibility for the party to 
gain influence in the Wehrmacht. He himself never exper­
ienced any difficulties with NSFOs and never heard of 
anyone who had--"at least not serious ones," he added.
As for the influence of the NSFOs, the general believed 
that they did have some effect on the German soldiers' 
will to resist the enemy, "but it was not very great.
The German soldier did his duty, partly with the support 
of the NSFO activity, partly also, however, in spite of 
this institution."^
In June 1973 General Albert Praun commented on the 
NSFO based on his experiences as division commander of the 
129th Infantry Division with Army Group Center in Russia 
from August 1942 to October 1943 and as division commander 
of the 277th Infantry Division from April 1944 to August 
1944 in France. He termed the "F" (Fuhrungs--leadership) 
portion of NSFO "a confidence trick" (Hochstapelei) be­
cause the NSFO had nothing to do with leadership. He saw 
the job of the NSFO in the area of Betreuung and added 
that before the NSFO was even thought of, the Ic had taken 
care of such matters. Further, combat leaders were too 
busy to concern themselves with party matters and the nazi 
Weltanschauung. Commanders ensured, he said, that the 
NSFOs would not get overly involved in ideology by
9
Letter, General Heinz Guderian, February 2-. 1972,
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appointing sensible combat veterans to the position#
instead of simply relying on official party members, Vvann 
did not believe that the NSFO exerted any influence on the 
German esprit de corps and the doggedness of the German 
soldiers. For this, "they had other sources in those days 
in training and tradition.
In March 1973 General I’rnun expanded on this tradi­
tion. He said that to understand the mentality of the Ger­
man officer, it was necessary to trace it back to the time 
of the monarchy when it was taboo for high society as well 
as members of the officer corps to discuss religion or pol­
itics. This mentality solidified during the period of the 
Weimar Republic when the 100,000 man army was forbidden to 
deal with politics. He left unsaid the obvious conclusion 
that habits of a lifetime could not easily be broken and 
that a naturally ingrained disdain for politics would carry 
over to the nazi era; but he did remark that it was no 1 
until the end of the war that he felt that be could talk 
frankly about such things even with old comrades, siicii as 
General von Hengl or General Guderian. He intimated that 
the Chief of the NSF Staff/OKH, the Ritter von itengl, may 
have had deep reservations about his service to the nay, I 
cause and that the last Chief of the Army General Htaff, 
Colonel General Guderian, may have had tongue in cheek
^^Letter, General Albert Praun, a, 11., June 8b, 1978,
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when he warned all general staff officers, after the "20th 
of July," that henceforth they must all be NSFOsl^^
General Walter Carganico, based on his experiences 
on the eastern front during the war, echoed many of the 
comments of other former generals : "With the troops at
the front, the NSFO played no significant role; at battal­
ion or regimental level, a reliable officer who was not
particularly sentimental over party ideology was usually
12appointed by the commander."
Colonel Franz Schraml, a former regular officer, 
commanded several infantry regiments in Russia and the 
Balkans between April 19^3 and the end of the war. In his 
opinion, the NSFO made himself hardly noticeable, if at 
all, to the troops. During periods of combat--"and these 
were without pause in the last part of the war"--there was 
no time for speeches or reading propaganda literature, he 
observed. However, he added that it differed little even 
in quiet times because of the severe shortage of officers 
and men. With companies down to forty to fifty men rather 
than three to four times that many, every man and officer 
had to do his job as well as other jobs, and no one had 
the time for NSFO work. Since soldiers were already at­
tuned against a "paper war," they naturally opposed the
^^Ibid., postmarked March l6, 1973*
12Letter, General Walter Carganico, a.D., Febru­
ary 3 , 1973.
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deluge of paper created by the NSFO system. Even with good 
intentions, there was simply no time to read it, and fre­
quently it remained in a file cabinet undistributed. Often 
if the material survived air attacks, train wrecks, mis- 
routed transportation, or a bad supply system, it was sabo­
taged by persons unknown. Commanders who opposed nazism, 
he declared, "did what they could (with the connivance of 
their adjutants, if these men were of the same opinion) to 
decrease the activity of the NSFO or to obstruct it en­
tirely." He adhered to the view that the higher in rank, 
the greater number of officers there were who rejected 
nazism. The younger officers, however, were in his opin­
ion predominantly for Hitler. He cited as an example the 
"20th of July" when not one single troop officer took part 
on the side of the attempt at a coup d'etat.
To Schraml's knowledge, those officers appointed 
as NSFOs were those who were well-known for their nazi in­
clinations and who had been active earlier in the Hitler 
Youth, the SA, and other party formations. These people, 
however, were not always persuasive speakers, so they were 
not always allowed to pursue a strong NSFO course. As a 
consequence, in many regiments one saw and heard nothing 
of them. Schraml once had the occasion to visit an NSFO 
at work in a neighboring unit behind the front. It was 
in November 1944, and the NSFO had the soldiers making 
Christmas toys for the children of war widows. In
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general, he felt that the Germans were unpolitical; al­
though they were hard workers, they were also revelers and 
dreamers. Accordingly, politics was hardly ever mentioned 
to the soldiers. They listened to the occasional speeches 
and "each thought on his own part of it. There was as 
little discussion in the Wehrmacht as earlier in the German 
army," he said. As the end of the war approached, Schraml 
believed the NSFO became even more insignificant.
A friend of Schraml's told him about a division 
commander who, because he was ordered to do so, appointed 
an NSFO who merely delivered a few lectures and said "noth­
ing new." From this, the colonel concluded that those who 
heard political speeches only expected novelties, not a 
political indoctrination or a strengthening of the will to 
"stick it out." Even the latter would have been unneces­
sary, added Schraml, if each unit of the Wehrmacht had 
fought loyally and with a sense of duty to the last hour I 
Schraml emphatically stressed that a decided difference 
existed between the places "above" which "did their duty" 
by passing on an order which they in turn had received 
from a higher place and those "below"--the troops--who had 
to carry out the order. This explained why' many of the 
orders on NSF contained remarks, such as "must not be hin­
dered" or "must be supported." The other side of the coin 
was that such an order created indignation on the part of 
the recipients which thus undercut its effect.
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Concerning anti-nazi officers and commanders,
Schraml pointed out that open resistance to nazism could 
have been quite serious. It probably would not have re­
sulted in a death sentence but certainly would have brought 
about the ignominious relief of a commander, his deporta­
tion to an insignificant position in the homeland, and per­
haps public degradation. As a thief or a criminal never 
openly comments over his misdeeds, so it had to remain, 
judged Schraml, with the clandestine activities of those 
who sabotaged or hindered the NSFO program; even today 
"what the daylight has to shun, must remain hidden in 
darkness." The colonel termed such activity "cowardly" 
and "wretched," and charged that those guilty of such 
activity even today "must avoid giving their names away 
and revealing their crime." Thus, he obviously considered 
resistance to nazism as treason. Generally, he agreed with 
the view of this author that there were two sides to the 
NSFO program--an official side and an unofficial side. Of­
ficially, the program was stressed while unofficially it 
was neglected, ignored- or rendered lip service!
As to ways of hindering the NSF work, Schraml in­
dicated time-honored ways which are common in any army. 
Propaganda and instructional material could disappear for­
ever into a box somewhere in the baggage train in the rear. 
If found by accident, "one would have already found by this 
time an excuse for that!" If an adjutant did not fully
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agree with his commander, it was easy enough to remove him 
and assign him as a company commander or in some other po­
sition. Further, "old school ties" were helpful. There 
were always friends or "connections" with higher echelons, 
and, of course, the higher the rank, the more connections 
an officer had. The younger officers, mostly staunch fol­
lowers of Hitler, had no such connections; accordingly,
13they could make little headway against their superiors.
Lieutenant Colonel Karl Kurz, a member of the West 
German Bundeswehr and a personal friend of the author, re­
lated that the combat troops were never bothered by the 
activity of the NSFOs. After the "20th of July," a friend 
of his was appointed as NSFO of his field artillery battal­
ion, but until the last day of the war this Sub-office 
"NSFO" only concerned himself with his primary duty as a 
battery commander, Kurz, a Bavarian who won the Iron Cross 
for combat action in Russia, stressed that the attitude of 
the armed forces had its origin, not in nazism, but in the
Reichswehr which carried on the Prussian spirit of Scharn-
ikhorst, Gneisenau, and Seeckt.
The thoughts expressed by Speer and the former mem­
bers of the Wehrmacht ring true for the simple reason that 
their judgments are in general agreement with the fears and
13Letters, Colonel Franz Schraml, a.D., May 25, 
1972, and October 2, 1972.
14Letter, Lieutenant Colonel Karl Kurz, March 12,
1971.
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apprehensions of members of Hitler's Party Chancellery. 
Officials in the P-K constantly expressed their doubts 
concerning the efficiency of the NSFO program and blamed 
the officer corps for its resistance to the program. There 
were, of course, moments when P-K members were optimistic 
concerning the program. This optimism arose when they con­
sidered the support for their cause from younger members of 
the officer corps and from fanatics like The Unreconstructed 
Nazi.
The Unreconstructed Nazi 
Also while researching this study, the author was 
able to establish contact with an unreconstructed nazi who 
serves as an interesting counterpoise to other present-day 
witnesses. Because of his former nazi activities before 
the war, his NSFO performance on a high level staff, and 
his present belief that only national socialism still holds 
the correct answers to the problems confronting the modern 
world, this former Major of Reserves asked that he not be 
named in order to protect his family from possible harm. 
Nevertheless, he reported his beliefs and activities quite 
openly in correspondence and apparently hid nothing during 
a personal meeting with this author in the spring of 1973. 
This convinced nazi joined the N.S.D.A.P. in 1930 and served 
in several party offices to include: District Propaganda
Leader; District Leader; County Leader; member of the Na­
tional Socialist Municipal Council of his city; and
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National Socialist Deputy to the Landtag in his Land 
(state). His last party function before his call-up to 
military service was as a leader in the National League 
of German Officials (Reichsbund deutscher Beamter); he 
had been a civil servant since shortly after the end of 
his World War I military service as an army officer. Be­
cause of his nazi past he was denied his former civil 
service position after the end of World War II until 1955 
and served twenty-five months of this ten-year period in 
prison because of his pre-war party activities.
After his mobilization in August 1939i this offi­
cer served in several field campaigns. He was one of the 
first to be selected as a Betreuung officer of his divi­
sion, and as a result of this activity and his experience 
in the party, he became an NSFO of an army group. In 
March 1944, he was sent temporarily to Krossinsee as a 
Work Group Leader, and he received several high decora­
tions for his NSFO activity. His qualifications to be an 
NSFO were, of course, his experience in the nazi party, 
decorations from the first world war (which must remain 
unnamed since they might identify him), several party dec­
orations, a citation for bravery in his World War I regi­
mental history, and the recommendation from his Gauleiter. 
In comparison with other telegraphic recommendations from
^^Letters, Major of Reserves P, a.D., February l4, 
1973, and March 28, 1973; and interview, April l8, 1973.
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the various District Leaders and party officials on file
in the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz t o d a y , h i s  is one of the
more exceptional. His Gauleiter termed him "absolutely
impeccable in character and politics." Thus, this NSFO
appeared unusually well-qualified, and perhaps this fact
speaks volumes concerning his present-day comments on the
NSFO program. This author informed the unreconstructed
nazi of Albert Speer's comment concerning the NSFO and
received a blistering remark by return mail that Speer's
comment was "not objective and in no way did it conform
to the truth. Out of the 400 NSFOs from troop units I met
at Krossinsee," he wrote,
all were splendid national socialists, and very 
qualified as NSFOs. That here and there were some 
who were unsuitable, 1 cannot dispute, since a few 
commanders, who had nothing good to say about Hit­
ler, perhaps appointed enemies of national social­
ism as NSFOs. . . .  It also does not seem believ­
able that Speer expressed a negative opinion to
Hitler on the NSFO. The overwhelming majority of 
commanders certainly appointed good officers as 
NSFOs, because one hoped to create through this a 
still better spirit in all troop units. . . .  I 
found that the establishment of the NSFO was good, 
only, unfortunately, it came too late. I wanted 
this institution already in 1939 when I was with
my regiment in the_____ --everything under the
designation of Wehrgeistige Betreuung. I did not 
think about an NSFO. I had no objection person­
ally, I had only reflections since there were cer­
tainly not genuine national socialists in the 
Wehrmacht. . . .
He claimed that he, as an NSFO, had the best pos­
sible contact with commanders and also with simple soldiers
^^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 366.
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He told about speaking to a battalion in an open field in 
the summer of 1944. After a two-hour talk, he realized 
what time it was, and dismayed at speaking so long, he 
apologized. Immediately, there rang from an unknown mouth 
the remark, "please go onl" Nevertheless, he stopped. He 
used to visit the troops in the front lines to converse 
with small groups in the best manner recommended by OKH. 
One time while speaking to the officers of a battalion in 
their officer club before a scheduled talk to the troops, 
the alert signal suddenly sounded. Grabbing his carbine, 
he ran out and talked to small groups of soldiers and in­
dividuals while they took defensive positions; then he 
laid down side by side with them to fight off an enemy 
attack. They appreciated his actions very much, he de­
clared. On another occasion, a major commanding an engi­
neer battalion tried to keep him in the officer club to 
prevent him from speaking to the troops. When this NSFO 
declared that he had a direct order from the army group 
commander and demanded to speak to the troops, the major 
conceded.
This former officer was quite upset and said that 
it embarrassed him that some people had termed the NSFO 
"a joke." He said that they must have been "former im­
perial officers" who did not want to answer for the NSFO 
today. The NSFO was certainly no joke, he said, and his 
"authority was an entirely natural sequel in a point of
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time when Greater Germany had already been wounded bloodily 
and the danger was always growing." He admitted that even 
he had been pessimistic occasionally, but he insisted that 
he believed in Hitler until the very end. Conceding that 
"a few commanders" attempted to keep the NSFO work in check, 
he declared that--no matter what they say today--most of 
them were glad to have in the NSFO a support for improving 
the attitude of the troopsi He added that the aftermath 
of the "20th of July" cut instances of sabotage of the NSFO 
program immensely. He agreed with others who said that the 
younger officers were for Hitler to an intensified extent 
but charged that the older officers, although to a smaller 
extent, were also supporters of Hitler because he wanted 
the best for Germany and was an idealist. "Only think what 
he did good for Germany and its people before the war," he 
said. "Hitler saw through the communist leaders as no other 
statesman."
The former NSFO agreed that conservative resistance 
elements of the officer corps carried on serious sabotage 
and declared flatly that this was why Germany lost the war. 
At one time in 1944, the la of a division, a lieutenant 
colonel, asked him if he knew that Hitler was wild and crazy 
and that he sometimes tore the epaulettes off generals who 
stood like ramrods in front of him. The former NSFO warned 
the la that he should not continue telling such stories.
If he had continued, he would have reported him to the
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commanding general. As it was, he let the event pass.
Ultimately, he said, if anyone had fear of an NSFO, it
must have been because he had good reason because of an
1?anti-nazi attitude or traitorous actions.
The evidence presented by Albert Speer and former 
members of the German army overwhelmingly give credence to 
the fears in the Party Chancellery that the NSFO program 
was in deep trouble. Even The Unreconstructed Nazi con­
ceded that sabotage of the program occurred and that mili­
tary traditionalism in the form of "former imperial offi­
cers" opposed the NSFO. He would have been right at home 
in the Party Chancellery where similar charges were hurled.
17•Letters and interview, P,
CHAPTER X 
DISINTEGRATION BEGINS
Red Tape and Recriminations 
Shortly after the "20th of July," Hitler gave 
Bormann some guidance on NSF. At that time the Führer 
said that he wanted "abuses, defeatist remarks, offenses 
against national socialist principles, etc." to be re­
ported to higher echelons of command so that offenders 
could be called to account. Therefore, he demanded that 
the NSFOs should have their own separate and direct chan­
nel for reporting and for issuing orders. Bormann and 
Ruder met with General Reinecke on this requirement and 
agreed on the wording of a Führer Order in draft form 
which would comply with Hitler's demand. Then, however, 
the Chief of NSF/OKW bound up the draft order in red tape, 
and the Party Chancellery started aiming recriminations at 
the military.
Reinecke sent the draft to the Chiefs of the three 
service NSF Staffs for their comments, and the array's 
Chief NSFO, Hengl, passed it in turn to various Commanders- 
in-Chief (e.g., Schorner and Model) for their points of
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view; Himmler, as C-in-C of the Replacement Army, also re­
ceived a copy. It was well-known that the SS Chief opposed 
giving an exceptionally strong position to the NSFO. In 
early October 1944 he had told Ruder that he thought it was 
very dangerous to create the suspicion that the NSFO might 
act the part of a political commissar. Advising strongly 
against instituting a special NSFO reporting channel, he 
pointed out the possibility that an NSFO could always and 
at any time write personally to the Chief of the NSF Staff 
of his service. In that way, situations which could not 
be settled locally could reach the highest leadership.^
By December the order was still bound up in the bureaucratic 
process while signs of disintegration could be seen.
On December l6 Berger reported to Himmler that "all 
men who are concerned with the salvation of Germany" agreed 
that signs of possible breakdown had appeared in air force 
and army units. Officers had abandoned their combat posi­
tions prematurely, and frequently soldiers were found strag­
gling far in the rear. In both military and civilian of­
fices, a lack of activity and its resulting signs of las­
situde were becoming obvious. Berger told his boss that 
several army officers had come to him asking that Himmler
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. l40, Vorlage an 
Herrn Reichsleiter Bormann, Betrifft: Fuhrerbefehl fur
die Verstarkung der nationalsozialistischen Fuhrung in 
der Wehrmacht, October 10, 1944, IIF, signed: Ruder,
with enclosure: Der Führer, Fuhrerhauptquartier, den
September 44.
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should see the Führer; he should ask Hitler to give the 
NSFO full powers. Berger conceded the difficulties in 
such a suggestion. By January 24, 1945, Himmler had 
still not made up his mind on the proposal, but he told 
one of his aides that great difficulties stood in the way. 
He saw it as possible only in the manner in which it had 
been done in the past, namely for Sondereinsatz, and even 
then only for certain situations. The danger of slipping 
into a commissar-like system was just too great, the 
Reichsführer SS said.
The reasoning of the various actors in this drama, 
except for Himmler's, was not divulged, but perhaps con­
jecture can approach the truth. Reinecke had a reputation 
in the military and the party as a "deskbound" general who 
delayed and weakened orders through his commitment to red 
tape; so his action was in character. Hengl, influenced 
by staff officers whom the P-K called obstructionists, 
anti-nazis, and anti-OKW may have used the red tape oppor­
tunity for two reasons: first, to tie up the order for
awhile; and second, to send it to field commanders who 
thought as he did, namely that the commander must remain
BAK, Personlicherstab Reichsfuhrer SS, NS 19/neu 
750, Berger to Himmler, Betrifft: Einrichtung von NS-
Fuhrungsoffizieren mit Sondervollmachten, December l6 ,
1944.
3Ibid., SS-Standartenfuhrer to Berger, Betrifft:
Einrichtung von NS-Fuhrungsoffiziere mit Sondervollmachten,
January 25, 1945.
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supreme. Himmler and Schorner had both expressed such be­
liefs strongly in the past, and they would no doubt support 
an OKH non-concurrence to the order. Model's position is 
unknown, but he had a reputation for disregarding Hitler's 
instructions and acting on his own judgment. A strange 
comment about Hengl was made by one of his close friends; 
if true, it places the NSF Chief of OKH as one of the 
staunch protectors of the traditional German army against 
the NSFO and the party despite his job as Chief NSFO. Gen­
eral Albert Praun, the last Chief of Communications for 
the Führer's headquarters after the execution of his pred­
ecessor, General Fellgiebel (because of the letter's im­
plication in the "20th of July"), claimed that no "NSFO 
problem" ever developed because his good friend. General
4
von Hengl, "took care of it I" As for Himmler's stand, he 
may have sincerely believed in the danger of a Politruk in 
the German army, but he also remained in the power struggle 
with Bormann. Any great increase in the NSFO's power would 
automatically increase Hermann's at Himmler's expense. 
Naturally, the P-K was unhappy with the generals and the 
SS Chief for their actions.
On October 10, 1944, Ruder wrote a memorandum to 
his boss, Bormann, in which he condemned as "completely 
false" the idea of opening up a sacred Führer Order to 
such discussion as Reinecke and Hengl had done. He pointed
Letter, General Albert Praun, a.D., June 26, 1972.
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out emphatically that recent experience had shown that
nearly all NSFOs were encountering great difficulties.
"Therefore," he wrote,
their position needs a special underpinning. There­
fore, it is advisable to get a decisive order from 
the Führer as soon as possible so that the NSFO can 
report directly, if a report through his unit com­
mander appears useless.
Ruder saw the danger that Himmler might institute his own
arrangements on the subject for his units and the Volks-
grenadier divisions which other commanders could then use
as a precedent. Accordingly, he asked Bormann to talk to
the SS Chief about it.
On the previous day General Reinecke had suggested 
that if the Führer Order could not be issued in the agreed 
format, a field mail number (similar to a zip code number) 
to which all soldiers could write could be set up. Ruder 
hardly thought this would solve the problem since all sorts 
of inconsequential complaints would flow in, and a large 
organization would have to be created just to handle the 
deluge of paper. There was an advantage in using a special 
NSFO channel, he wrote: many things could be settled lo­
cally, and furthermore, the validity of a complaint could 
be checked. The institution of a field mail number, he 
concluded, would mean the elimination of the NSFO from this 
type of work. Ruder asked Bormann to talk to Hitler to 
offset the other interpretations of the Führer Order. On 
October 24 Bormann did talk to the Führer on the subject.
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but the content of the conversation remains unknown. Since 
the final version of this Führer Order was not published 
until March 1945--eight months after Hitler's guidance to 
Bormann--Hitler obviously backed off in face of foot drag­
ging by his NSF Chiefs and known opposition from Himmler.
A comparison between the draft order which circu­
lated at this time with the final version shows that Himm­
ler 's thoughts ultimately prevailed over Ruder's (and per­
haps Bormann's). It also revealed a certain amount of com­
promise which muddied the water. The final version added 
that the NSFO "like all other members of the staff" was 
fully subordinate to his commander; it also added that the 
NSFO furnished his commander a copy of the monthly activity 
report which he was now required to send to the next higher 
NSFO and to the Chief of his service NSF Staff. NSFOs were 
also required to report difficulties which affected their 
work. A portion of the original draft order was eliminated; 
this part had stated that
in cases of special political import and [when] there 
is danger in delay--despite regular channels--they 
[difficulties] will be reported immediately and di­
rectly to the NSFO of the next higher command [and] 
up to the highest office.
An original statement that the Chief of NSF/OKW in coopera­
tion with the Leader of the Party Chancellery would be re­
sponsible for the uniformity of the execution of the order 
also did not appear in the final version.^ While time
^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. l40, Vorlage an 
Herrn Reichsleiter Bormann, Betrifft: Fuhrerbefehl fur
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passed and bureaucratic ensnarlments tied up the Führer 
Order until March 19^5» other things, of course, were 
happening.
During these intervening months, the military 
situation deteriorated and the morale and will to resist 
of the German soldiers eroded. On July 10, 1944, Hassell 
wrote in his diary that there was evidence of disintegra­
tion among the soldiers; in East Prussia German troops 
were retreating in disorganization at a rate never seen 
in 1918.^  The next day he wrote that he had heard that
the generals in the west were "doing their duty" with com-
7
plete resignation. In August the mail censor report was 
enlightening. One soldier wrote that his unit was com­
posed of men forty to forty-six years old and that they 
were treated like "dumb kids." A first sergeant described 
how his regimental commander won the German Cross in Gold 
when he had served nowhere near the front; and a Lance 
Corporal wrote that one did not know what to believe any­
more. A corporal complained that political indoctrination
die Verstarkung der nationalsozialistischen Fuhrung in der 
Wehrmacht, October 10, 1944, IIF, signed: Ruder, with en­
closure: Der Führer, Fuhrerhauptquartier, den Septem­
ber 44. For the final version, see Waldemar Besson, "Zur 
Geschichte des Nationalsozialistischen Fuhrungs Offiziers 
(NSFO)," Viertel.jahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, doc. no. l4 
(January 19^1), pp. 1l4-15.
^Ulrich von Hassell, The Von Hassell Diaries: 
1938-1944 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1947), p. 350.
^Ibid., p. 355-
283
lasted a very long time; he also protested because the
traditional military salute had been taken away from the
army. In Army Group "E," the l4th Army, the 15th Army,
the l6th Army, and the 20th Mountain Army, the rate of
major offenses against breaking mail censorship regula-
o
tions climbed somewhat from July to August. To add to
the signs of disintegration, by September the Soviet
armies had achieved definite superiority. Ratios between
the Soviet and German forces stood at: divisions, 9=1;
tanks, 6:1; guns, 10 or 15:1. German army tank divisions
had only one-third of their personnel strength while,
surprisingly, 70 to 80 per cent of the tanks were battle-
9
worthy; but SS units were at full strengthl In the west 
between the allied invasion of Normandy on June 6 and the 
fall of Antwerp on September 4, the allies claimed the 
destruction of fifty-three German divisions, and twenty- 
two corps and division commanders were either dead, 
wounded, or prisoners of war. The front had begun to 
crumble, and formerly unheard of scenes in the Prussian/ 
German army occurred. Trucks with officers, mistresses, 
champagne, and brandy made it as far to the rear as the 
Rhineland, and it took the iron hands of Field Marshals 
von Rundstedt and Model, plus Special Courts-Martial, to
Q
NAM, T?8, Roll 134, Frames 6062771-2842.
9
Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General 
Staff: 1657-1945, trans. Brian Battershaw (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1953)1 p. 482.
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reform the army.^^ The application of Sondereinsatz un­
doubtedly had some effect also. In the I Army Corps on 
the eastern front in December, the corps NSFO reported 
that the troops worried most about the safety of their 
families at home, and he told his corps NSFOs to convince 
the soldiers that they must put their trust in the leader­
ship of the Wehrmacht and the party.
By September 1944 the German army began to man the 
West Wall (the so-called "Siegfried Line") on the German 
border; in Italy the western allies had cleared much of 
the peninsula; and in the east the Soviet Army had pushed 
the Germans behind the line they had occupied before the 
invasion of the U .S .S.R.--the battle for the Reich itself 
was about to begin, and Reinecke tried to polish up the 
tarnished image of the NSFO.
Apparently, Reinecke had heard that even high of­
ficers sometimes referred to NSFOs as "NS-Fohse" (a simple 
play on the NSFO initials which indicated that NSFOs were 
"wet behind the ears") or "NS-Null" (NS-Nothing). On 
September 6 Reinecke informed each service NSF Staff that 
the Führer had ordered the designation "NS-Leadership Staff 
of the High Command of the Wehrmacht" changed to the more
* 1 b i d  . , p . 480 .
'^NAM, T314, Roll 80, Frames 17-22.
12 BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 137, Hans Krober
to "Licber Hermann," August 7, 1944.
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independent and important sounding "NS-Leadership Staff 
of the Wehrmacht." In addition, he announced that the 
common use of the short titles "NSFO," "NS-Leadership 
Officer," or "NS-Leadership" caused people to lose sight 
of the importance of NSF for the war effort. Therefore, 
the Chief NSFO requested that the armed forces use these 
abbreviations only in telegrams, teletype messages, and 
in internal Wehrmacht communications. In all other cases, 
to include all printed literature even within the armed 
forces, the full titles would be used. A copy of the 
directive, with "NS-Leadership Staff" on the letterhead,
13was sent outside the Wehrmacht to the Party Chancellery! 
Thus, the NSFO initials themselves became important.
While Reinecke dealt with the trivia of names and titles, 
he was fast losing his control over the Armed Forces NSFO 
program, and nazis like Himmler were moving much faster 
toward the goal of nazification of the armed forces.
The SS Chief was moving rapidly toward toughening 
the spirit of his army forces and mobilizing a people's 
army representative of the German nation. He had appar­
ently learned from Rohm's mistake of 193^- He would not 
build a revolutionary army around the cadres of an elite 
group; instead he would fall back on an idea which incor­
porated Prussian traditionalism. In a speech to area and
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 15I, Abschrift, 
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, NS-Fuhrungsstab der Wehrmacht, 
September 6 , 1944.
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school commanders of the Replacement Army on September 21, 
1944, Himmler explained his ideas. First, he took the 
commanders to task over the softness of their units. In 
this speech, Himmler freely admitted that he was a "bar­
barian" when necessary, and he implied that a soldier had 
to be barbaric at times in order to be hard. If a company 
commander ran away from his men, he told his distinguished 
audience, that troop leader should be told that as a result 
he could earn either death or the Knight's Cross in battle 
or else face a court-martial. Then Himmler incorporated 
his own version of Prussian traditionalism into his ideas. 
War could not be conducted gentlemanly as in the past; it 
had to be brutal and built on the tradition bequeathed to 
Germany by "Old Fritz," Frederick the Great. The Prussian 
king's example of I813, he claimed, was now being followed 
through the creation of the Volkssturm (People's Defense 
Units). Only this time, the old and the young--from six­
teen to sixty--would arise from the nation itself and 
would fight a partisan war in Russian fashion; they would 
fight with everything they could lay their hands on, to 
include flintlocks and improvised weapons. The SS Chief 
declared that the enemy would have to reckon on meeting 
and killing every German man and woman in order to win. 
Besides, the allied coalition was shaky, he avowed, and
l4it would collapse within the next twelve months. Himmler
T84, Roll 175, Frames 1544l64-84.
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was dreaming--not only about a great popular arousal of 
the Prussian people in I813, but also concerning the 
reality of Germany in 1944.
Daylight travel in Germany was impossible in many 
p l a c e s , a n d  furthermore, reports circulated of civilians 
not understanding what was going on or why Himmler's vaunted 
Volkssturm was being called up.^^ In December a great num­
ber of the old and young who were supposed to arise from the
17nation itself failed to answer the call-up. Another re­
port described how it took one area four weeks to receive
its mobilization order because of the chaotic communica- 
X 8tions. At the same time nazi files bulged with reports
19of increasing defeatism in the officer corps, and many 
of the cures employed in such circumstances were pathetic 
since they did not alleviate the basic problem, which was 
the appearance of the first signs of chaos. For example, 
the most original thought in one division of Himmler's Re­
placement Army in October was for its headquarters to give
blanket permission to NSFOs to inspect courses of instruc-
20tion on nazi education without prior warning.
In August 1944, with the Reich under direct enemy
21threat. Hitler had finally ordered total mobilization.
l^ibid.. Frame 1543770. ^°Ibid., Frame 1543774.
l^Ibid., Frame I5438O2 . ^®Ibid., Frame 1543866.
^^NAM, T78, Roll 40, Frames 6OOI8OO-I807.
20
NAM, T84, Roll 160, Frame 1527112.
21
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third
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Two months later he proclaimed a levee-en-masse, created
Himmler's vaunted Volkssturm, and instituted the Wehrwolf
(a formation of partisan fighters which existed only in
22Hitler's imagination). At least Hitler had an eye for 
history--the Volkssturm, composed of old men and young 
boys, resembled the Landsturm of the days of the Prussian 
War of Liberation (ca. I813). The mission of the Volks­
sturm, like that of the old Prussian Landsturm, was home
23defense and, if necessary, partisan warfare. In this
atmosphere of an impending fight to the finish, seniority
of rank began to count less while "nazi efficiency" and
belief meant more. On July 20, 1944, Hitler had promoted
Major Ernst Remer to Colonel (and later major general) as
his reward for putting down the attempted coup in Berlin 
24that day, and later in the battle for Berlin a young 
NSFO named Kaether suddenly became a general because of
Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 19^0) , p . IO87. See also Alan Bullock, Hitler :
A Study in Tyranny, Harper Torchbooks, rev. ed. (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1964), p. 757.
22Goerlitz, German General Staff, p. 421.
2 3For information concerning the Landsturm see 
Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army: l640-
1945, a Galaxy Book (New York: Oxford University Press,
I9&4 ), pp. 60-69.
24John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, 
The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945, Viking Compass ed. 
(New York: The Viking Press, I967), pp. 655-5?. See also
"Playboy Interview: Albert Speer," Playboy, June 1971,
p. 193.
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25"the glow of his National Socialist convictions." The 
atmosphere was also conducive to thoughts on more concrete 
matters. In view of the impending disaster facing the 
Third Reich, the Party Chancellery had to take a hard look 
at the NSFO program.
At the end of October or the beginning of November 
1944, Ruder's work group held a conference in order to 
evaluate the NSFO program. Ruder led off with an assess­
ment. He believed that unclear orders had impeded the work. 
Although the Führer Order should have given clear direction, 
of course, the desired results had not yet come about; 
therefore, someone was at fault. Now Ruder's guns shifted 
from their former aim at the army's NSF staff to a cannon­
ade against the NSF Staff of the Wehrmacht. Ruder placed 
much of the blame for the NSFO's failure on Reinecke's 
staff which he declared had not used all of its "intellec­
tual capacities." Thus Reinecke was destined to become 
the party's scapegoat for the failure of the NSFO program. 
The army, on the other hand, was now conducting systematic 
work, and its nomination of NSFOs, although it could be 
improved, was "good." Nevertheless, he estimated that at 
division level, only 50 per cent of the assigned NSFOs were 
suitable; the others gradually had to be replaced. He con­
ceded that commanders impeded the nomination of officers
n c
Goerlitz, German General Staff, p. 498. Assum- 
edly this was Colonel Kaether of the NSF Staff of OKH.
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since they did not want to give up qualified men and he 
even singled out Himmler's Replacement Army as demonstrat­
ing "a certain aimlessness." Ruder typified those living 
in the nazi dreamworld as they teetered on the edge of 
catastrophe; he pinned his hopes on the coming generation. 
Future armed forces leaders he said, should be selected 
only from impeccable political and ideological individuals 
such as former Hitler Youth members who had proved them­
selves as leaders in combat. This idea concerning the 
army of the future must have served as Ruder's basic as­
sumption when he showed his willingness to accept a some­
what less than dominant position of the party vis-a-vis 
other party offices and the Wehrmacht. Ruder was begin­
ning to accept the reality of the present.
Ruder also assessed his own staff and stressed 
that it must cooperate strongly and continuously with the 
other party offices. Other party offices had to be brought 
in on planning early and should not be informed of accom­
plished facts later by the armed forces. If the Wehrmacht 
was to ever become politically activated, he correctly 
asserted that it must not see the party as something which 
handed out instructions on political leadership "from 
above." Rather, the party should create "the material" 
and then place it at the disposal of the military. Party 
members had to realize that the NSFO work stood in its 
infancy and that the military services would not be
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politically activated by just political instruction or 
lectures. Still Ruder saw that the commanders had to be 
won over to the nazi cause. Then the nazi troop leader 
had to introduce a new spirit in the troops, and the 
"Landser [the term used for the German soldier] must have 
the possibility to report grievances to higher echelons 
through the NSFO.” After criticizing several pieces of 
well-known instructional literature, Ruder said that 
greater emphasis had to be placed on the courses at 
Krossinsee since general staff officers--"this up to now 
uninfluenced category of officers"--could be influenced 
when they attended the courses t h e r e . T h e  picture of 
a traditionalist Ruder which emerges here can be very 
misleading. In this assessment he appeared to back off 
and further the concept of the Wehrmacht having suprem­
acy in its own sphere while the party stood by as a 
helpmate to furnish it ideological and political material. 
This can only be viewed in context. Ruder looked to the 
future when the armed forces would be thoroughly nazified, 
and only with this assumption having become reality would 
he have been willing to place the party in an equal if not 
inferior position to a nazi Wehrmacht. In the meantime, 
however, the party would have to move slowly and depend on 
its ability to sell itself through its propaganda.
^^BAK, Sammlung Schumacher 36?» Entwurf, Arbeits- 
tagung der Gruppe IIF, November 2, 1944.
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Hatred, Fear, and Propaganda 
The nazi propaganda machine had been in full swing 
for some time in order to scare Germans into resisting the 
enemy, but in the last few weeks it poured out in a tor­
rent. The January 19^5 issue of "The Political Soldier," 
published by NSF/OKW, told the soldiers that the enemy 
hated them because Germany was building an orderly state. 
That was why the enemy wanted to "liberate" Europe. Ameri­
can "liberation" aimed at gaining control of phosphorous 
and iron works and robbing art treasures in Italy; the 
United States only wanted a market for her wares. The 
propaganda sheet then listed quotations from the enemy 
press. The October 19^3 edition of Popular Science urged 
that Germany's industry had to be dismantled and distrib­
uted to her neighbors--the clock had to be set back fifty 
years. William Barkley was quoted as saying in the May l6, 
1944, edition of The Daily Express ". . . if a strongly
reduced German people have to scratch their food from the 
soil without technical help or machines . . . then perhaps
they can be happy in idyllic ways." Other statements and 
questions included: "Does the bolshevist hangman follow
the American soldiers?"; "Americans let negroes fly in the 
terror attacks on our culture in Munich"; and "We are all
damned to the pity of God if the Americans come into Ger-
27many. But if we are soldiers it won't happen." On
2?NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frames 1526123-34.
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February 15, 19^5, NSF/OKW published a list of enemy 
atrocities for the information of NSFOs. It listed rapes, 
shootings of catholic nurses, and murders of children. 
Major Klahn, who signed the directive, asserted that the
28information should be suitable for inspiring hatred.
On February 23 Himmler, as C-in-C of Army Group
Weichsel on the eastern front, issued a rousing appeal to
his NSFOs. He proclaimed:
The goal of the entire ideological and political 
work at the present time must be to bring every 
individual to the realization that only through 
struggle, aggressiveness, and mental attitude, 
can he defend his family, his relatives, and 
thus his nation and his own future from bolshe­
vist bloodthirstiness.
After a few overworked slogans and emotionalism, Himmler 
told the NSFOs: "Don't glue yourself to a desk, but get
out with the troops 1" He also told them to place the 
sharpest demands on party members in uniform. If any re­
fused these requirements, he demanded that they should be
29reported at once to the Army Group NSFO.
On March 5 an NSFO in Wehrkreis X (Hamburg) tried 
to lift the spirits of soldiers with quotations from news­
papers. An article in the American Hearst Press had al­
legedly stated: "If our losses at Iwo Jima go on, there
Q O
NAM, T84, Roll ,160, Frame 1527334.
^^BAK, Personlicher Stab Reichsfuhrer SS, NS 
19/neu 750, Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Weichsel, 
Vla/NSF, Richtlinien fur die Arbeit des NSFO, Febru­
ary 23, 1945, signed: H, Himmler.
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is the danger that the US troops will be finished before 
they reach the critical Japanese areas at all." The NSFO 
added that U.S. losses in Europe were similar, and then 
he quoted the Washington Daily News : "We must reckon on
at least one dead American soldier for each German pris­
oner." He pointed out that extensive labor problems had 
grown in the United States, and added that the American 
regime had had to threaten to draft the strikers into the 
army to get them back to work. The U.S. Senator Wheeler 
in a radio speech, the NSFO continued, had spoken about 
the Yalta Conference and charged that the policy of ex­
termination against Germany was psychological madness be­
cause it would cost tens of thousands of American lives. 
He wrote that the troops would be interested in what an 
English war correspondent wrote about the German troops 
in the west. The correspondent allegedly reported that 
German artillery surmounted everything on the battlefield 
and that the English troops met the most stubborn resist­
ance conceivable; he called the German soldiers young, 
fanatical, and disciplined fighters. If England had not 
capitulated after Dunkerque and Russia had not quit after 
Leningrad, why should the Reich give up, asked the NSFO.
Besides, he prophesied, England did not want a Soviet 
30Europe.
3°NAM, T77, Roll 1039, Frames 6512763-64.
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On March 7 the LXXXII Army Corps NSFO pointed at 
the outrages in East Prussia by the "Red beasts" and said 
that instead of causing anxiety and fear, it should stir 
hate, fanaticism, and the will to fight harder. Occupa­
tion of German soil by the Anglo-Americans would be no 
better, the Corps' battalion NSFOs were told, because the 
Soviet Union would dominate and bring hunger, death, and 
misery. The goals of the plan cooked up by Churchill, 
Roosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta, supposedly in "their own 
words," were :
Demolition of German Industry. 30,000,000 German 
men and women as slave workers in Siberia. Destruc­
tion of the German Wehrmacht. Military occupation of 
Germany until the year 2000. Dictation--no negotia­
tion. Biological extermination--sterilization.
Women and girls exported overseas. Death of the 
German nation.31
On the same day, the XIII Army Corps NSFO called Yalta a 
"new Wilson-trick for Germany" and said the Reich would 
not fall for a second Versailles. In his "Data for Troop 
Information" of March 7i he quoted an officer on the East 
Prussian front as telling his grenadiers: "The hour be­
fore dawn is always the darkest. Think of that and fight 
like a lion. Victory will still be ours. Our Führer and 
beloved Germany livel" Since the beginning of the current 
Soviet offensive on January 12, the NSFO reported, the 
Soviets had lost a third of their infantry and three- 
fourths of their tank forces, and their losses would
3^NAM, T84, Roll 159, Frame 1525945.
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climb higher. He concluded that only ideas and those who
32fight for them could win wars.
The NSF Staff of OKH put out the same type of prop­
aganda and demanded that those who could not handle the 
current crisis should at least hold their tongues and main­
tain their composure. The staff called on NSFOs in the 
army to discuss relevant measures for the strengthening of 
NSF and to report their recommendations to NSF/OKH by 
April 10, 1945.^^ This admission of a lack of its own 
ideas showed a bankrupt policy in OKH. Henceforth, it 
would be at the mercy of those who did have ideas and 
would only direct minor NSFO changes and react to initia­
tives from other places.
In Search of Ideas 
Obviously new ideas were needed, and Hitler led 
the way. On November 251 1944, he ordered that any troop 
leader who believed he could no longer lead his unit in 
the manner the Führer expected should query first his of­
ficers, then his noncommissioned officers, and finally 
even his enlisted men as to whether one of them fulfilled 
the requirements of command and would willingly lead the 
unit in combat; if so, the commander should turn over his 
command to this individual--without concern for rank--and
^^Ibid., Frames 1525941-42.
^^NAM, T77, Roll 852, Frames 5597522-31.
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the new leader would command the unit with all the rights 
and privileges which went with the job. This Führer 
Order directly attacked traditional army custom, but at 
least it allowed the commander himself to designate his 
replacement.
On December 9, 1944, in connection with the end 
of the thirteenth course at Krossinsee, Party Member 
Beringer submitted a pessimistic report to Ruder on the 
status of the NSFO program. No doubt, he began, the 
courses at Krossinsee had been very fruitful, but since 
Lieutenant Colonel Herschel had been transferred from 
his position as commandant, the reputation enjoyed by 
the courses had dwindled; despite repeated recommenda­
tions from the work staff, the NSF Staff/OKW had failed 
to find a suitable replacement for him. Further some 
changes were needed among the Work Group Leaders--some 
of them had never experienced combat, and others who 
were combat veterans had stayed at Krossinsee so long 
that Beringer feared they would forget how to put their 
knowledge into practice.
Beringer believed that the failures of General 
Reinecke and the command structure both caused the NSF 
program to move rather slowly. His criticism of Reinecke
34Walter Hubatsch, ed., Hitlers Weisungen fur die 
Kriegsfuhrung, 1939-1945Î Dokumente des Oberkommandos 
der Wehrmacht (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag
GmbH & Co. KG, I965), doc. no. 68, pp. 343-44.
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reflected those previously expressed by other party and 
military people--the old man had not seen combat but once, 
and that had been over thirty years previously. Further, 
the general had selected "impossible people" for his staff 
who should be cast aside since they only stood in the way 
of the work of the party. Beringer did not see how the 
work staff could put up with Reinecke much longer, and 
he pondered whether it would be better to replace him 
with a better man or to work directly with the NSF Staffs 
of the three services. As opposed to Reinecke, he cred­
ited General von Hengl and his staff with the good re­
sults achieved by the army. Apparently the strong criti­
cism previously leveled against Radke, Sprengel, and 
Lersner had been forgotten. The army, he reported, stood 
way ahead of the navy, and as far as the air force was 
concerned, Beringer had nothing good to say since he felt 
that the Luftwaffe received very little guidance from its 
chief (Goring). Turning to the command structure, he com­
plained that there were still "a great number of commanders" 
who, through mistrust, opposed the political activation of 
the armed forces and wanted to hear nothing of a "'polit­
ical commisar.'" He charged that many high commanders did 
not really support the NSF program with their whole hearts. 
Too often the party work staff, outnumbered by the military, 
had to be content when commanders merely let their NSFOs 
work unhindered, and frequently, he reported, the NSFO had
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insufficient rank to make himself felt within the staff. 
However, the main problem with the program was the NSF 
selection process on which it stood or fell.
Even after the publication of the Führer Order of 
December 22, 1943, Beringer claimed, commanders in many 
cases appointed people based on their civilian occupations 
or who had the same politically neutral attitudes as them­
selves. As a result, a disproportionately high number of 
professors and teachers became NSFOs regardless of their 
political experience or beliefs. Frequently, B.O.s who 
were former members of the Stahlhelm and the German Na­
tional Party (the D.N.V.P.) had been carried over to the 
new NSFO positions, and as late as the spring of 1944 a 
pastor had appeared at the NSFO course at Krossinsee. 
Beringer blamed Reinecke for wanting to send "an unwar­
ranted great number" of physicians and officers from the 
noncombat support services to the course and said that as 
yet none of the three military services had provided a 
complete list of NSFOs to the party. If only these lists 
could be obtained, he added, the work staff could reject 
the unqualified NSFOs after running a check through all 
the District Leaders.
According to Beringer, the lack of professional 
officers created a major problem in filling the goal of 
one-third regular officers in the NSFO program. General 
von Hengl had stated recently at a conference in Potsdam
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that the army vias short about 300 Main Office NSFOs, and 
at the most, only twenty officers could be assigned di­
rectly from the course at Krossinsee to make up this short­
age. So far party offices had reported a total of 12,928 
prospective NSFOs to the work staff which then culled out 
1097 to recommend to the NSF Staff/OKW. Nevertheless, only 
a small number of these were actually employed as NSFOs or 
had ever been sent to Krossinsee. Beringer could not help 
but think that the adverse situation resulted from either 
an "enormous paralysis" or "malevolence." He observed the 
rather conspicuous fact that some 75 per cent of the higher 
NSFO positions were filled with former SA leaders. Ponder­
ing the reason, he theorized that this might have occurred 
because of the former close cooperation between the armed 
forces and the SA or that the military placed higher value 
on SA leaders than it did on leaders of other nazi forma­
tions. He warned that the work staff had to prevent this 
tendency.
In conversations with participants in the Krossinsee 
courses, Beringer had received many complaints. For exam­
ple, he had learned that commanders had so shackled regi­
mental and battalion NSFOs with other duties that they 
could not adequately perform their NSFO work. It took an 
especially strong personality, he observed, to overcome 
such restraints. In his opinion, the NSFO positions at 
regimental level should become Main Office positions; this
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had already been done several times in Himmler's Replace­
ment Army, he noted. He had also heard that NSFOs were 
nearly overwhelmed with propaganda literature. They wished 
that the periodical, Officers of the Fuhrer, would follow a 
more clear political line, but he reported that unit com­
manders considered The Political Soldier as an excellent 
basis for NSF instruction. Nevertheless, they would like 
to see definite guidelines in the latter publication which 
they could easily follow in setting up instructional pro­
grams; they claimed that they had too little time to do 
this on their own. Beringer berated this attitude and
said that it only showed how inefficient these complainers
35were. Beringer's criticisms were aimed directly at the 
officer corps, but the troops soon came in for their share 
too since after all, it would have been heretical to blame 
Hitler and the N.S.D.A.P. for Germany's impending defeat.
Criticisms leveled at the troops by party officials 
usually concerned the soldiers' unwillingness to continue 
fighting. One such report in early February was from a 
party member named Schonwalder who was serving as a Major 
of Reserves in the army. Criticizing army troops on the 
eastern front who had fled to the rear, he said that young, 
strong boys with the best of armaments, in sloppy dress and
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 36O, Vermerk fur 
Pg. Ruder, Betrifft : Überblick iiber den Stand der NS-
Fuhrungsarbeit in der Wehrmacht. Ihr Vermerk vom 23» Nov. 
1944, December 9» 1944, IIF, signed: Beringer.
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with cigarettes hanging from their mouths, took items from 
stores without paying for them; they told shopkeepers that 
the war was over. Newly activated troops also lacked the
will to fight and had no interest in what was going on;
this proved to Schonwalder that ideological training had 
failed. The first war, he declared, was lost at home,
or
but this one would be lost at the front. Another Febru­
ary report was from a Walter Roesner who informed a Gau­
leiter of conditions on the western front. He cited sol­
diers who, even in the presence of known party members, 
openly stated that they did not intend to retreat when 
the Americans came. On the contrary, they were happy 
that for them the battles and privations would soon be 
over. They thought that since the war was already lost, 
the nation's leadership elicited useless sacrifice. There­
fore, when the next occasion presented itself, they would 
either surrender or desert. When party members tried to 
change a man's mind about surrendering at the next oppor­
tunity, it did no good. Defeatists cited the cases of
towns which had been retaken from the Americans in which 
the civilians told the soldiers how decently the Americans 
had treated them; they only laughed at newspaper articles 
about mistreatment of German soldiers in American prison
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 135< Kramer to 
Dr. Naumann, Betrifft: Bericht des Pg. Schonwalder M.d.R.,
March 6 , 19^5i with enclosure: Schonwalder to Reichspro-
pagandaleitung, Abteilung Aktive Propaganda, February 1?,
1945.
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camps and called it loathsome propaganda. The narrator 
of this tale blamed soldiers from Austria and the eastern 
part of Upper-Silesia for all the defeatist talk since 
they were not defending their immediate homeland.
No doubt the bad supply conditions were responsible 
for the defeatism that was permeating the German army, but 
Roesner, although he described these conditions, failed to 
link the two together. With the infantry soldier it was 
especially bad. There was no leather to repair worn out 
boots while everywhere hides of cattle and horses laid 
around. The medics had few resorts, not even for rashes 
and diarrhea. Therefore, whoever was sick could not 
count on treatment in his unit; he went at once into the 
hospital. On the other hand, many wounded men died be­
cause means of transportation failed; they had to be car­
ried by hand or horse litter for hours through snowstorms 
and bitterly cold weather to the receiving station or hos­
pital. Soldiers seemed to have given up. It presented a 
similar picture, he claimed, to the earlier retreat in 
Normandy--weapons, ammunition, rocket launchers, articles 
of clothing, and other equipment were strewn along road­
side ditches and in the forests > hile no one seemed to care 
or interfered. To make it worse, rifles, carbines, and ma­
chine guns were often in a desperate condition because of 
rust and dirt. The fuel situation was also very bad. One 
artillery battery with five guns and four tractors had no
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fuel at all. Repeatedly, when ordered to fall back units 
had to blow up guns and tractors; sometimes, but only with 
great difficulty, they could be saved by using horses and 
manpower to move them. One time the guns could only be 
secured from capture by the pressing enemy with carbines 
since there was no artillery ammunition available. Entire 
regiments with tanks and guns of all kinds stood on access 
roads without fuel. Tankers often had to shoot up what 
ammunition they had and then blow up the tanks because 
they could not be moved. At the same time "many, much 
too many" automobiles were driving around. As for the 
horses, they had not had sufficient fodder for weeks, and 
they perished daily from exhaustion. The civilian popula­
tion parted with nothing, and their supplies had already 
dried up completely.
There was also a systematic hue and cry against 
the SS. After some SS men had been billeted in Hammerhutte 
bei/Rodtkyll, some silver spoons had come up missing in the 
town. Another time the SS came in the middle of the night, 
and since a young boy had not answered the door immediately, 
they had severely reviled him and threatened to blow his 
brains out. The inhabitants of one community complained 
that their village, which was 70-80 per cent destroyed, had 
been bombed because of the SS. The Black Order troops had 
had a radio station there and had shot at low flying air­
planes; in retaliation the airplanes had bombed and strafed
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the town. As it burned, the SS men disappeared instead 
of helping the people save their furniture and belong­
ings. The incitement of soldiers against Himmler's men
was open, and many common soldiers refused to occupy
37quarters on the same premises with them. Despite all 
this the nazis expected the NSFOs to instill a will to 
fight in the German soldiers.
Consequently, in February 19^5 NSF/OKH called for 
"Revolution against Revolution." NSFOs pointed out to the 
troops that German armies in late spring 1941 had driven 
as close to Moscow as the end-station of the streetcar 
network and that Russian soldiers had learned from this 
experience, thanks to German soldiers, that the signifi­
cance of Moscow to the Russian was as strong as Berlin for 
the German. Germans must defend Berlin as obstinately as 
the Russians defended Moscow, said the NSFOs. They made 
clear to German soldiers that the U.S.S.R. did not con­
duct war, but revolution, and they cited the bolshevist 
"will," together with the Russian masses and huge quanti­
ties of materiel, as the reason for the Soviet successes. 
Noting that in 1940 Germany had eliminated the bourgeois 
armies of the western continental powers from the war, the 
NSFOs declared that only a people who had undergone a rev­
olution of their own could withstand the bolshevist assault;
37Ibid., Abschrift, Walter Roesner to "Lieber Gau­
leiter," February 7, 1945.
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without the nazi revolution, Germany would have long ago 
succumbed. Against the enemy masses, they continued, Ger­
many had mobilized millions of German civilians into the 
Volkssturm where they would sacrifice their lives as neces­
sary to halt the surging force of bolshevism. German in­
dustry, the NSFOs preached, would win over Soviet materiel 
because of the German creative spirit and superior culture. 
Summoning the entire force of nazism to battle against the 
revolutionary will of the enemy, the NSFOs called for the 
spirit of the barricades and declared that the nazi revo­
lution had arisen out of the highest value of the Teutonic 
race. Even in the darkest days, the nazis expected that 
perpetually new forces would always arise from nazism and 
that only the side which felt its obligations the deepest
, , . 3 8would survive.
From this call to revolution it is difficult to 
prove whether the party was pursuing Rohm's goal of trans­
lating nazi ideology into practice (concerning the SA 
Chief's attempt in 1934 to make the brownshirts the core 
of a national socialist people's army) or whether Hitler's 
actions signified a desperate attempt to stave off defeat. 
His statement after the SA purge about masking the continu­
ation of the revolution suggests the former, but Hitler's 
words cannot be trusted fully. The call to revolution may 
have represented either a logical result of the nazi
^®NAM, T79, Roll 80, Frames 57O-71.
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thinking or an opportunistic move to galvanize all Germans 
to the defense of the fatherland, or both. It may have 
been a Hitlerian smokescreen when he allegedly told party 
intimates in 1940 that his goal was a revolutionary army, 
but he made decided moves in that direction when he saw 
his nazi Reich directly threatened by invasion. On the 
other hand every move by Hitler--strong efforts to nazify 
the army, contempt for military tradition, creation of the 
Waffen-SS, establishment of para-military forces, and the 
institution of the NSFO--could signify his constant ideo­
logical adherence to Rohm's goals of 1934. Needing the 
support of professional generals, the Führer may have 
merely denounced Rohm's ideas to them while intending to 
move step by step toward achieving the dead SA Chief's 
fancies as the situation allowed. As his power grew 
steadily stronger against weakening but still significant 
resistance, he may have used each opportunity to move 
closer to an ideological goal, but he may also have been 
trying to simply increase his personal power and place the 
German nation more firmly in his grasp. Furthermore, by 
this time Himmler's power over much of the army, over the 
German people, and in his Waffen-SS had nearly reached its 
zenith. Thus, more party control over the army through 
the NSFO to balance off Himmler and Bormann fit neatly into 
the Hitlerian method. Seen in ideological context and as a 
part of an overall goal of a revolutionary army, the NSFO
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presents a problem. But not knowing the true intent of 
the nazi Führer, these questions cannot be answered con­
clusively except to state that Hitler did make his moves 
at appropriate times and that they did fit into the nazi 
ideological pattern. They were definitely opportunistic 
in the midst of a desperate situation, but they did not 
necessarily oppose the so-called nazi ideology. In any 
event, the call to revolution continued, but as far as 
good nazis were concerned, the propaganda hardly helped.
During the evening of February 27, 19^5i Lance 
Corporal Helmuth Vogel, 9th Panzer Division, appeared in 
Section IIW of the Party Chancellery to talk to Party 
Member Stosch. He told Stosch that his commander, Haupt­
mann Michelsen, had expressly ordered him to report to 
concerned offices in Berlin on his experiences and impres­
sions regarding the western front. His commander held the 
view that reports through channels had no purpose since 
they did not arrive in the proper hands, and the troops 
often feared that Hitler did not really know what was 
going on. Therefore, Vogel had been commissioned to pro­
cure indoctrination material published by the Propaganda 
Ministry and at the same time take advantage of the situ­
ation by pouring out his heart directly to the P-K.
The political leadership of the troops, Vogel told 
Stosch, was still deficient. The unit commanders were 
willing and did their best to instruct the troops concern­
ing current events, but they lacked guidance material, and
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the NSFO so far had not been very noticeable. Vogel felt 
that superiors and staff officers often seriously hindered 
the NSFOs; their ranks were too weak and they needed 
stronger and fuller powers to offset this command and staff 
resistance. Here and there the Wehrmacht Report was posted, 
but most of them were pretty old. Newspapers and mail ar­
rived after a three or four month delay, and soldiers re­
ceived moderate amounts of news only through rumors, enemy 
broadcasts, and enemy propaganda leaflets. Vogel felt that 
there was not enough done to contradict or confront the de­
structive attempts of the enemy or various "Schweinehunde" 
(dirty dogs) soldiers who had no character. With a typical 
combat soldier's attitude toward troops in the rear, he 
thought most of the Schweinehunde were behind the lines.
The rear areas were especially shaky, Vogel said. 
Combat units wanted to fight even if they knew that the 
enemy had superiority, but they expected draconian meas­
ures against every shirker in the rear. Allegedly, staffs 
were too concerned with their own comfort and were thereby 
derelict in troop leadership. It was mainly in the rear 
areas, he claimed, where defeatist remarks were heard. 
Behind the front, Vogel claimed, soldiers ran around by 
the hundreds from one place to another and avoided doing 
their jobs all day long without any fear of punishment. 
Moreover, offices in the rear were over-manned. As an 
example, this combat soldier cited a newly organized
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front-line company ■which only had an aggregate strength 
of 120 men while the supply company in the same organiza­
tion had 180. The people in the rear often considered 
combat as none of their affair, he said, and their prema­
ture flight to the rear was the rule when enemy break­
throughs occurred. Vogel thought it was necessary to set 
up groups of enthusiastic nazis behind the front with 
powers of police intervention to control the rear area.
At this point Stosch informed him that such units were 
already active in the east and as a precaution they were 
being established in the west. (This, of course, was in 
reference to Sondereinsatz.)
Vogel added that the common soldier often felt 
that his officers could no longer think clearly; this 
feeling had arisen because of the apparent lack of plan­
ning on their part and the chaos which resulted. As an 
example Vogel cited traffic plans--two parallel roads 
which were close together each had two way traffic, and 
the resulting congestion presented a field day for enemy 
fighter bombers. The establishment of one-way traffic, 
he said, could have improved the situation immeasurably. 
Further, entirely too many automobiles scurried here and 
yon behind the front, and the common soldier failed to 
understand why these cars could run around in abundance 
while a tank had to be blown up for lack of fuel. Obvi­
ously Vogel aimed most of these charges at the officer
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corps, and he also reported on the officer-enlisted man 
relationship.
Although the soldiers at the front normally felt 
very close to their officers, Vogel said, the troops never­
theless believed that the officer corps still had forces 
at hand which sabotaged many things. The most often heard 
remark was that the "20th of July" had not yet been over­
come. As one possible solution to this problem, Vogel 
recommended that convinced nazis, regardless of age or 
rank, must quickly assume important positions of leader­
ship because the lack of confidence between troops and 
officers had resulted in a breakdown of the reporting and 
grievance system. The common soldiers, however, were re­
signed to the situation; they reported nothing and consid­
ered that anyone who did was stupid. Another possibility 
which common soldiers often posed was for Himmler to take 
over the army entirely; it would be the most reasonable 
solution, Vogel said. Despite these problems, however, 
he reported that the spirit of the combat troops was gen­
erally good. On the plus side, they had no fear of the 
Americans and of their material superiority. On the other 
hand, however, they were concerned over the air attacks on 
the homeland, and this distress over the welfare of their 
families burdened their fighting value. The troops also 
felt that replacements, many of whom had never even mas­
tered the carbine, went into battle too soon. Thus, high
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39losses occurred. Although Vogel's comments revealed a 
strong element of pessimism, they also contained traces 
of optimism. Most devoted nazis during this critical 
period shared these mixed emotions, and it was the trace 
of optimism which spurred the search for ideas.
Vain efforts to improve the NSFO program and stir 
the soldiers continued. As part of the effort to improve 
the status of the NSFO, Ruder informed Bormann on March 1, 
1943, that he had induced the three service NSF Staffs to 
issue appropriate regulations requiring commanders to 
bring their NSFOs to political consultations and confer-
4oences. That same month the Army Personnel Office fi­
nally directed that the Sub-office positions at regimental
4llevel would henceforth be Main office positions. These 
were certainly weak measures, but on March l4, one week 
after the Americans had breeched the Rhine at Remagen, at 
a time when the Russian army fought only forty miles from 
Berlin, and eight months after Hitler's demand for a sep­
arate NSFO reporting channel, the Führer finally published 
a watered down version of the Führer Order which Reinecke
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 133, Aktenvermerk, 
Betrifft: Mundlicher Bericht des Gefreiten Helmuth Vogel,
9 . Pz. Div, Feldpost nummer I998OA, March 2, 1943, IIW, 
signed: Stosch.
^*^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. l40, Vorlage,
March 1, 1943, IIF, signed; Ruder.
^^NAM, T84, Roll 139, Frame 1323929.
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had ensnarled in red tape by sending it to commanders-in­
chief for comment.
The tone of Hitler's decree showed the desperate 
determination of the nazi leader, but it also revealed 
that perhaps his control of events had slipped. Proclaim­
ing that tactical expertise no longer stood as the most 
important duty of troop leaders, Hitler made commanders 
directly responsible to him for "the political activation 
and fanaticization of the troops." Furthermore, he 
stressed that the NSFO shared this responsibility and or­
dered the NSFO to be the tactical assistant to the troop 
leader. This indeed opened new horizons for the NSFO-- 
up to this time he had only concerned himself with ideol­
ogy and inducing a will to fight. In addition. Hitler 
struck a heavy blow at the traditional staff structure. 
With this one order he practically destroyed one of the 
traditional staff responsibilities since heretofore the 
Ia--not the NSFO— had advised his commander on tactical 
affairs. Hitler may have seen that it was too late for 
tactics; perhaps faith in ideology, or himself, could now 
save the Reich. Previously the Führer had declared that 
the nazi Weltanschauung was a^ important as tactics, but 
he now pronounced it all important. Pure necessity now 
appeared to stimulate Hitler, but his order also showed 
the results of the confusion which Reinecke and Hengl had 
managed to give it. If any NSFO knew exactly what to do
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on receipt of this order, he must have been clairvoyant. 
Hitler declared that "there is no special national so­
cialist leadership channel of communication"; however, 
he also ordered the NSFO to forward a monthly written 
activity report to his own troop leader and to furnish 
copies to both the NSFO of the next higher headquarters 
and to the Chief of NSF/OKH. Thus, in defining the re­
porting system. Hitler in fact affirmed the existence 
of a special NSF channel while simultaneously denying 
it. Although the Führer claimed the NSFO still re­
mained subordinate to the troop leader, he now announced 
that the NSFO shared equally in any ideological criti­
cism leveled at the troop commander. At this late date 
Hitler himself admitted the lack of qualification of 
many NSFOs when he found it necessary to say again that 
only fighting, fanatical nazis could work successfully 
as NSFOs and since he directed the replacement of those 
who did not fill these conditions. This order showed 
that even the Führer of Germany either could not or 
would not convert the NSFO into a Politruk, but the 
party saw it as a step forward anyway.
Although Hitler's order caused confusion, at least 
some people in the P-K saw its potentialities. Party Mem­
ber Derr told Party Member Herrmann that at least the order 
left open "the possibility" for an independent reporting 
system. The eventuality stood so near that Derr believed
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the NSFO no longer had to take part in mixed commissions; 
if NSFOs still continued to attend the deliberations of 
these commissions, it would be only to ensure that griev-
42ances they had already reported would not be ignored.
By early March it appeared that mutual trust be­
tween the party leadership and the Wehrmacht had deterio­
rated because of party "gossip about sabotage and failures, 
etc." in the armed forces. General Reinecke sent a pro­
posed regulation to the P-K work staff which was intended 
to fortify party-Wehrmacht trust in each other. Both Fried­
richs and Ruder thought that Reinecke's wording was too 
negative, but they conceded that a joint regulation, signed 
by Bormann and Keitel, might improve party-armed forces re-
43
lations. Whether the joint regulation ever saw the light 
of day is unknown to the author, but within this atmosphere 
of mistrust ideas continued to pour forth.
Goebbel's representative on the P-K work staff,
Dr. Rugheimer, thought of a new way to use the NSFO. On 
March 17 he recommended to First Lieutenant Noack, also 
working in the P-K, that division NSFOs might get soldiers 
who were condemned to face a firing squad to volunteer for
^2 • •BAK, Sammlung Schumacher 367, Vermerk fur Pg.
Herrmann, III STK, Betrifft: Uberprufung der Wehrmacht,
Waffen-SS und Polizei; Beteiligung der NSFO an den ge-
mischten Kommissionen, March 26, 1945, IIF, signed:
Ruder.
4 3Ibid., Vorlage, March 7, 1945, IIF, signed:
Dotzler.
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suicide units. Referring to death sentences for desertion, 
cowardice, and pillage, he said men were shot without their 
deaths meaning anything. He believed that some of these 
men might be allowed to salvage their honor, but not their 
lives. Relatives of executed traitors usually received no 
welfare payments, and sometimes, "within limits," they were 
subject to the extremes of family responsibility for the 
traitorous deed. The division NSFO should talk to such 
men, Rugheimer urged, and pointing out these facts, he 
should try to discover whether a condemned man had a "good 
heart." Nordic men were destined to be doers of violence, 
he said, but a good heart was often present, and only 
through lack of discipline could it be "blocked up." In 
view of this metaphysical nonsense, Rugheimer philosophied 
that at least to some extent the tenderhearted and the milk 
sops could be led back to what remained of their "manly at­
titude" if they were at all susceptible to values and eth­
ical demands. The NSFO could try to call forth positive 
expressions from the past lives of these condemned men and 
could suggest that they volunteer for "Self-sacrifice Units" 
(Selbstaufopferungs-Einheiten). The NSFO could make it 
very clear that each man so honored would serve his family 
through a last respectable deed and that he could thus se-
kkcure for himself a creditable memory. Again, the further
^^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 135i Dr. Rugheimer, 
Der Beauftragte von Reichsleiter Dr. Goebbels im Arbeitsstab
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history of this suggestion is unknown to the author, but 
not all ideas during this period were like Rugheimer's.
The files of the P-K, dating from February 19^5, actually 
bulge with the many criticisms of the lack of spirit, dis­
cipline, and the will to fight of the German soldiers as
well as remedies recorded in reports to the P-K from both
45soldiers and officials of the party. There is little 
doubt that these reports were an indication of what was 
brewing in the P-K at that time.
fur NS-Fuhrungsoffiziere, to Oberleutnant Noack, Partei- 
Kanzlei, Betrifft: Feldpostbrief, March 1?, 1945» with 
enclosure: Aktennotiz from Rugheimer to Pg. Kramer,
Betrifft: Einsatz von zum Tode verurteilten Soldaten.
45See the other documents in BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, 
NS6 vorl. 135-
CHAPTER XI 
TOWARD A PARTY TAKEOVER
Reinecke Discredited 
An April 4, 1945, note from Pnrty Member Uurgol 
to Party Member Walkenhorst revealed either the coul'uslon 
which existed within party circles or else uffirmed that 
Bormann normally kept his own counsel; portions of the 
note reflected rumor, but some of it was true. Hurgel 
stated that Party Member Plumb had informed him that a 
planned takeover of the NSF program by the Party Cliau- 
cellery could not succeed because of strong "counter cur­
rents" in the Führer's headquarters. Willy Ruder, he 
said, had told him about the planned change, and he 
pleaded with Walkenhorst to try to resume the broken-ofI' 
negotiations with Bormann because of the emo t ionai status 
of the troops. He believed that soldiers, if correctly 
addressed, would readily give their lives, but if tfiey 
knew their commanders were politically unreliable or in­
adequate, they would not sacrifice themselves. He said 
he had observed the work of NSFOs at every level and noted 
that it unnerved him when he saw how little authority and
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means the political officers had to do their jobs. It had 
shocked him to observe that an NSFO of a field army had to 
wait in an anteroom to see his commander on even the most 
minor things. If an entirely different method for acti­
vating political work in the Wehrmacht could not be found, 
Biirgel expected only the most meager results for the fu­
ture. There had never been a better time than the present, 
he said, to introduce fanatical nazis into the armed forces 
with full powers to capture the troops from all opposition 
and to "produce fighters again." He stressed that nazifi- 
cation of the troops should become stronger as the burden 
at the front became greater. Daily examples existed,
Burgel wrote, where qualified men modestly assumed lead­
ership and achieved what others thought impossible. As an 
example of the effects of stirring words, he cited the case 
of Kreisleiter (County Leader) Schulte who had addressed 
five hundred civilians on Easter Sunday; as a result of the 
"rousing words," all five hundred voluntarily joined the 
Freikorps Adolf Hitler (a volunteer unit of the Volkssturm). 
The correctly spoken word at the right moment, he said, 
could arouse the weakest man. In closing, Burgel urged 
Walkenhorst to tell Bormann about the thoughts in his let­
ter and to take every measure to subordinate the NSF Staff 
to the party since only the party could decisively carry 
on NSF work.^
^Waldemar Besson, "Zur Geschichte des National- 
sozialistischen Ftihrungs Offiziers (NSFO)," Viertel.jahrshefte
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Burgel had many of the facts right, but he also 
had an erroneous view of the course of events. The ac­
tual story is confusing and complicated even in the minds 
of the participants. To fully understand what really 
happened, an insight into Bormann's state of mind is 
helpful. On January 28, 194$, he wrote his wife that he 
was disturbed over the signs of disintegration of the 
eastern front. On February 4 he complained about the 
material superiority of the Soviet forces against which
3
even the strongest resistance was powerless. And on Feb­
ruary l8 he admitted to a feeling of desperation because
the German soldiers no longer held their ground against
4
the enemy as they could and should. These remarks to his 
wife picture a man who felt a frustrating combination of 
desperation and hope, along with the determination to win. 
This was a man dealing with a situation which he hoped to
fur Zeitgeschichte, doc. no. 15 (January I96I), pp. 115- 
16. WalterGoerlitz in History of the German General 
Staff, 1657-1945, trans. Brian Battershaw (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1953), p. 493, claimed 
that in the final days of the war. Hitler decided to re­
place the NSFO by a new organization under Bormann as 
"the triumph of ideology rising out of the ruins of the 
Army." He further claimed that on March 15, 1945, Hitler 
dissolved the NSF organization and created the new party 
organization. Neither Burgel nor Goerlitz knew the real 
story.
2
H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed.. The Bormann Letters.
The Private Correspondence Between Martin Bormann and His 
Wife from January 1943 to April 1945, trans. rT hT Stevens 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954), p. I63.
^Ibid., p. 170. ^Ibid., p. l84.
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be able to change in spite of all the odds but who would 
resign himself to helplessness when he saw that the game 
was indeed over. Here.is the way it happened.
On February l6 , 19^5 Ruder wrote a long memorandum 
to Bormann. He reported that the NSF Staff of the Wehr­
macht had done nothing since the beginning of the Soviet 
offensive to take measures to activate the troops and to 
raise their resolution and morale. He believed that Rein­
ecke 's staff thought only of getting out of Berlin (to 
Weimar) and that it was making preparations to do just 
that; instead they should work up a political and tactical 
plan in which NSF would hold a central place. Ruder placed 
the fault squarely on General Reinecke; because he lacked 
experience in the last war and because he was too inflex­
ible, the NSF work had "not grown." Reinecke had not met 
with the Führer, he told Bormann, since August 1944, and 
he simply could not understand how a man responsible for 
the political activation of the troops could do his job 
without speaking to Hitler for months on end. Furthermore, 
since taking over the job, the general had "not one single 
time" called the chiefs of the service NSF Staffs together 
to speak to them about their duties, nor had he supervised 
the uniformity of the work of the three services as re­
quired by Hitler's order of December 22, 1943- Because of 
Reinecke's failures. Ruder felt it was time to deal a "fi­
nal blow" to the NSF Staff/OKW and its chief. In solving
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the problem, however, a decision had to be made concern­
ing who would replace Reinecke and what changes would be 
necessary to improve the situation. He saw several 
possibilities.
Himmler could take over as Chief of the NSF Staff 
of the Armed Forces. One advantage to this solution,
Ruder thought, would be that a well-known nazi personality 
would stand at the pinnacle of the NSF system. The SS 
Chief already commanded the Replacement Army and the 
VoIksgrenadier divisions (the Volkssturm) whose numbers 
grew daily; thus he already had an ideological influence 
over an important part of the army. Also, his personality 
was strong enough to "guarantee" uniformity of political 
training in the Wehrmacht even in the face of navy and air 
force opposition. Ruder also saw a disadvantage. If per­
chance the Reichsführer SS should delegate these duties to 
an SS Obergruppenfuhrer, Berger for instance, the NSF work 
might deteriorate instead of improve. The Chief of the 
P-K work staff had little use for the manner in which ide­
ological training in the SS was conducted; he thought that 
if the armed forces handled NSFO work like it was done in 
the Waffen-SS's VI Sections (Section VI in Waffen-SS units 
was the SS equivalent of the NSFO section in the armed 
forces), the influence of the NSFO would decrease. Even 
if "the entire force of the party and the experiences of 
the Wehrmacht in political leadership were exploited.
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undoubtedly the work would be set back." He had observed 
many Waffen-SS leaders, Ruder declared, who did not show 
any great understanding for the political leadership of 
troops, and often they had no appreciation for the situa­
tion in the Wehrmacht. If Himmler should become chief of 
the NSF Staff of the Armed Forces, he would have to act 
in his capacity as a party leader rather than as SS Chief 
and work in close cooperation with the Leader of the P-K. 
Further, if Himmler wanted to delegate the duties, Bor­
mann should have a veto over the appointment of any of 
Himmler's assistants. In any event, the P-K would have 
to assign a liaison man to the SS Chief. Almost as an 
afterthought. Ruder listed one other advantage to this 
solution. Himmler had ordered a great number of "techni­
cal measures" in the SS unit "Kurt Eggers" which, when 
joined with the NSFO system, might prove advantageous.
(He failed to specify the measures.)
Ruder saw the second possible choice as a revolu­
tionary one which would have to have a "positive founda­
tion." In this solution, the Führer could charge Bormann 
himself with the supervision of the political activation 
of the Wehrmacht, and the P-K Chief could then exercise 
his power through an amenable general. This solution had 
a special advantage, he theorized, in that the party would 
"finally" have a direct hand in the political training of 
the armed forces. The front man would be duty-bound to
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follow Bormann's instructions in order to ensure the 
party's control, and the big NSF Staff in OKW could dis­
appear. Ruder recommended General von Hauenschild for 
the job. Hauenschild had shown special qualifications 
for political training and leadership tasks as an armored 
troops commander in combat and wore many high decorations; 
also he was sufficiently well-known to assert himslf in 
the job. Ruder failed to specify an obvious disadvantage 
to this solution. The Wehrmacht as well as high party 
leaders, such as Himmler, feared such a solution; Hauen­
schild, under the recommended conditions, would have ap­
peared as nothing more than a super Politruk. It is no 
wonder that Ruder termed it a revolutionary solution.
The third solution was even more revolutionary, yet Ruder 
did not label it such and gave it the least space of any 
of his recommendations. Maybe this was why Bormann liked 
it.
The third solution was simple--the NSF Staff would 
be axed, and Bormann himself would issue orders directly 
to the three service NSF Staffs. Ruder preferred this al­
ternative "to retaining the [existing system] since the 
NSF Staff in its present make-up only burdens the NS Lead­
ership work." In order to eliminate discussion over basic 
questions between the Wehrmacht Leadership Staff and the 
three services, Bormann could offer suggestions directly 
to Hitler for decision, and then the Führer could issue
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his orders directly to the three service NS Leadership 
Staffs. Now Hitler was to be Bormann's front man!
The next solution was simply to fire Reinecke, 
but Ruder could not think of any suitable general to re­
place him. He preferred Hengl by far over Reinecke;
Hengl was a good man, well thought of by NSFOs, and he 
worked well with the party. But he was not politically 
oriented. Hauenschild also cooperated with the party, 
but even he would assign a definite limit to the NSFO's 
activities. It seems that even those generals who co­
operated best with the party placed a limit on party in­
fluence in the military realm.
Of the several solutions Ruder recommended the 
second--the so-called revolutionary one--since it pro­
vided the basis for the greatest party influence. In 
the event Bormann did not care for this suggestion, then 
his second choice was the appointment of Himmler, pro­
vided the continuing influence of the P-K was guaranteed.^ 
The next day Ruder talked to Bormann about the recommenda­
tions. Bormann told him that Reinecke could no longer re­
tain his present job, and Hitler refused to give Himmler 
any more additional duties. Hauenschild was out--he was 
needed for the defense of Berlin--so the P-K had to for­
mulate a plan and discuss the idea of direct contact
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. l40, Vorlage, 
Betrifft: NS-Fuhrungsstab der Wehrmacht, February l6,
19451 IIF, signed: Ruder.
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between the P-K and the service NSF Staffs with General 
Burgdorf of the Army Personnel Office. The P-K Leader 
approved the concept of strengthening and improving the 
status of the NSFO, and this too should be discussed 
with Burgdorf. In any event, Bormann declared that he 
did not intend to renounce political power in favor of 
the Wehrmacht.^  This left only two possible solutions; 
Bormann would take over himself, or he would find a new 
general. Considering Ruder's ideas on the latter solu­
tion, the former loomed as the most probable. How to do 
it was another problem. Ruder put his staff to work, and 
on February 20, he submitted his ideas to Bormann.
Again Ruder blamed the Chief of NSF of the Wehr­
macht for everything and declared that Reinecke's unclear 
instructions had in great measure hindered the uniform 
structure of the three services. The armed forces needed 
a shake-up. Ruder said, to include the establishment of 
clearer authority. At the same time, the party's methods 
in dealing with the military had to change. In the past 
the P-K had made only suggestions or requests. This was 
not good enough for Ruder; the party had to have a decid­
ing influence and should instruct the armed forces on 
matters of political leadership and training. In ques­
tions of basic politics, the party had to retain the
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. l44, Aktenvermerk, 
Betrifft: Vortrag bei Reichsleiter Bormann (am 17.2 [hand­
written]), February 19, 1945, signed: Ruder.
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right of decision. It seemed also that the days of de­
nouncing the NSF Staff of OKH were over, and it was now 
OKW's turn to receive the P-K's ire. Ruder, who had 
strongly criticized members of the NSF Staff/OKH in the 
past, now believed that the army had gone much further 
in its NSF work than either the navy or the air force.
The reason for this, he said, was because the army's NSF 
Chief answered directly to Hitler, and he suggested the 
same arrangement for the other two services so Bormann 
could give orders and instructions to all the service 
NSF Chiefs in the name of the Führer. To help Bormann, 
Ruder recommended the establishment of a new NSF Staff 
of the Wehrmacht directly under the Leader of the Party 
Chancellery. In such an event, Keitel would have to act 
as the prime mover in dismantling the present staff in 
OKW since he would have to decide what should be done 
with the General Armed Forces Office, a part of the NSF 
Staff. It should remain as part of OKW, and Ruder sug­
gested that Reinecke's Domestic Section (Amtsgruppe 
Inland) should again fall under its jurisdiction. In the 
event that Bormann approved of his suggestions. Ruder en­
closed a draft Fuhrer Order which incorporated his ideas 
on the new staff and its relationship with the three NSF 
service staffs.
Ruder's first draft of a Führer Order would have: 
a) placed the Chiefs of the service NSF Staffs directly
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under Hitler who would personally give orders on political- 
ideological leadership and training; b) empowered Bormann, 
after consultation with the Commanders-in-chief of each 
service, to issue instructions and orders for "political 
activation and the building of an NS will" to the Chiefs 
of the NS Leadership Staffs; c) authorized Bormann to 
establish his own NSF Staff to carry out these measures; 
and d) directed Bormann to issue regulations to carry out 
the program.^
The next day Ruder became confused. Several ver­
sions of draft Führer Orders were circulating, and Hitler 
had approved one of them, at least in concept. On Febru­
ary 21 Ruder forwarded a draft order to General Burgdorf 
which he stated was the last concept known to him; he 
asked the general to let him know what changes had been
8made to it and which final draft the Führer had approved. 
Within two days Burgdorf clarified things; the Army Per­
sonnel Chief concurred in the draft originally proposed
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. l40, Vorlage, 
Betrifft: Nationalsozialistische Fuhrung in der Wehr­
macht, February 20, 1943, IIF, signed: Ruder, with en­
closure: Entwurf eines Fuhrerbefehls. This document is
also in NS6 vorl. l44. Another loose draft followed the 
document in NS6 vorl. l44 of the P-K records. It left 
out the words "after consultation with the Commanders- 
in-Chief," and it stated that the P-K Leader would util­
ize the NSF Staff of OKW. A question mark which looked 
like it was made by Ruder's pen and in his handwriting 
followed the latter statement. One can surmise, there­
fore, that Ruder was not too sure of how the takeover 
should be done, 
o
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. l44. Ruder to
Burgdorf, February 21, 1945.
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by Ruder and approved by Bormann. Now the work staff chief 
recommended that Bormann and Burgdorf should meet with 
Donitz and Goring to clear up the part about the status of 
the navy and air force Commanders-in-Chief. Ruder thought 
that the concurrence by the service leaders for the NSF 
Chiefs to report directly to Hitler only involved "a vote 
of confidence between party and Wehrmacht." Then came 
some more clarification. Burgdorf had given Ruder the 
draft of an entirely different Führer Order which con­
cerned an entirely different idea regarding the political 
activation and status of NSFOs. Its original source was 
not explained, but this was the one which had been pre­
sented to Hitler and approved by him. Himmler had also 
concurred, but it could not be published, Burgdorf pro­
nounced, because General Reinecke had not participated in 
the meeting in which the decision was reached. The word­
ing of this order. Ruder told Bormann, was designed so as 
not to make the NSFO appear as a commissar, and the full 
responsibility of the commander remained fully preserved, 
even for political leadership. However, this order con­
tained points which Bormann had previously wanted: the
NSFO would "participate" in pronouncing judgment on the 
suitability of individuals for their jobs, and he would 
have a direct line to the NSF Staff of his service; also 
each soldier would have the right to report grievances to 
the NSFO if he found "no appreciation" from his unit leader.
330
Ruder asked Bormann to approve of this new NSFO Führer 
Order and at his next meeting with Hitler to obtain a 
decision on the originally proposed order for the dis­
solution of Reinecke's staff. Burgdorf had already in-
9
formed Keitel of the proposal, he reported. At this 
point a slight divergence from the P-K is necessary in 
an attempt to track down both the seed and the harvest 
of the elusive NSFO Führer Order.
A possible source for the order was the Unrecon­
structed Nazi referred to in Chapter IX. He claimed that 
once in 1944 he spoke before an audience of some 100 high 
officers of different branches of the armed services, SS 
and police officials, and diplomats on the need for vari­
ous sectors of the government and the military to work 
closely together so as not to hinder each other from reach­
ing a common goal. Because of its import, at the end of 
the year his commander directed him to deliver the same 
speech to the NSF Staff of OKH. On that occasion he held
a conversation with a highly decorated colonel in which
• »
he declared that, because of the dire war situation, the 
NSFO should be granted powers to remove unfit individuals 
of all ranks from their jobs. He claimed that the colonel 
reported this to General Reinecke who in turn relayed the
9Ibid., Vorlage, Betrifft: Entwurf eines Fuhrer-
befehls, February 23, 1945 (IIF-Ru/Tp. 82/459), signed: 
Ruder. Ruder's memorandum to Bormann stated that copies 
of both Führer Orders were enclosed, but the allegedly 
approved NSFO order was not present in the P-K files.
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statement to Hitler. After two days, Reinecke allegedly 
returned and told him that Hitler wanted no commissars in 
the German armed forces--each German officer had to be his 
own Politruk. But some four weeks later, he maintained, 
the Fiihrer approved his proposal.
On being questioned by this author, the former 
NSFO admitted that he had never actually seen the order 
as such, but that he had heard of its approval. Another 
former army officer who definitely disagreed with many of 
the Unreconstructed Nazi's views, especially those about 
his present devotion to the nazi memory, was present at 
the interview; he explained that such situations fre­
quently happened. Published orders, he said, often failed 
to reach the troops; they were either lost in the chaotic 
communications situation, or anti-nazi staff officers en­
sured that the troops would never receive them. The 
former NSFO stated that he himself had on one occasion 
asked for the removal of a company commander, and that 
the request was granted. Upon questioning, however, he 
admitted that this occurred before the publication of the 
alleged order. He also cited NSFO friends of his who had 
done similar things based on the elusive order. Of course, 
there could have been a lapse of memory on the part of the 
former NSFO after twenty-eight years. It could have been 
his interpretation of the confusing order of Hitler's con­
cerning the establishment of a quasi-official NSFO reporting
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channel, or it could have concerned Super NSFOs on "spe­
cial assignment" (Sondereinsatz). Perhaps he had heard 
a rumor that NSFOs might receive special powers and, be­
lieving he had originated the idea, had taken it as fact. 
Or else the elusive order may have been only for his area 
of the war. In any event, he was convinced the order was 
factual. When told about Hitler's order in late 1^44 
which directed that the NSFO henceforth shared responsi­
bility with the unit commander for political leadership, 
he disclaimed any awareness of it. He also denied knowl­
edge of Hitler's order in March 1945 that the NSFO must 
be the tactical assistant of the unit commander; however, 
he believed that such orders could easily have been given 
since it was in character of the times and of Hitler. "I 
did not hear of it myself; it may be that the order did
not get to my office." Concerning these orders, he also
stated that Hitler and Himmler were certainly obeyed "in 
most cases," but that toward the end of the war they were 
not obeyed so much any more since morale diminished with
the continuance of the c o n f l i c t . I f  the story of the
Unreconstructed Nazi is true, he may indeed have been the 
seed, or one of them, for the elusive NSFO Führer Order 
which may have been sabotaged, lost in the communication
Major of Reserves P, a.D., Letters, February 14, 
1973 and March 28, 1973, and interview April l8 , 1973*
The former NSFO also disclaimed knowledge of Hitler's 
infamous Commissar Order for the invasion of Russia.
333
chaos, or carefully removed from all records. The most 
likely answer, however, is that it was a combination of 
sabotage and chaotic conditions which caused the order to 
slip through the cracks of the crumbling nazi structure.
In this chaotic situation one wonders why the dictator 
failed to knock heads together, but Hitler's own condition 
toward the end must receive consideration in connection 
with his failure to assert himself during this latter 
period.
The Führer's Condition 
The physical and emotional condition of Hitler 
during the first half of 19^5 leaves some doubt as to his 
ability to control himself, let alone the events around 
him. On January l6 , 19^5i the Führer returned to Berlin 
where he spent most of his time in a bunker fifty feet 
beneath the Reich Chancellery building--a place in which 
he finally committed suicide. His physical condition was 
deteriorating. In February his head wobbled, his left arm 
was practically useless and his hand trembled considerably; 
he gave the appearance of a senile and completely exhausted 
man.^^ On February 13 the Supreme Commander got into a
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the 
Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 19^0), pt 1109. The description of Hitler 
was given by Captain Gerhardt Boldt who saw Hitler in 
February for the first time. Cited from Gerhardt Boldt,
In The Shelter with Hitler (London: n.p., 1948), chap. 1.
See also Alan Bullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny, Harper
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fierce two-hour argument with Guderian over tne situation
on the Russian front, and the Army Chief of Staff described
12how the Führer lost complete control of himself. In
early April the Führer and Goebbels resorted to horoscopes 
to determine the hour of German victory; one was of Hitler 
drawn up on the day he became Chancellor, and the other 
concerned the Weimar Republic. Both forecasts of the fu­
ture predicted temporary German successes in late April
13and peace in August. On April 22 Hitler blew up at the 
daily military conference, and all surviving witnesses 
testified that he again lost complete control of himself, 
screaming that this was the end--it was all over; he would
14stay in Berlin and meet his fate. That night Keitel and 
Jodi were questioning whether the soldiers would fight for 
Goring if the air force leader should take over direction 
of the Reich. Hitler, showing a remarkable sense of real­
ism, questioned the word "fight" and admitted that little
Torchbooks, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, Pub­
lishers, 1964), p. 767.
12Ibid., p. 1103" Cited from General Heinz 
Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: n.p., I952), p. 343.
See also Bullock, Hitler, p. 773-
13 Ibid., p. 1109. Cited from Count Lutz Schwerin 
von Krosigk, Es geschah in Deutschland (Tubingen: n.p.,
1951), n.p. See also Bullock, Hitler, pp. 78O-8I.
14Ibid., p. 1113" The author stated the confer­
ence took place on April 20 but provided no source. Bul­
lock, in Hitler, p. 783, maintained that this conference 
took place on April 22 and cited as his source Karl Kol- 
ler. Die Letzte Monat (Mannheim: n.p., 1949), p. 3I ,
diary entry of April 23"
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of it remained for G e r m a n y . A t  the time, Himmler thought 
the Führer was finished; the SS Chief claimed that Hitler, 
alternating between long silences and rage, blamed everyone 
for deceiving him.^^
On the other hand, Albert Speer claimed that Hit­
ler's authority in the party itself had waned as early as 
September 1944. The Führer's closest associates, such as 
Bormann and Goebbels, allegedly ignored his authority or 
simply violated his directions whenever they chose to do 
so. The context of Speer's statement was in relation to 
the nation's economy, but if the Führer could be so unin­
terested in such a basic factor of making war, there is a
strong probability that a similar situation existed in
17other areas as well. In the last few weeks of the war, 
Speer noted that the courtesy toward Hitler had slipped 
noticeably. Previously, everyone had risen when the Führer 
entered a room, and they remained standing until the nazi 
chief had sat down. Now they hardly paid him any attention 
at all. They continued talking, often loudly and with no
Ibid., p. 1114. Cited from U.S., Nazi Conspir­
acy and Aggression, 8 vols, and 2 supps. (Washington, D.C 
Government Printing Office, 1946), supp. B, pp. 1275-79- 
See also Bullock, Hitler, p. 784.
^^Ibid., p, 1114. Cited from H. R. Trevor-Roper, 
The Last Days of Hitler (New York: n.p., 1947), PP- 124,
126-27-
17Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs,
trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Avon Books,
1971), P- 507.
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inhibitions; they did not stand, and those under the in­
fluence of alcohol fell asleep in their chairs in the
18presence of the august one.
All accounts of Hitler's last days show his physi­
cal and mental state while living in the unhealthy atmos­
phere of his bunker and tell how he lost complete control 
of events, gave orders to non-existent armies, and how 
former followers flagrantly disobeyed or deserted him.
These few examples show that he probably lost the ability 
to make rational decisions and that he had resigned him­
self to total defeat. In fact Speer maintained that the 
Führer's emotional make-up began to change with the to­
tally unexpected disaster at Stalingrad and that he with­
drew within himself. As disasters continued, he lived 
more and more in a dream world, and without a doubt,
Speer claimed, mental disintegration took place in the 
nazi leader from 1942 to the end. Speer attributed some 
of this deterioration to Dr. Theodor Morell who injected 
vitamins, hormones, minerals, and various matter taken 
from animals, plants, and human excretions into Hitler's 
body. Historians too numerous to mention have also com­
mented on Morell's quack injections. Speer saw Hitler on 
April 22, 19451 and remembered him as a walking dead man,^^
1 o
^°Ibid., p. 597.
19 "Playboy Interview: Albert Speer," Playboy,
June 1971, pp. 96, 168, 190, and I98.
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and the Führer's secretary reported that as early as the
Supreme Leader's return to Berlin in January his conversa-
20tions became entirely self-centered. Considering the 
mass of evidence, Hitler at this time may not have cared 
whether or not the NSFO should ever become a Politruk, or 
he may have considered the question as only a minor detail 
of form. In fact he may not have thought about it at all. 
Many eyewitnesses to the last weeks of Hitler's life have 
testified to his despair, and his suicide reflected the 
ultimate manifestation of human despondency. Such a mind 
could not have made a rational decision concerning any dis­
agreement between the military and the party over the fate 
of the NSFO except in periods of lucidity, which some wit­
nesses claimed he had. Whether he was able to make a co­
herent decision concerning the proposed Führer Order during 
this period can only be a matter of conjecture since the 
evidence is lacking. At least Bormann would not have dared 
to take over the NSFO Staff even at that late date without 
Hitler's blessing. During this period (beginning March 19)
Hitler believed that the German people fully deserved their 
21fate, and he may not have cared one way or the other about
20Bullock, Hitler, p. 7?6. Cited from A. Zollor, 
Hitler Privât (Düsseldorf: n.p., 1949), pp. 230-31*
21 Ibid., pp. 774-75* Cited from Speer's evidence 
at Nuremberg: The Trial of German Major War Criminals.
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting 
at Nuremberg" 22 parts (London: H.M.S.O., 1946-50),
part XVII, p. 35.
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the NSFO. In the struggle for power, however, neither 
Himmler nor Bormann won. The former fell into lethargy 
when Hitler appointed Grand Admiral Karl Donitz as his 
successor, thus bypassing the SS Chief who had attempted 
to surrender German armies in the west to the British and 
Americans, and Bormann supposedly died in Berlin while on 
his way to join the newly appointed Führer. The game was 
obviously over, and at this late date it made no differ­
ence whether the NSFO was a Politruk or if he even existed 
at all. Nevertheless, the nazis still believed in their 
final victory, and they conducted business as usual right 
up to the end.
What's the Use?
Unaware of efforts by the P-K to abolish the NSF 
Staff of the armed forces, some nazis continued to offer 
suggestions on how to use the NSFO system under OKW's 
leadership to somehow win the war. One of these was a 
Dr. Metzner who served as a civilian official in northern 
Italy. On February 28, 19^5, he wrote Party Member Koch 
complaining about the status of the NSFOs. Metzner, who 
said he had a high opinion of the NSF work, had observed 
that NSFOs, even old party members and active and energetic 
men, could not always make headway against their superiors. 
One reason was that they, as young officers (lieutenant or 
at the most major), were always in a subordinate position 
and that they had to respect their superiors who were
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colonels and generals. Many of these older gentlemen 
were either reactionaries or else they belonged in retire­
ment, he said, and this was why the NSFOs could not make 
any direct headway. He concluded that it was probably a 
mistake when NSFOs were placed under a military superior. 
Metzner thought it might be better to create an independ­
ent organization of NSFOs responsible only to OKW while 
avoiding calling them "Commissars." He suggested that 
perhaps "Peoples' Deputies" (Volksbevollmâchtigter) or 
something similar might be a more appropriate title.
The name was less important to Metzner than the fact 
that the organization would function directly under Hitler 
(specifically OKW) and act independently of all other serv­
ice offices. He commented further that the new organiza­
tion was not needed so much in the frontline where the sol­
diers were splendid as in the communication zone behind the 
front. Finally he asked Koch to present the idea to his 
s u p e r i ors.Meanwhile, the proposed Fiihrer Order which 
would have allowed Bormann to establish his own NSF Staff 
was encountering difficulties.
On the surface, however, the problems appeared 
minor. By March 4 General von Hengl knew about the pro­
posed Führer Order, and he concurred. He only asked for 
it to be toned down somewhat so that Bormann would be
22
BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 135i Minister- 
ialrat Dr. Metzner M.V.--Abteilungschef Mil. Verw.
Gruppe Verona--to Parteigenosse Koch, February 28, 1945.
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authorized to issue Anordnungen instead of Befehle■ (Both
words mean "orders," but the former is considered somewhat 
weaker than the latter.) The next day Ruder pointed out 
to Bormann that the proposed Führer Order contained noth­
ing about the dissolution of Reinecke's staff, but he did 
not think it advisable to mention this in the order since 
those "on the outside" might get the impression that the 
entire NSF program had been axed. Further, because of 
the attitudes of some commanders and even Commanders-in- 
Chief, such an interpretation might have to be faced if 
the dissolution was mentioned. If Hitler approved the 
order. Ruder reasoned, Keitel could then work out an in­
ternal OKW order to disestablish the NSF Staff and espe­
cially to order some of its members to duty in the P-K.
He therefore pressed Bormann for an early decision to 
abolish Reinecke's staff since it constantly hampered 
the NSF work.^^
By March 10, the order appeared to be running into 
a few more difficulties, so Ruder recommended some changes. 
He suggested that the navy and air force NSF Chiefs should 
remain under their Commanders-in-Chief. If the party re­
tained influence in other points, this concession would 
not be too important. The offsetting factor was that the 
NSF work in all three services would have to result in full
2 3BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. l44, Vorlage,
Betrifft: Entwurf eines Fuhrerbefehls, March 3 , 1945,
IIF, signed: Ruder.
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conformity with the principles handed down by the party 
leadership. Ruder did not believe that Admiral Donitz, 
for example, would object to these two changes since he 
was ready to acknowledge the subordination of the service
24Commanders-in-Chief to the party, at least in principle. 
These changes seemed to put Ruder at ease because two days 
later, he told one of his co-workers. Party Member Walken- 
horst, that Bormann and General Burgdorf would present the 
proposed Fiihrer Order to Hitler within the next few days. 
Confidently, he asked Walkenhorst for his support in ob­
taining Major Hess, Lieutenant Ihlert, and Party Members 
Griesmayr and Noack for the new P-K NSFO s t a f f . T o  Ruder, 
the little skirmish appeared over.
Walter Goerlitz, in his study of the German General 
Staff, claimed that on March 15, 1945, the NSFO organiza­
tion was dissolved and that its reconstitution was en­
trusted to B o r m a n n . H o w e v e r ,  Goerlitz was mistaken and 
Ruder's confidence was misplaced. On that day the Führer 
Order was still in draft form. On March l4 Keitel had met 
with Bormann in the Reich Chancellery where they had de­
cided to lift the lid of secrecy somewhat and finally 
notify Reinecke of the impending dissolution of his staff
^^Ibid., Vorlage, March 10, 1945, IIF, signed:
Ruder.
^^Ibid., Ruder to Walkenhorst, March 12, 1945. 
^^Goerlitz, German General Staff, p. 493-
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and his position as chief of that staff. On March l6 
Keitel notified Bormann that he had told Reinecke who 
already knew about it; Ruder had informed him. The Field 
Marshal said that Reinecke was too good a nazi to see the 
loss of his position as anything but a necessity arising 
from circumstances and added that Reinecke was ready to 
talk to Bormann about arranging for the transfer of his 
officers to the P-K. Keitel, unlike Ruder and Bormann, 
belatedly rallied to Reinecke's side; he said the gen­
eral's tireless efforts were responsible for the "present 
efficiency" of the NSF program. Then Keitel, perhaps be­
cause of Hitler's deteriorating condition, demonstrated 
a newly found independence; he announced that he would 
retain a small NSF Staff in OKW and requested that Bor­
mann keep this staff informed of all his direct dealings
27with the service chiefs=
Within a few days Bormann's frustration began to 
show, and Ruder, who was still over-confident, was the 
direct recipient of the party boss's wrath. On March 19 
Ruder had written a memorandum to Bormann recommending 
new concepts of a minor nature and asking for his boss's 
approval of the transfer of certain individuals to posi­
tions in the proposed new NSF Staff in the P-K; he pro­
posed that: a) Major Hess, who had been an NSFO under
^^BAK, Partei-Kanzlei, NS6 vorl. 144, Keitel to
Bormann, March l6 , 1945.
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Model, Harpe, and Schorner, head Section 1 (Political 
Leadership); b) First Lieutenant Ihlert, an SS Stand- 
art enfuhrer and a member of Reinecke's staff, should be 
Chief of Section 2 (Personnel and Organization); c) Sec­
tion 3 (Schooling) should be directed by Oberbannfuhrer 
Griesmayr; d) Oberbannfuhrer Noack, already representing 
the Propaganda Leadership on the work staff, should head 
Section 4 (Propaganda); and e) the Commandant of the NSFO 
School at Doberitz, Colonel Weller, should hold the re­
sponsibility for Section 5 (Teaching Staff). On the 20th 
Bormann scathed Ruder in the margins of the memorandum.
Next to Ruder's proposed changes to the Fuhrer Order, he 
wrote, "I wait 8 days, I again receive a corrected draft," 
and "Dreadful and dreadful ineptitude--psychologically 
stupid wording I" Concerning the personnel recommendations, 
he scribbled "Wagnerian music 11 Have you spoken to General 
Reinecke??" and "I refuse--! said it already simply enough 
--to handle these kinds of questions as long as the order
28is not signedl" Bormann was clearly agitated.
Reinecke, however, was currying favor. On the 19th 
Ruder had also belatedly informed his boss that he had 
talked to Reinecke a few days previously. Reinecke, he 
reported, asked him to tell Bormann that he had seen the
28 • • • •Ibid., Vorlage, Betrifft: Fuhrerbefehl uber
Bildung eines NS-Fuhrungsstabes beim Leiter der Partei- 
Kanzlei, March 191 1945» IIF, signed: Ruder, with Bor­
mann' s marginal comments.
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development coming and that he thought it was absolutely
correct. The general hoped that the P-K Leader's attitude
toward him had not changed because of all this, and as the
future Chief of the General Armed Forces Office he would
need Bormann's acceptance. Accordingly he wanted to talk
to the Leader of the P-K, but meanwhile he assured Bormann
that he would not stand in the way of the reorganization
and that he would support it fully. Concerning Keitel's
intent to retain his own NSF Staff, Reinecke said that he
had advised the Field Marshal against it. Reinecke stood
ready to disestablish his own staff and a r r a n g e  for Bormann
29
to take over some of his officers.
If Reinecke was cowed, Hengl was not, and it ap­
peared that the army's NSF Chief was beginning to play the 
same game he had played with the proposed Führer Order for 
an independent NSFO reporting channel. On March 20 Hengl, 
backed by Burgdorf, attacked the latest proposed Führer 
Order. He said it was superfluous in places and was liable 
to cause confusion. However, he offered no concrete recom­
mendations and did not submit a new version. He also added
30that General Burgdorf agreed with his point of view. The 
staff action involving this Führer Order had now been going
Ibid., Vorlage, Betrifft: Auflosung des NS-
Fuhrungsstabes der Wehrmacht. Rucksprache mit General 
Reinecke, March 19, 1945, IIF, signed: Ruder.
30Ibid., Vorschlag zum Entwurf Führer Befehl, 
March 20, 1945, signed: von Hengl, with handwritten
comments.
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on for over a month. Burgdorf had appeared as a strong 
supporter at first, but now, under Hengl's influence, he 
seemed to be retreating. Perhaps both were playing a 
double game which involved apparent cooperation and covert 
sabotage. We could now probably add anger to Bormann's 
list of problems, and to increase the P-K Leader's diffi­
culties, Alfred Rosenberg re-entered the fray after a long 
silence.
On March 23 Rosenberg sent Bormann a telegram 
charging that the P-K had been discussing questions of 
ideological schooling and training as part of its NSFO 
work. As "Deputy of the Führer for the Safeguarding of 
the National Socialist Weltanschauung," he requested that 
Bormann's Staff Chief brief him before any definite con­
clusions were reached so as to prevent double work. Add­
ing that a purely ideological piece of literature published 
by the NSF Staff of OKW, "The Volkisch Ideal," had not been 
submitted to him for comment, he asked Bormann to instruct
his subordinates to clear materials of definite ideological
31content with him. Five days later Rosenberg conversed 
with Bormann about another subject, but in the course of 
the conversation he again expressed displeasure over "The 
Volkisch Ideal" which was written by Griesmayr. He inti­
mated that Griesmayr, because of his deficient article.
March 23, 1945.
31Ibid., Telegram, Rosenberg to Bormann, FS 2056,
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should not be a member of the planned new staff in the
P-K; Rosenberg, of course, wanted to put one of his own
men there. Apparently, he no longer mentioned that he
wished to be kept informed of events as to prevent double
work, and one could suspect the telegram was a cover for
a different purpose; he wanted an inside man on Bormann's
32new staff and Bormann saw right through it.
Meanwhile, developments proved the duplicity of 
Reinecke. While making overtures to Bormann, he actually 
felt strongly embittered because Keitel had shown the 
Führer Order to him in "final form" without having previ­
ously informed him about what was developing. Passe told 
Friedrichs that he thought it had all been handled poorly. 
After Reinecke's many years of working with the P-K, this 
affair could have at least been handled more openly with 
Reinecke; as a minimum he could have been informed.
Friedrichs, of course, passed this on to Ruder, one of
33the principals in the affair. By now then, there was 
a rift growing in OKW between Keitel and Reinecke; members 
of the P-K were criticizing each other (and indirectly 
Bormann himself); but leading figures in OKH (Hengl and 
Burgdorf) had drawn together with the apparent goal of 
sabotaging the Führer Order.
^^Ibid., Aktenvermerk Fur Pg. Ruder, Betrifft: 
NSFO, March 28, 1945, signed: Bormann.
^^Ibid., Vermerk fur Pg. Ruder, March 26, 1945,
IIP, signed: Friedrichs.
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On March 29, 19451 the army's attack began. Major
Hess of Reinecke's staff informed the P-K that Colonel
Kaether of the army's NSF Staff had called OKW at 4:30 P.M.
It seems that the air force had transmitted the Führer
Order to its field units without comment, and Kaether
asked that the order should not be published at this time
without implementing regulations. It is unclear from this
whether the air force had made a horrendous mistake, Hitler
had signed the order, or whether sabotage was involved.
Nevertheless, Kaether reported that General Ritter von
Hengl proposed a conference of the three service NSF Chiefs
to be held within the next few days under Ruder's chairman- 
34ship. From all evidence it seems that Hengl had struck 
again! The proposed conference would further delay the 
staff process, and if he got together with his navy and 
air force counterparts, he could conceivably delay things 
a little longer and perhaps convert them to his way of 
thinking. Preparing and coordinating the necessary regu­
lations would also cause considerable delay, and asking 
Ruder to chair a tri-service conference would automatic­
ally increase Reinecke's bitter attitude toward the party
34Ibid., Vorlage (sent telephonically by Hess), 
Betrifft: NS-Fuhrung der Wehrmacht. Fuhrerbefehl vom
13*3»45« Auflosung des NS-Fuhrungsstabes beim OKW. (The 
date of 13.3«45 [March 13, 1945] cannot be construed as 
the date the order was published because as late as 
March 20, Hengl had attacked the draft order. There were 
so many versions of the proposed order that dates were 
assigned to keep them straight.)
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--a factor which would certainly not help the speedy pro­
cessing of the Führer Order; also it would further under­
cut OKW and increase the authority and status of OKH. With 
the end of the war in sight, just a little delay could mean 
that even in defeat the honor of the officer corps might be 
salvaged. All of this is conjecture, of course, but it 
fits neatly with General Albert Praun's comment in Chapter 
X that his good friend Hengl "took care of it." Additional 
justification for this theory was offered by Major Hess.
Hess said that as long as the planned Führer Order 
remained unissued. General Reinecke did not feel that he 
was the proper person to publish any implementing regula­
tions since only the P-K appeared to be competent now in 
this sphere. Moreover, Hess believed that an "interregnum" 
now existed because Reinecke's authority had been subverted, 
and the P-K, since Hitler had not signed the order, did not 
yet have the authority to issue regulations for NSF work. 
This situation had to be righted soon, Hess said, since 
the three NSF Staffs remained without guidance, but he 
agreed that regulations were needed to explain properly 
the authority of the Leader of the P-K since the Führer 
Order was too vague oh the subject. It did not even suf­
fice as a skeletal order for establishing uniformity in 
the three services, he added. Hess proposed that Ruder 
chair the conference as suggested by Hengl on the follow­
ing Sunday evening so that it would not be necessary to
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ask General Reinecke to get back into the NSFO business.
He added that the publication of the order was a pressing 
issue. Obviously, Hess was either an innocent tool of 
Hengl's or else he was involved in the delaying action, 
and Bormann's comments on the margin of this report, 
dated March 29, are highly significant.
In fact, Bormann's comments meant the end of the 
attempt to replace the NSF Staff of the Wehrmacht with a 
P-K NSF Staff. The party chief wrote: "1 request that
General von Hengl leave this order alone." As for the 
recommended conference, he wrote: "This meeting will not
take place." Next to Hess's comment that an order could 
not go out without implementing regulations, he telegraph­
ically noted:
Therefore, leave it alonel In the present situ- 
ation--tanks at Korbach/Hessen, at the Bavarian 
border, Raab front broken through in Upper Silesia, 
heaviest fighting and deep penetrations. It would 
be nonsense if we change our organization and talk 
about it would no longer get to the troops who are 
everywhere on the move: To give orders which can­
not get to the troops at this time is uselessl35
This effectively killed the whole issue. Bormann's frus­
tration and pragmatism, buttressed by resignation, over­
rode his hope and determination. His was a "What's the 
Use?" attitude. Hengl's latest delaying effort was not 
even necessary because Bormann and the allies saved what 
remained of the tarnished honor of the officer corps: On
35lbid.
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April 2, 19^51 Bormann wrote his wife about the despair
which gripped everyone and said that no one saw any sense
in further resistance. Some people, however, could not
quit yet. Lieutenant Colonel Ihlert of Reinecke's staff
wanted to talk to Bormann about his boss who had given up
37and "now did nothing whatsoever." This was not exactly 
true; Reinecke did do something.
On April 9 Reinecke, still the Chief of the NSF 
Staff of the Armed Forces, told the Wehrmacht NSFOs that 
the fateful hour had come. They could now forget instruc­
tions from higher headquarters and the "paper war"; only 
deeds were now important, and anyone who could walk and
shoot had to fight. Finally, he placed the fate of Ger-
38many in the hands of the NSFOs, but the prevention of 
party domination of the army in the final days of the war, 
except for posterity, represented a final but useless vic­
tory of tradition over nazism.
In December 1938 General Fritsch, with complete 
resignation, had told Hassell that Hitler was Germany's
destiny for good or evil, and that if he fell into the
39abyss, he would drag everyone else down with him. In
*^6Trevor-Roper, Bormann Letters, p. 197»
^^BAK, Sammlung Schumacher 367, Vorlage, Betrifft: 
NS-Fuhrung in Heei, Luftwaffe und Marine, April 10, 1945, 
II, signed: Walkenhorst.
^®NAM, T77, Roll 783, Frame 5511297- 
3 9Hassell, Diaries, p. 23, entry of December iB,
1938.
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the spring of 19^5 Hitler and the German army did go 
into the abyss together, but the army which disappeared 
did so without a nazi Politruk at the helm. Prussian/ 
German military traditionalism won the fight, but it was 
useless. Nazism died quickly, and the German army, led 
by its commanders, marched into the allied prisoner of 
war cages. A few short years later, the German military 
tradition would live again--but without nazism. In May 
1945 the German army ceased to exist and the allies as­
sumed responsibility for the Prisoners of War and for 
Germany.
CHAPTER XII 
EPILOGUE
Prisoners of War 
Even before the German defeat, the U.S. Army con­
ducted surveys based on Prisoner of War interrogations and 
questionnaires. These studies confirmed many of the thoughts 
party members had of soldier morale, defeatist thinking, and 
the effect of the NSFOs on the troops. At the same time, 
however, they showed that the nazis were often dead wrong.
A statistical opinion poll, based mainly on system­
atic analysis of front line interrogations of POWs and 
later detailed psychological interviews in rear areas, was 
cross-checked against captured enemy documents, reports of 
secret agents, recaptured allied military personnel, and 
observations of front line combat observers. This poll 
showed conclusions which tend to support present-day wit­
nesses on the NSFO. For example, until March 194$, a ma­
jority of the prisoners held strong loyalties to Hitler 
personally, and the German soldier generally remained 
steadfast in combat. It was not until the failure of the 
Ardennes Offensive in late 1944 that the psychological
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reserves of the German army became exhausted. Still, no 
large-scale surrenders took place until February and March 
19^5* Shortly after the Normandy invasion in June 1944 by 
Anglo-American forces, the allies fixed hardcore fanatical 
nazis--those who believed wholeheartedly in nazi ideals-- 
at only 10 to 15 per cent. This rate subsequently proved 
accurate. Even when soldiers despaired of ultimate vic­
tory, resistance continued at least partly because of 
trust in Hitler rather than a fanatical belief in the nazi 
party. Faith in secret weapons only captured a minority.^
Another interesting factor was that defeatism was more
2
widespread at higher levels than at lower. These find­
ings confirm those of present-day witnesses.
Another study also determined that desertion and 
surrender by individuals or groups remained insignificant 
in the west until the very end when no other choice re­
mained. The authors of the study believed that this fact 
was caused, not by nazi convictions, but rather because 
of the demands of the social organization of the army. 
When this organization met the soldier's primary social 
needs, little disintegration occurred. When the primary
M. I. Gurfein and Morris Janowitz, "Trends in 
Wehrmach'. Morale," in Propaganda in War and Crisis: Ma­
terials for American Policy  ^ ed. Daniel Lerner (New York : 
George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1951)i PP* 200-206.
2
Richard H. S. Crossman and others, "Standing 
Directive for Psychological Warfare Against Members of 
the German Armed Forces. June 1944," Propaganda in War 
and Crisis, p. 24?.
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social group held together, allied propaganda largely 
failed, but when communications broke down, leaders were 
lost, personnel were depleted, and serious breakdowns of 
the food supply and medical care occurred, last ditch 
resistance crumbled. Deserters were mainly those who 
could not adjust to the primary group. This was more 
important than any political dissidence, and most de­
serters were "Volkdeutsche" (Austrians, Sudeten Germans, 
etc.), Poles and Russians in the German army, or men who 
had shown anti-social behavior in civilian life or had 
criminal records. The conclusions showed that German 
soldiers had little inclination for politics or strategy. 
Most of the deterioration took place in hastily formed 
units--thirty-five men from one battalion who were inter­
rogated came originally from fifteen different units 1 
Further, most defeatist talk among soldiers arose from 
fear for the welfare of families, not politics. One sol­
dier told his interrogator that since the allies had occu­
pied his hometown, he no longer had any reason to fight. 
This also showed that the centuries-old trend toward par­
ticularism had not died in Germany. Many men stayed 
loyal because of "honor," and they eagerly accepted dom­
ination by their officers. Suppression of their superego 
allowed the primary group to function, and the traditional 
military code had a considerable impact on their thinking.
According to the study, much depended on the per­
sonality of the leader, and pep talks and indoctrination
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counted for little. The leader was a father figure--both 
a model to emulate and a protector; in the eyes of the 
soldiers he was supposed to be all-powerful and benevolent. 
Despite nazi efforts at social leveling, the soldiers 
hardly ever commented on the differences in privileges 
between officers and men. As for the influence of offi­
cers above the company level, they were just too remote 
to play any significant role on the attitude of the com­
mon soldier. Except for the small hard-core, most of the 
soldiers had little interest in the nazi political system. 
They were apathetic toward the NSFOs or thought them a 
joke. However, even those who denounced nazism had some­
thing good to say about Hitler. They attributed his errors 
to dishonest advisors who kept the truth from him. Older 
men who had lived through the inflation and depression of 
the Weimar period praised Hitler for providing gainful 
employment while those between twenty and thirty-five 
praised him for his strength and masculinity. Younger men 
tended more toward fanaticism and saw Hitler as a father 
figure who restrained their dangerous impulses. Most of 
the soldiers claimed that they either slept through NSFO
3
indoctrination periods or paid little attention. These 
findings confirm many of the statements by present-day wit­
nesses as well as views of several party officials during
3
Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion 
and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," Propaganda in War 
and Crisis, pp. 365-^04.
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the war, and there can be hardly any doubt that ultimately 
nazism fought a losing battle against military tradition­
alism. As Field Marshal Erich von Manstein wrote of the 
German soldiers in his book, Lost Victories, " . . .  the
tradition of self-denial and comradeship could withstand
4
the hardest of tests," and "The German fighting troops, 
convinced of their superiority as soldiers, stood their 
ground in the most desperate situations, and their courage 
and self-sacrifice did much to compensate for the enemy's 
numerical superiority."^ Because of the Prussian/German 
military tradition, the NSFO never became an outright 
party commissar empowered to dictate or veto the military 
actions taken by commanders.
4
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, 
trans. Anthony G . Powell (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,
1958), p. 357.
^Ibid., p. 44l. Since Field Marshal Erich von 
Lewinski gen. von Manstein died in June 19731 his son, 
Rudiger von Manstein, graciously permitted this author 
to quote from his father's excellent book.
CHAPTER XIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
The German officer corps showed a duality in its 
thoughts on nazism. Willing to support the nazi state and 
commit the Reichswehr to the nazi cause, the army's leaders 
did not want nazism to dominate their traditional preserve. 
They held Prussian traditions higher than nazi principles, 
yet army custom encouraged political and spiritual indoc­
trination in order to increase the military effectiveness 
of the soldiers. Still the army prided itself on political 
noninvolvement and considered itself the rock upon which 
the state was built. Before 19l4 honor stood as the high­
est principle for officers, but during World War 1 obedi­
ence became even more important. During the Weimar period 
Seeckt turned obedience into the highest principle of the 
Reichswehr, and the aristocratic-thinking officer corps 
even more so than before was thoroughly nonpolitical. Be­
fore the national socialists came to power, however, the 
nazis had already made considerable inroads into the ranks 
of the officer corps because Hitler offered the officers
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the lure of nationalism, a powerful army, and a return to 
German greatness.
When Hitler became Chancellor, he held an advantage 
over the nonpolitical and obedient officers. By allowing 
the army to continue to consider itself as the pillar of 
the state and in return for subduing the lawless elements 
of the party through the SA purge, the Chancellor had a 
good chance of retaining the officers' continued support. 
When Hitler assumed supreme power and army members swore 
a personal oath to him, the Führer benefited from two of 
the highest traditions of the officer corps--unconditional 
obedience bound by an officer's honor through the sacred 
oath. Hitler realized the army's power, so he bided his 
time while allowing the officers' duality of thought to 
further the cause of nazism as much as possible. Thus 
both sides compromised, and divisions within the officer 
corps worked to Hitler's advantage. The generals believed 
they held more power than the party, and, therefore, many 
thought the army could remain immune from undue nazi pene­
tration. However, admirers of the Führer helped the nazis, 
and others allowed sufficient nazification to promote es­
prit de corps or to show Hitler that the army supported 
the nazi state. Thus, while Hitler expanded the armed 
forces, passed out promotions, tore off the "shackles of 
Versailles," and refrained from interfering in military 
affairs, nazification moved onward. When checked, the
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party halted, but when resistance faded, it advanced.
Hitler told his friends during the war that he had always 
intended to avoid conflict with the army until he had per­
meated it with nazism and said that his purge of the SA 
masked his revolutionary plans for Germany. He lulled the 
generals into thinking the reign of the party had ceased 
after the SA purge while expansion of the army began to 
change the political and social composition of the junior 
officer and enlisted ranks, members of which, unlike many 
of the generals, identified themselves more closely with 
nazism. The generals, meanwhile, underestimated Hitler 
and the party until 1938 when they abruptly discovered 
their lack of real power.
In 1938 Hitler began the subjugation of the offi­
cer corps while his prestige soared in Germany. He sacked 
the Defense Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army on flimsy pretexts, personally assumed command of the 
Wehrmacht, and purged top-ranking officers. His diplomatic 
victories and the doubts of some generals concerning the 
reliability of the troops checked their plans for revolt, 
and his knack for diplomatic success and military conquest 
in spite of their advice made them look ridiculous even in 
their own eyes. As a result the new Commander-in-Chief 
could now intimidate the army's leaders, and he no longer 
hesitated to cast aspersions on their traditions. It ap­
peared that control of the armed forces, under Hitler's
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direction of course, could go to either Himmler or the 
Party Chancellory. In fact it began to gravitate to both. 
The Waffen-SS began to expand and the party penetrated 
deeper into the army.
The invasion of the Soviet Union in ig4l opened 
new opportunities for the SS and the party with equivalent 
loss of influence and prestige for the army. While the SS 
got the best of German youth, the army became implicated 
in SS criminal action. Hitler declared nazi ideology all 
important in the struggle with the communist-dominated 
Soviet army, and traditional theories and ideals began to 
fall by the wayside while some members of the officer corps 
continued to plot against the Führer. Hitler, counting on 
obedience, took full, personal responsibility for viola­
tions of international rules of warfare; because of the 
barbaric methods employed in the U.S.S.R., the Prussian 
chivalry, honor, and morality of the German army was under­
mined. However, obedience reached a new high. When the 
army in Russia began to meet reverses. Hitler blamed the 
generals, assumed personal command of the German army, and 
established a new nazi method of command. The possession 
of nazi spirit now became essential for commanders.
In 1942 the army established the Wehrgeistige 
Fuhrung program, and Hitler purged generals who failed to 
satisfy him in combat. In February 1943 the Soviet army 
annihilated the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, and other
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disasters in North Africa and Sicily quickly followed.
Bombs fell in increasing numbers on Germany while the SS 
carried on its grisly business of human roundups, incar­
ceration, and extermination. In an atmosphere of fear and 
defeat, the Betreuung Offizier of the Wehrgeistige Fuhrung 
program became important both for improving morale and for 
nazifying the army. However, resistance to nazification 
continued in spite of the work of B.G.s and nazi fanatics 
like General Schorner who established the concept of unit­
ing tradition and nazism. The nazi enthusiasts used this 
theory in an attempt to win over those who resisted nazi­
fication, but Hitler, influenced by the SS, party, and the 
army's own example, saw a need for greatly strengthening 
nazi ideology in the Wehrmacht and personally ordered the 
institution of NSFOs.
Hitler instituted the NSF system in December 19^3 
in order to make every soldier a nazi and to develop a will 
to victory by means of political indoctrination by the NSFO. 
The Führer established a special staff structure to handle 
the program and placed supposed nazi generals in charge.
The party and Bormann received an inordinately large share 
in the development and control of the NSF system, but the 
responsibility for nazification of the army remained in 
the hando of the commander. Bormann held final authority 
on what went to Hitler for decision concerning NSF, but 
the military insisted that the NSFO would not become a
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Politruk. The commander, who had the total responsibility, 
used the NSFO as his political advisor and as a nazi propa­
gandist. Resistance, confusion, and sabotage marked the 
program until the end of the war, and regardless of direc­
tives on prerequisites, selection, position, and duties of 
NSFOs, Hitler and the hierarchy repeatedly had to call for 
the replacement of unsuitable NSFOs and frequently had to 
redefine their position and duties. The armed forces with 
party help set up schools to train NSFOs, and great propa­
ganda efforts too\ place to win over the officer corps to 
the support of NSF. The propaganda attempted to show that 
historically nazism grew out of the Prussian tradition and 
that the German officer, therefore, combined in himself 
the best of the past and the present. However, these ef­
forts largely failed, and party members either fumed and 
complained or expected the death sentence or the passage 
of time to stop the army's resistance. While the nazi 
bureaucrats showed their wariness of and frustrations at 
the army's resistance to party domination, they expected 
the NSFO to break through it. Having contempt for the 
military traditions, party members nevertheless cooperated 
with the Wehrmacht at all levels since they expected the 
NSFO to bring the army into line.
After an abortive coup by disgruntled officers on 
July 20, 1944, which included the attempted assassination 
of Hitler, the NSF concept began to change. NSF/OKW
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believed the last resistance to the NSF program had ceased 
with the July 20th aftermath, but this staff would end its 
days discredited. Hitler himself made most of the changes, 
but Bormann always stood in the background. The Führer 
established a confused special channel for NSF work which 
went beyond the sphere of the immediate commander, and he 
instructed those troop leaders who believed they could no 
longer lead as the Führer expected to find an individual 
of any rank who believed himself capable and to appoint 
him troop leader. The NSF system summoned the army to 
wage a nazi revolution against the Soviet revolutionaries. 
Hitler even appointed the NSFO as the tactical assistant 
of the commander, placed ideology above tactical consider­
ations, and made the NSFO co-responsible with the commander 
for the ideological battle. However, these actions made 
little difference. In the last days of the war when the 
party attempted to take one last giant step toward control­
ling the NSF program, army leaders, in an atmosphere of 
confusion and recrimination, managed to scuttle the attempt. 
Surprisingly, it was Bormann who finally called off the po­
litical battle against the officer corps, and the army of 
the Third Reich surrendered under commanders who retained 
their traditional authority.
Conclusions
The permeation of the German army with nazism pro­
gressed steadily from 1933 to 194$. Assisted by the duality
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of thinking within the officer corps, the custom of in­
doctrination of soldiers, the desire for spirited soldiers, 
and obedience to Hitler bound by oath, the party had little 
difficulty in beginning its infiltration of the army. As 
the Führer outmaneuvered the generals and gained in pres­
tige, he increasingly subjugated the army to his will as 
many of the generals vacillated or withdrew into the back­
ground. Some supported him wholeheartedly; some accepted 
their fate with resignation; others bogged down into inde­
cision; but many resisted in either active or passive ways. 
Most officers, even when they were nazi supporters or NSFOs, 
believed in traditional military concepts. Even when the 
reason for resistance meant only the desire to prevent in­
terference in the military sphere by the unprofessional 
party politicians, opposition to nazism found its raison 
d'etre in upholding traditional Prussian/German military 
methods and ideals. Thus the struggle always signified 
one of tradition versus nazi ideology, or the military 
versus the party rather than the officer corps necessarily 
against Hitler. Within this context the military hierarchy 
compromised to the extent it had to, and used the concept 
of spiritual leadership to improve morale and the will to 
fight. The NSFO represented such a compromise, and he was 
touted as exemplifying the merger of tradition and nazism 
and was expected to win over the officer corps to the nazi 
cause. However, this largely failed because the response
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from the officer corps was a double procedure--an official 
program and an unofficial one. The corps paid lip service 
to the official line while many commanders went their own 
way--ignoring the NSF system, appointing political offi­
cers who thought as they did or who would do as they were 
told, or in some cases sabotaging the program. Meanwhile, 
the majority of the soldiers were simply not interested. 
Mostly apathy marked their response even when they approved 
of Hitler or nazism in principle. Thus a lack of unified 
support for the NSFO ensured his lack of success. Ulti­
mately, the soldiers' loyalties were to Hitler himself as 
Chief of State and Supreme War Lord and to tradition.
All the moves toward subjugation and nazification 
of the army, whether by Hitler or the party, were made 
opportunistically or as drives for personal power, but 
they were within the hazy ideological concepts preached 
by the nazis. Prior to Stalingrad these moves were de­
signed to win over the last bastion of resistance to the 
nazi state--a force which could if it wished put a quick 
halt to nazism; after Stalingrad these moves, to include 
the establishment of the NSFO, were desperate attempts to 
win the war. Having encountered disasters to German arms. 
Hitler needed something to put a fighting spirit back into 
his soldiers. Terming the war with the Soviet Union an 
ideological fight to the finish. Hitler found the use of 
Soviet methods appropriate, but even he could not force a
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Politruk down the throats of members of the officer corps.
He created a pale imitation of the Politruk, and mollified 
the officer corps by allowing the commander to remain su­
preme. Then he used the NSFO to peddle nazism thereby at­
tempting to forge an army determined to follow his own will 
for the sake of defending the homeland from the ideological 
enemy. Hitler capitalized on this by allowing the NSFO to 
stand as the great merger of tradition and nazism--the 
union of the old and the new in an ideological war— but 
this failed owing to the resistance of the traditionalists. 
The nazi hierarchy pitifully overestimated its abilities to 
capture the minds and hearts of millions in the armed forces 
and grossly underestimated the talents of alleged nazi gen­
erals and officers in frustrating its designs. Even party 
members frequently showed an aversion toward upsetting age- 
old traditions, and the worst of them, Heinrich Himmler, 
showed a certain reluctance to the establishment of Politruk 
methods. When the final choice came to tradition or nazism, 
the officer corps and even some high nazis opted for the 
former, even if it was too late. At this point some conjec­
ture can be added. The nazis blamed the collapse of the 
home front for the defeat in 1918, and the comment by the 
nazi (Major Schonwalder, Chapter X) who said that this time 
the war would be lost by the officer corps at the front 
showed that had not nazism been thoroughly discredited, a 
new "stab in the back" legend might have been fostered for
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"another go" at it later. In fact such a legend does 
exist. Several former officers have told this author that 
one of the reasons for defeat was that portions of the of­
ficer corps betrayed their country by defeatism, sabotage, 
and the "20th of July." This attitude suggests that if 
only the officer corps had put its faith in Hitler and 
had cooperated with the NSFO, things might have been dif­
ferent. It also demonstrated that the NSFO program indeed 
enjoyed some scattered successes and perhaps considerable 
support, to a point, but overall the NSFO was a grandiose 
failure. The odds against his success were against him 
from the beginning.
The NSFO, of course, could have been a Politruk 
from the beginning. However, the Reich in December of 
1943 did not yet seem, to Hitler at least, to be verging 
on total defeat, and the Führer may have seen such a step 
as unnecessary. A drastic measure flaunting all German 
military tradition might have alienated even those gen­
erals who wholeheartedly supported him as it seemed to do 
in February and March 19^5. In the midst of a world war, 
Hitler needed his professional officers more than ever, 
and he would certainly not push the army into opposition 
by one extraordinary act which would have even violated 
his own Führer Prinzip. The army still retained the power 
to topple him if it had the courage and the will to do, so 
as some members of the officer corps demonstrated in the
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near-successful coup seven months later. Full powers for 
the NSFO would also have given Bormann excessive power 
which could have endangered Hitler's own position, but 
retention of the traditional supremacy of the commander 
with a toe-hold on him by the party neatly balanced army, 
party, a growing SS, and Goring's military formations. 
From the army's viewpoint, the NSFO represented no imme­
diate or great danger as long as the commander retained 
full control, but to the party, led by Bormann, the po­
litical officer signified an important step toward party 
domination of the German army. When the status of the 
commander or traditional staff concepts finally became 
endangered, army leaders belatedly managed to undermine 
the party's efforts.
After July 20, 1^44, Hitler believed he had 
smashed the army's resistance, and under the pressure of 
events--attack on the Reich itself and the possibility of 
defeat--he gave more power to the NSFO, increased Himm­
ler 's authority, and created para-military formations 
under the dual control of Himmler and Bormann. These 
opportunistic acts fitted neatly into the power juggling 
exercise and signified further nazification of the army 
during a period of lessening, but not disappearing, re­
sistance from the proponents of tradition, and Hitler 
assumedly retained control of events until near the end.
When the party made its final move to gain full 
powers for itself (or Bormann) and thus accomplish its
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desired sway over the army, Hitler was fast losing control 
of events because his emotional condition had begun to re­
move him from the position of supreme arbiter. In the 
chaos of Germany in March and April of 19^5i "counter cur­
rents" in OKH, confusion everywhere, and Bormann himself 
then gave the coup de grace to the planned party takeover. 
The basis of the nazi philosophy— emotion--finally lost to 
tradition and pragmatism. Tradition won a useless victory. 
The only consolation the German military traditionalists 
may have had was in witnessing the death of nazism and the 
later rebirth of a German army free of the nazi party and 
tied to much of the old tradition.
APPENDIX
LIST OF LECTURES
These lectures were delivered at the First NSFO 
Course at Krossinsee, March 8-21, 1944.
March 8 "Duties of NS-Leadership"
General Reinecke
"Party and Armed Forces"
P.M. Passe
"The NSFO, his Position in Relation 
to the Commander"
Capt. Kolle
"Schooling of the NSFO"
Capt. Presting
"Cultural Work in the Armed Forces" 
P.M. Cerff
March 9 "Activity of the Party in the War" 
P.M. Stredele
"The Historical Mission of the Party" 
P.M. Ruder
March 10 "The European Revolution. Basis for 
our Weltanschauung"
P.M. Stellrccht
"Culture and Weltanschauung"
P.M. Strobel
March 11 "The Reich Idea in the Past and Present" 
P.M. Baumler
"The Reich as a Socialistic Order of 
Life"
P.M. Schacht
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March 13
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"The Onslought of the Steppe People 
against Europe. Historical Survey 
up to the Present"
P.M. Springenschtnid
"The Fate of Germany Lies in the East" 
P.M. Eckhardt
March l4 "Marxism and Bolshevism" 
P.M. Leistritz
March I5 "Bolshevist Propaganda against Germany 
and the German Soldiers"
1/LT Ellenbeck
"Bolshevist Propaganda" (with films) 
P.M. Rudolf
"The Political Situation"
P.M. Schwarz von Bergk
March I6 "Work Activity--the policy of Alien 
Nations"
P.M. Gohdes
"German Social Policy"
P.M. Hapfauer
"German Socialism"
P.M. Borger
March I7 "The Practical Handling of Propaganda 
Measures"
P.M. Rostiflr
March I8 "The Piratical State--the U.S.A., 
Historical Survey"
P.M. Schonemann
"England the enemy of Europe"
P.M. Pfeffer
Discussion of "Troop Betreuung" 
Colonel von Beguelin 
P.M. Lafferentz 
P.M. Kockmanovsky
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March 20 "Jewry and Freemasonry as the wire­
pullers of Plutocracy"
P.M. Otto
"German Nationality Policy"
P.M. Kundt
"The National Socialist Teaching on 
Race and its Political Enemy"
P.M. Gross
March 21 "The Military Situation"
1/LT Ziervogel
"The Results of the Course" 
(closing speech)
General Reinecke
Note: "P.M." stands for Party Member.
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